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INTRODUCTION 
When Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 1982,1 one of the many powers vested in the new court was 
the power to review decisions of the U.S. Court of International 
Trade, also a new federal court at the time.2  The statutory provision 
conferring this jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5), is deceptively 
simple, stating merely that the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over any “appeal from a final decision of the United 
States Court of International Trade.”  However, as reflected in the 
Federal Circuit’s international trade jurisprudence of the last three 
years, reviewed in this article, this area of jurisdiction encompasses 
scores of distinct and difficult issues arising from the federal 
government’s regulation of international trade.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, given the steady increase over the years in both the 
volume of trade across the United States border and the level of 
complexity of the trade laws, the Federal Circuit’s caseload in this 
area has grown beyond levels anticipated by Congress in 1982.3 
In reviewing the Federal Circuit’s recent international trade 
jurisprudence, this article stresses three related themes.  The first is 
the standard of review applied by the court, which varies depending 
on the type of government regulatory action under review.  This 
standard has not been static in recent years—particularly with respect 
to certain determinations of the U.S. Customs Service.4  The second 
                                                          
 1. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982).  Prior to enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act, appellate 
jurisdiction over international trade cases resided with the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals.  See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 
13. 
 2. Congress created the U.S. Court of International Trade through the Customs 
Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980). 
 3. The Senate Report accompanying the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982 states the Senate’s anticipation that the structure and jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit “will produce a reasonable caseload.”  S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6, reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16.  According to the Senate Report, during Fiscal Year 1981, 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals terminated thirty cases involving “Customs, 
commerce, and international trade.”  Id.  By contrast, in the most recent twelve-
month period for which the Federal Circuit has provided this figure (ending 
September 30, 2002), it terminated a total of 128 international trade cases—more 
than a four-fold increase.  See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANN. 
REP. 2002, tbl.B-8, available at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep02.pdf (last 
modified Apr. 22, 2003).   
 4. As of March 1, 2003, the U.S. Customs Service was combined with certain 
other government agencies and renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection, a unit of the new Department of Homeland Security.  See Customs & 
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theme is the remarkably high rate of reversal of the Court of 
International Trade, as compared to other areas of Federal Circuit 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Indeed, the court’s own statistics reveal a 
consistently high reversal rate—in one recent twelve-month period 
even exceeding fifty percent.5  The third theme is the intensely 
litigated nature of many of the international trade disputes before 
the Federal Circuit, and the attendant commercial uncertainty for 
interested parties—particularly in cases involving the trade remedy 
laws, where final disposition of a case may follow multiple remands 
for reconsideration by the U.S. Department of Commerce or the U.S. 
International Trade Commission and drag on for years.6 
For purposes of this Article, the Federal Circuit’s international 
trade cases over the last three years are divided into three broad 
categories: the U.S. customs laws, the U.S. trade remedy laws, and 
trade and the environment.7 
I. U.S. CUSTOMS LAWS 
Even within the specialized niche of U.S. customs laws, the Federal 
Circuit is called upon to consider a rich and diverse array of issues, 
and the period from 2000 through 2002 was no exception.  If 
anything, changes prompted by the Supreme Court in longstanding 
rules governing the standard of review made this a particularly 
dynamic and unpredictable period for litigants before the Federal 
Circuit.  The discussion below begins with the most heavily litigated 
area of customs law—questions of classification under the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”)8—and 
                                                          
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, at http://www. 
customs.ustreas.gov./xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/cbp.xml (last visited May 14, 
2003). 
 5. For the twelve-month period ended September 30, 2002, the Federal Circuit 
reversed some aspect of twenty-six percent of the international trade cases 
terminated during that same period; for the twelve-month period ended March 31, 
2001, the figure is twenty-eight percent; and for the period ended September 30, 
2002, the figure is a remarkable fifty-four percent (as compared to an overall reversal 
rate of fifteen percent).  See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANN. 
REP. 2002, tbl.B-8, available at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep02.pdf (last 
modified Apr. 22, 2003). 
 6. Review of international trade decisions by the Supreme Court is very rare, so 
as a practical matter, final disposition of an international trade dispute arising under 
U.S. law is virtually always by the Federal Circuit; several notable exceptions are 
discussed in the Article. 
 7. This Article discusses only published decisions of the Federal Circuit, 
representing the vast majority of the court’s international trade decisions over the 
three-year review period. 
 8. The HTSUS is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202, but is not published in the Code.  
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).  
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 3007, the HTSUS is published, as annotated for statistical 
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moves on to issues surrounding the appraisal of imported 
merchandise, duty drawback, final assessment of duties and other 
charges owed on entries of merchandise, and other issues affecting 
the flow of goods and people across the U. S. border.  The discussion 
below also reviews the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence over the last 
three years with respect to the so-called Harbor Maintenance Tax, an 
area characterized during this period by a series of hotly contested 
disputes.  As detailed below, over the last three years, the Federal 
Circuit frequently reversed the Court of International Trade. 
A. Tariff Classification 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States,9 
upon remand from the Supreme Court,10 marked the end of an 
intensely litigated dispute and a turning point in the court’s 
jurisprudence concerning the level of deference owed to Customs 
classification decisions.  Haggar Apparel involved a Customs decision 
under the “maquiladora” provision of the HTSUS, which allows a 
partial exemption from import duties for certain U.S.-origin articles 
that have been assembled or subjected to “operations incidental to 
the assembly process” abroad.11  The dispute arose from a refund 
proceeding for Customs duties imposed on Haggar Apparel’s imports 
of men’s pants, assembled in Mexico with U.S.-origin parts, and 
“permapressed” prior to importation.12  Haggar Apparel claimed that 
permapressing was an operation “incidental to the assembly 
process”13 and, thus, that its men’s pants qualified for a partial duty 
exemption under HTSUS 9802.00.80.14  Customs, however, denied 
Haggar Apparel’s claim pursuant to a regulation, 19 C.F.R. 
§ 10.16(c), listing examples of operations not considered incidental 
to assembly for purposes of subheading 9802.00.80.15  One of the 
listed operations was “chemical treatment of components or 
                                                          
reporting purposes, by the U.S. International Trade Commission. See U.S. 
International Trade Commission, HTSUS, available at http://www.dataweb. 
usitc.gov/SCRIPTS/tariff/toc.html (last modified Apr. 15, 2003). 
 9. 222 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 10. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999). 
 11. Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1338-39.  The exemption applies to “Articles . . . 
assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components, the product of the 
United States, which . . . (c) have not been advanced in value or improved in 
condition abroad except by being assembled and except by operations incidental to 
the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating and painting.”  Id. (quoting 
HTSUS, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, Subheading 9802.00.80). 
 12. Id. at 1338. 
 13. Id. at 1339. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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assembled articles to impart new characteristics, such as . . . 
permapressing . . . .”16  Following a protest proceeding,17 Haggar 
Apparel challenged Customs’ decision in the Court of International 
Trade, which held that 19 C.F.R. § 10.16(c) does conflict with the 
plain language of the HTSUS because it is too narrowly drawn, 
denying the allowance with respect to certain assembly operations 
within the scope of the statute.18  Accordingly, the Court of 
International Trade found that the regulation was not entitled to 
Chevron deference.19  Customs appealed to the Federal Circuit, which 
affirmed the lower court’s decision.20  Customs then petitioned the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.21  The Supreme Court granted 
the writ, and reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding that 
HTSUS 9802.00.80 was ambiguous and, thus, that Chevron deference 
was indeed owed to Customs.22  The Supreme Court, however, did not 
decide whether 19 C.F.R. § 10.16(c) constituted a reasonable reading 
of the statute, leaving that issue for evaluation by the Federal Circuit 
on remand.23 
In applying Chevron principles on remand, the Federal Circuit 
rejected Haggar Apparel’s arguments concerning Congress’s intent, 
instead agreeing with Customs that “the statute permits the so-called 
‘categorical’ or ‘qualitative’ analysis adopted by Customs.”24 The 
permitted analysis involved the delineation, by regulation, of 
examples of value-added operations are not considered “incidental to 
                                                          
 16. 19 C.F.R. § 10.16(c)(4) (2002). 
 17. See Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1339 (noting that Haggar Apparel followed 
the protest and review procedures set out in 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1994)). 
 18. Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States, 938 F. Supp. 868, 874 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1996). 
 19. See id. at 875 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  As later explained by the Federal Circuit, prior 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Haggar Apparel, the Federal Circuit or the Court 
of International Trade never applied Chevron deference to a Customs’ interpretation 
of a tariff heading.  Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1343 (citing Universal Elecs. Inc. v. 
United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491-93 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and Rollerblade, Inc. v. United 
States, 112 F.3d 481, 484 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  The Chevron standard is used to analyze 
regulations that administrative agencies make pursuant to their rulemaking 
authority.  Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1340.  The standard first asks whether 
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and if so then the 
investigation stops; however, if “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue” then the court asks “whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44). 
 20. Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997), vacated 
by United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999). 
 21. Id., cert. granted, United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 524 U.S. 981 (1998). 
 22. Haggar Apparel, 526 U.S. at 380.    
 23. Id. at 397. 
 24. Haggar Apparel, 222 F.3d at 1341. 
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the assembly process” for purposes of subheading 9802.00.80.25  The 
Federal Circuit also rejected Haggar Apparel’s contentions as to the 
preferred analytical framework in implementing subheading 
9802.00.80.26  The court held that a judicial determination of which 
approach best reflects Congressional intent would, given the broad 
delegation of power, usurp the agency’s authority to implement the 
intent of Congress in the first instance.27  Upon concluding that 19 
C.F.R. § 10.16(c) constituted a permissible interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute, the Federal Circuit also upheld Customs’ 
underlying application of the regulation in its finding that 
“permapressing” was an operation not “incidental to the assembly 
process.”28 
In a companion decision to Haggar Apparel—Levi Strauss & Co. v. 
United States29—the Federal Circuit also affirmed Customs’ reliance on 
19 C.F.R. § 10.16 to determine whether merchandise assembled 
outside the United States from U.S.-origin components qualified for a 
partial duty exemption under subheading 9802.00.80.30  In this 
instance, the merchandise was denim fabric shipped to Guatemala 
for assembly and “stonewashing” prior to U.S. importation.31  The 
procedural history of Levi Strauss was identical to that of Haggar 
Apparel,32 and the court incorporated by reference its analysis in 
Haggar Apparel.33 
In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. United States,34 the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
tariff classification decision of the Court of International Trade 
regarding certain synthetic organic coloring matter, known as 
“PERGASCRIPTS,” used to produce carbonless copy paper.35  Ciba-
Geigy sought to overturn Customs’ classification of PERGASCRIPTS 
as “synthetic organic coloring matter” under HTSUS Heading 3204, 
arguing instead for classification as “ink” under Heading 3215.36  
                                                          
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1342. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 222 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 30. Levi Strauss, 222 F.3d at 1346. 
 31. Id. at 1345. 
 32. The underlying Customs ruling was that the merchandise at issue did not fall 
under subheading 9802.00.80 because the processing operations, performed outside 
the country, were not incidental to the assembly process. Id. at 1345-46. Customs’ 
decision was affirmed first by the Court of International Trade, then by the Federal 
Circuit, and reversed by the Supreme Court. 
 33. Id. at 1346-47. 
 34. 223 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 35. Id. at 1369. 
 36. Id. 
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Applying a de novo standard of review,37 but also clarifying that 
Customs classification decisions are presumed to be correct, the 
Federal Circuit rejected Ciba-Geigy’s contention that ambiguities in 
the notes to Chapter 32 compelled classification under Heading 
3215.38  The dispute turned on the interpretation of Note 1(a) to 
Chapter 32, which excludes from that chapter “separate chemically 
defined elements or compounds (except those of heading . . . 
3204. . . .”39  Ciba-Geigy argued that Note 1(a) is ambiguous, and does 
not direct where in Chapter 32 a specific “synthetic organic coloring 
matter” must be classified once it is included in Chapter 32.40  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that, read in conjunction with 
Note 2(f) to Chapter 29,41 Note 1(a) is clear that any “separate 
chemically defined compound” (such as PERGASCRIPTS) is 
classifiable only under Heading 3204.42  In reaching this decision, the 
court found it significant that the chapter notes failed to exclude 
Heading 3215 classification from the general rule that “separate 
chemically defined compounds” cannot be classified under Chapter 
32.43  Notably, the court also rejected Ciba-Geigy’s argument, 
pursuant to General Rule of Interpretation (“GRI”) 3(a), that 
Heading 3215 offered a more specific product description than did 
Heading 3204.44  According to the court, that argument amounted to 
a request “to place the cart before the horse,” because a product must 
in fact be classifiable in the more specific heading before the GRI 3 
specificity requirement can be applied.45  As noted, however, the 
Federal Circuit found classification under Heading 3215 to be 
precluded—notwithstanding the arguable specificity of that 
heading.46 
In JVC Co. of America v. United States,47 the Federal Circuit again 
affirmed a decision by the Court of International Trade to sustain a 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 1371 (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. of Puerto Rico v. United States, 
182 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 21 F.3d 
1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 38. Id. at 1372. 
 39. Id. at 1369 (quoting HTSUS, Chap. 32, Note 1(a) (1992)). 
 40. Id. at 1372. 
 41. Id. at 1370 (concluding that note 2(f) excludes, among other things, a 
“synthetic organic coloring matter” from classification under Chapter 29). 
 42. Id. at 1370. 
 43. Id. at 1373. 
 44. Id. at 1372.  GRI 3(a) provides that “[t]he heading which provides the most 
specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general 
description.”  Id.  The GRIs are an integral part of the legal text of the HTSUS. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 234 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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Customs tariff classification.48  The lower court granted the 
government’s motion for summary judgment that certain video 
camera recorders imported by JVC were properly classified under 
HTSUS subheading 8525.30.00 as “television cameras.”49  JVC sought 
classification under certain residual provisions (i.e., provisions 
covering unspecified or “other” articles) elsewhere in HTSUS 
Chapters 84 or 85.50  Applying a de novo standard of review51—but also 
stating that “considerable deference” was owed the trial court52—the 
Federal Circuit rejected JVC’s arguments, including that its 
camcorders were “more than” mere television cameras because they 
also had a recording function.53  The court noted that the question 
whether the “more than” doctrine applied to cases involving the 
HTSUS (as opposed to its predecessor, the Tariff Schedules of the 
United States, or “TSUS”) was “an issue of first impression,”54 and 
ruled on this question for future classification disputes by holding 
that it did not.55  The court concluded more broadly that the GRIs 
prescribed by statute, which fully and systematically set standards for 
classification, supercede the “more than” doctrine created by the 
courts and preclude its application to HTSUS cases.56  The court also 
dismissed JVC’s reliance on Federal Circuit cases supposedly 
establishing a common meaning of the term “television camera” 
because those cases, like the “more than” doctrine, construed the 
TSUS rather than the HTSUS.57 
In North American Processing Co. v. United States,58 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s classification of certain bovine fat 
trimmings containing both meat and fat as “meat” under HTSUS 
                                                          
 48. Id. at 1350. 
 49. JVC Co. of Am. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1133 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1999), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 50. JVC Co., 234 F.3d at 1350. 
 51. Id. at 1351 (citing Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999)). 
 52. Id. (quoting Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 
1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 53. Id. at 1353. 
 54. Id. at 1353.  The court acknowledged that a series of prior Federal Circuit 
decisions involving cases under the HTSUS had appeared to approve of application 
of the “more than” doctrine.  Id.  The court, however, distinguished those earlier 
cases, finding that this issue was not  “squarely presented” to the court previously.  Id. 
(quoting UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 654 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 55. Id. at 1354. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1354-55 (citing Mitsubishi Int’l Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 884, 886 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) and H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-576, at 549-50 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1582-83). 
 58. 236 F.3d 695 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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subheading 0202.30.60.59  The court departed from its usual 
explication of the standard of review and presented it as entailing a 
two-step process: first, ascertaining the proper meaning of the 
specific terms in the tariff provision, a question of law; and second, 
determining whether the merchandise at issue fits within such terms, 
a question of fact.60  The court further stated that it exercised 
“complete and independent review” over the first step, but reviewed 
the second “for clear error.”61  Applying this standard, the Federal 
Circuit rejected North American Processing’s arguments seeking 
classification of the imported fat trimmings as “fats,” rather than as 
“meat,” under HTSUS subheading 1502.00.00.62  Citing the 
Explanatory Notes to Chapter 2, which state that “fat present in the 
carcass or adhering to meat is treated as forming part of the meat,”63 
as well as USDA regulations setting forth a comparable definition of 
“meat,”64 the court reasoned that the imported merchandise could 
only be classified as meat under subheading 0202.30.60.65 
The Federal Circuit again affirmed the lower court’s tariff 
classification decision—this time involving plywood made from 
tropical hardwoods in Brazil and classified under HTSUS subheading 
4412.12.20—in Russell Stadelman & Co. v. United States.66  In this 
instance, the dispute centered around the commercial meaning of 
“Baboen,” a term used in subheading 4412.11 to designate tropical 
wood, but not defined in the HTSUS or legislative history.67  While 
the importer, Stadelman, sought classification of the plywood under 
subheading 4412.11, Customs had classified the plywood under a 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 696. 
 60. Id. at 697 (citing Pillowtex Corp. v. United States, 171 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 698. 
 63. Id.  The court noted that the Explanatory Notes are “not legally binding or 
dispositive,” but “may be consulted for guidance” and that they “are generally 
indicative of the proper interpretation of the various HTSUS provisions.”  Id. (citing 
Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1378 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).  The 
Explanatory Notes form part of the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System, as maintained by the Customs Cooperation Council, now known as 
the World Customs Organization (“WCO”).  See Jewelpak Corp. v. United States, 97 
F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195 n.6 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000) (stating that the Notes are, 
according to the WCO, the official interpretation of the scope of HCDCS, which 
forms the basis for HTSUS). 
 64. 236 F.3d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2000), which 
defines “meat” as “muscle . . . with or without the accompanying and overlying fat”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 242 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 67. Id. at 1048.  Subheading 4412.11 provides for plywoods “[w]ith at least one 
outer play of the following tropical woods: . . . Baboen.”  Id. at 1047. 
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residual provision for “other” plywood, subheading 4412.12.20.68  In 
construing “Baboen,” the court explained that, absent evidence to 
the contrary, the meaning of a tariff term that is not defined in the 
HTSUS or legislative history must be its ordinary or dictionary 
meaning.69  It also clarified, however, that the ordinary or dictionary 
definition is trumped by a “commercial meaning in existence which is 
definite, uniform, and general throughout the trade.”70  The court 
further clarified, citing longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
that only commercial use in the United States is relevant in 
construing the tariff term.71  While some evidence existed that 
“Baboen” could describe the plywood at issue outside the United 
States, the Federal Circuit, upon examining a variety of general and 
technical sources, concluded that “Baboen,” as understood in the 
United States, could not describe the merchandise.72  The court thus 
affirmed the classification of the plywood at issue in a residual 
category for “other” plywood, subheading 4412.11.20.73 
In General Electric Co. Medical Systems Group v. United States,74 the 
Federal Circuit reversed the classification decision of the Court of 
International Trade with respect to multiformat cameras (“MFCs”) 
used with computerized tomography X-ray scanners.75  Citing Mead 
Corp. v. United States, the court noted that it had no obligation to 
defer to a Customs classification ruling that did not explicitly 
interpret an HTSUS provision unless Customs had issued a 
regulation.76  The court also clarified at the outset that, under GRI 
3(a), headings providing more specific descriptions are preferable to 
headings providing less specific descriptions.77  The Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 1046. 
 69. Id. at 1048 (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. United States, 727 F.2d 1095, 1097 
(Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 70. See id. (citing Rohm, 727 F.2d at 1097) (noting that courts may only apply 
commercial meanings if both Congress and all of the trade would understand the 
meaning at the time the law was enacted). 
 71. Id. at 1049 (citing Two Hundred Chests of Tea, Smith, 22 U.S. 430, 439 
(1824)). 
 72. Id. at 1050 (examining through a lexicographic analysis). 
 73. Id. 
 74. 247 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2001), amended by 273 F.3d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 75. Id. at 1232. 
 76. Id. at 1234 (citing Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000), vacated, 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).  In its 
amended opinion, based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mead, the Federal 
Circuit issued a replacement paragraph describing the revised standard of review 
applicable to Customs tariff classification decisions.  Gen. Elec., 273 F.3d at 1071 
(citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)) (stating that a court must 
review a customs classification issued without an explicit regulation in accordance 
with Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
 77. Gen. Elec., 247 F.3d at 1235. 
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reversed the lower court’s classification of the MFCs under Heading 
9006 as fixed focus cameras because, as it explained, merchandise 
must be classified in its condition as imported,78 and the MFCs at 
issue could, in that condition, only be used as accessories to 
computerized tomography X-ray equipment.79  The court also found 
that the imported MFCs were “combination apparatuses” because 
each included both a camera assembly and a separate display 
monitor.80  The court then held that Heading 9022, which described 
an “apparatus based on the use of x-rays,” provided the most specific 
description of the MFCs.81  Notably, the court rejected Customs’ 
argument, based on the Explanatory Notes,82 that the MFCs could not 
be classified under Heading 9022 because, in their condition as 
imported, they could not generate X-rays.83  The court characterized 
the Explanatory Notes as “non-binding,”84 and held that the statutory 
language clearly contemplated the inclusion in Heading 9022 of 
articles that do not, by themselves, generate X-rays.85 
In Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States,86 due in part to the 
Supreme Court’s revision of the applicable standard of review in 
Mead, the Federal Circuit affirmed a Customs classification ruling that 
had been reversed by the Court of International Trade.87  The dispute 
involved the appropriate HTSUS classification of certain sugar 
syrups—some of which are under a Tariff Rate Quota (“TRQ”), and 
others of which are not.88  In 1995, Heartland By-Products obtained a 
                                                          
 78. Id. (citing Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 487 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  The court’s analysis pertained to ninety-seven of ninety-eight MFCs 
imported by General Electric.  Id. at 1232.  The single MFC was like the others except 
that it included a shield that enabled it to be used in connection with magnetic 
resonance imaging (“MRI”) systems.  Id.  The court classified this MFC under 
subheading 9018.90.80.  Id. at 1236.  In its amended opinion, and based on the 
agreement of the parties to the litigation, the court reclassified this MFC under 
subheading 9018.19.80, noting that this subheading was more accurate for MFCs 
used with MRI systems than the earlier classification.  Gen. Elec., 273 F.3d at 1071. 
 82. Gen. Elec., 247 F.3d at 1236 (stating that Explanatory Notes are non-binding 
and do not require that an accessory device be imported with an apparatus).    
 83. Id. at 1236. 
 84. Id. (citing Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 21 F.3d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 87. See Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1344 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1999), rev’d, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that Customs 
abused its discretion in classifying the product inconsistently with the Tariff statute). 
 88. Heartland By-Products, 264 F.3d at 1128-29.  Specifically, sugar syrups, classified 
under HTSUS subheading 1702.90.10 and 1702.90.20, are subject to the TRQ, while 
syrups classified under HTSUS subheading 1702.90.40 are not.  Id. at 1129. 
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ruling letter from Customs classifying the syrups it intended to import 
under a subheading not subject to the TRQ;89 however, U.S. interests 
opposing this classification sought its review, and in 1999 Customs 
published notice revoking the earlier ruling, and reclassifying the 
syrups at issue under a subheading subject to the TRQ.90  Heartland 
By-Products then filed a complaint with the Court of International 
Trade,91 which declared Customs’ revocation ruling unlawful and 
ordered classification of the syrups under HTSUS subheading 
1702.90.40, as they had been classified prior to the revocation 
ruling.92  The United States and certain U.S. interests appealed the 
court’s decision.93 
In articulating the applicable standard of review, the Federal 
Circuit noted that since issuance of the decision below, the Supreme 
Court had ruled, in Mead, that courts may defer to Custom 
classifications depending on their power to persuade, pursuant to the 
Court’s 1944 decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.94  The Federal Circuit 
proceeded to review the lower court’s reversal of the Customs 
revocation ruling—reviewing it in particular for completeness and 
logic and against relevant sources and prior interpretations95—and 
reversed the decision of the Court of International Trade.96  The 
Federal Circuit identified one factor militating against deference to 
the revocation ruling, i.e., its inconsistency with the underlying 1995 
ruling, but held that this inconsistency was not, by itself, a basis for 
denying deference to the revocation ruling given that the earlier 
ruling was not issued pursuant to a notice and comment process, and 
given that it had not addressed the specific technical points that gave 
rise to Customs’ revocation in 1999.97  The Federal Circuit also 
disagreed with the lower court’s reading of the applicable HTSUS 
                                                          
 89. See id. at 1129 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 810329 (May 15, 1995)) (agreeing with 
plaintiff Heartland By-Products that because syrup was not lactose, maple, glucose, or 
fructose, it could not be classified under heading subject to a tariff). 
 90. Id. at 1131 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 33, Cust. Bull. No. 35/36, at 41 (Sept. 8, 
1999)). 
 91. Heartland By-Products obtained jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h), 
which permits the Court of International Trade to review the classification of goods 
prior to importation if the party bringing the challenge can show that irreparable 
harm will result if judicial review is not obtained prior to importation.  Heartland By-
Products, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1326, 1329-32. 
 92. Id. at 1345. 
 93. Heartland By-Products, 264 F.3d at 1128. 
 94. Id. at 1133 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) and 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
 95. Id. at 1135 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 220). 
 96. Id. at 1136-37 (finding that the Court of International Trade should have 
deferred to the Customs revocation because it met the Mead standard). 
 97. Id. at 1136. 
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provisions and Explanatory Notes, describing its construction of these 
provisions as unduly “narrow.”98 
In Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States,99 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s classification of certain metal fasteners 
imported by Rocknel Fastener from Japan.100  Customs placed the 
fastener entries under HTSUS subheading 7318.15.80, a residual 
subheading covering certain “other” threaded fasteners.101  Rocknel 
Fastener protested, claiming classification under subheading 
7318.15.20, which covers certain “bolts.”102  The court explained at 
the outset that where, as here, a tariff term is not statutorily defined, 
the term’s common meaning applies, and that the common meaning 
may be discerned by consulting various sources, such as dictionaries 
and lexicographic or scientific authorities.103  The court also 
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Mead, 
requiring the reviewing court to take into account the persuasiveness 
of the decision under review.104  The issue of statutory construction 
before the Federal Circuit hinged on whether the fasteners at issue 
were “bolts” or “screws.”105  Applying longstanding definitions of 
fasteners embodied in American National Standards Institute 
(“ANSI”) specifications, Customs’ classification essentially held the 
latter.106  The Federal Circuit tested Customs’ analysis by reference to 
a variety of technical sources, including the Millwrights and 
Mechanics Guide, Machinery’s Handbook, as well as to Webster’s and 
American Heritage Dictionaries,107 and found that the ANSI 
specifications were consistent with the dictionary definitions.108  The 
court also rejected Rocknel Fastener’s proposed alternate definitions, 
concluding that because Rocknel Fastener’s alternative definitions 
were not more consistent with the common meaning of the terms, 
Customs’ classification was appropriate.109 
                                                          
 98. Id. 
 99. 267 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 100. Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1238-39 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)  (classifying fasteners as 
screws under subheading 7318.15.80 and denying plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment to classify fasteners as bolts under subheading 7318.15.20). 
 101. Rocknel Fastener, 267 F.3d at 1356. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1356-57 (citing C.J. Tower & Sons v. United States, 673 F.2d 1268, 1271 
(C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
 104. Id. at 1357 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001)). 
 105. Id. at 1356. 
 106. Id. at 1358-59. 
 107. Id. at 1359-60. 
 108. Id. at 1360. 
 109. Id. at 1361. 
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The Federal Circuit again affirmed the lower court in Rollerblade, 
Inc. v. United States,110 a case involving in-line skating protective gear.  
Again applying Mead deference principles, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Court of International Trade.111  Rollerblade contended 
that the protective gear should be classified as “other accessories” 
under HTSUS subheading 9506.70.2090.112  Agreeing with the lower 
court, however, the Federal Circuit found that the applicable HTSUS 
provisions did not define “accessories,” such that it was appropriate to 
turn to the common meaning of the term.113  That analysis, in turn, 
led to the conclusion that the protective gear could not be classified 
as accessories to in-line skates because the gear is not physically 
connected to and does not contact the skates.114  Moreover, the 
protective gear merely provides skaters with comfort, but is not 
necessary to the safe operation of the skates.115  The court concluded 
that Customs did not err in classifying the protective gear in the most 
appropriate residual category.116 
In Mead Corp. v. United States,117 on remand from the Supreme 
Court,118 the Federal Circuit for the second time reversed the Court of 
International Trade’s affirmance of a Customs classification ruling.119  
The original judgment of the Federal Circuit in Mead was reversed for 
failure to apply deference under Skidmore;120 however, even applying 
the more deferential standard required by the Supreme Court, the 
Federal Circuit held that Customs’ reasoning was unpersuasive and 
reversed the classification ruling.121  The merchandise at issue was five 
models of Mead’s day planners, classified by Customs under HTSUS 
                                                          
 110. 282 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 111. Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1257 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2000), aff’d, 282 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that Customs properly classified 
product under subheading 9506.99.6080). 
 112. Rollerblade, 282 F.3d at 1351. 
 113. Id. at 1352-53. 
 114. Id. at 1353 (citing Trans Atl. Co. v. United States, 48 C.C.P.A. 30 (1960)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1354 (citing EM Indus. v. United States, 999 F. Supp. 1473, 1480 n.9 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1998)). 
 117. 283 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 118. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (requiring lower court 
to consider case under Skidmore standard). 
 119. Mead, 283 F.3d at 1344. 
 120. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (holding that an agency’s interpretation is entitled to 
deference because of its expertise). 
 121. The Federal Circuit explained that, “[w]hile this court . . . recognizes its 
responsibility to accord a classification ruling the degree of deference commensurate 
with its power to persuade, this court also recognizes its independent responsibility 
to decide the legal issue regarding the proper meaning and scope of the HTSUS 
terms.”  Mead, 283 F.3d at 1346 (citing Rocknel Fastener, 267 F.3d at 1358). 
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subheading 4820.10.20 as bound diaries.122  Mead sought classification 
under subheading 4820.10.40, a residual basket provision, arguing 
that the day planners were neither bound nor diaries.123  The Federal 
Circuit first analyzed whether Customs and the lower court 
reasonably concluded that the planners were diaries.124  Relying on 
dictionary definitions, and noting in particular the limited amount of 
space that the planners provided for “detailed notations about events, 
observations, feelings, or thoughts,” the court concluded that the 
planners were not diaries.125  The court also considered whether 
Mead’s planners were “bound,” and again disagreed with Customs 
and the lower court.126  Relying on both the structure of the HTSUS 
and dictionary definitions, the court ruled that the concept of 
binding did not encompass loose-leaf binding.127  In light of this 
analysis, the court concluded that Customs’ classification was not 
persuasive under Skidmore deference.128 
In Franklin v. United States,129 the Federal Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the United States with respect 
to the classification of imported Japanese coral sand packets used to 
purify water.130  Customs classified the coral sand packets under 
HTSUS subheading 2106.90.99, a residual basket provision covering 
food preparations.131  Franklin sought classification under subheading 
8421.20.00, which includes machinery used to filter and purify 
water.132  Citing Mead, Rollerblade, and Rocknel Fastener, the court stated 
that its review would be based on the persuasiveness of Customs’ 
classification decision.133  The court turned first to Franklin’s 
contention that the principal purpose of the coral sand packets was 
to “purify” water, and agreed that the packets should be classified 
under 8421.20.00.134  Because the coral sand removed unwanted 
chlorine, bacteria, and acidity from water, the court found it fit the 
definition of purify—“to remove unwanted constituents from a 
                                                          
 122. Id. at 1344. 
 123. Id. at 1345 (noting that under this subheading, Mead would not owe an 
import tariff). 
 124. Id. at 1346-47. 
 125. Id. at 1348 (arguing that a day planner is used to plan future events, while 
diaries account past events). 
 126. Id. at 1350. 
 127. Id. at 1349-50 (finding that a book is bound if it is permanently secured). 
 128. Id. at 1350. 
 129. 289 F.3d 753 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 130. Franklin v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001), rev’d, 
Franklin v. United States, 289 F.3d 753 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 131. Franklin, 289 F.3d at 755. 
 132. Id. at 756. 
 133. Id. at 757. 
 134. Id. at 758. 
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substance.”135  The court turned next to whether any basis existed for 
the classification of the sand packets under subheading 2106.90.99, 
i.e., as a food preparation.136  Noting that GRI 3(a) requires 
classification under the HTSUS Heading providing the most specific 
description of the product at issue, the court found Heading 8421 
provided a more specific description of the coral sand packets than 
classification as a food preparation.137  The court further agreed with 
Franklin’s argument that coral sand packets are not a food 
preparation at all because the sand packets are not consumed when 
placed in water, but purify the water.138  The Federal Circuit 
concluded that the underlying classification decision was not 
persuasive under Skidmore.139 
Finally, in Jewelpak Corp. v. United States,140 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a Court of International Trade decision involving the 
reclassification of Jewelpak’s imported jewelry boxes.141  The first issue 
before the Federal Circuit was whether Customs was required, 
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1315(d) and 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(c)(2), to 
publish notice of its intended reclassification of the jewelry boxes.142  
Jewelpak contended that the original classification constituted an 
established and uniform practice (“EUP”) under the precursor to the 
HTSUS—the TSUS—such that reclassification, which occurred well 
after the transition to the HTSUS, triggered the statutory publication 
obligation under § 1315.143  Relying heavily on an earlier decision 
defining the establishment and rescission of EUPs, the Federal 
Circuit ruled that Jewelpak had failed to meet its burden that any 
EUP had been applicable.144  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Jewelpak’s related argument that, given the absence of a published 
notice of the intended reclassification, it was prejudiced.145  The court 
                                                          
 135. Id. (quoting Noss Co. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1408, 1412 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 1984)). 
 136. Id. at 760. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 760-61 (differentiating the coral sand packets from tea bags because a 
tea bag is placed in water with the intent of drinking the tea, whereas the packets are 
intended to purify). 
 139. Id. at 761. 
 140. 297 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 141. Jewelpak Corp. v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 2d 100 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001), 
aff’d, 297 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 142. Jewelpak, 297 F.3d at 1331. 
 143. Id. at 1332. 
 144. Id. at 1332-34 (citing Heraeus-Amersil, Inc. v. United States, 795 F.2d 1575 
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).  The court characterized Heraeus as the case most relevant to its 
analysis, and admonished Jewelpak’s counsel for failing to cite it in its opening brief.  
Id. at 1333 n.6. 
 145. Id. at 1334. 
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found it was unreasonable to find that Jewelpak had been prejudiced 
by the lack of published notice of the change in classification because 
it had actual notice.146  In addition, the Federal Circuit rejected 
Jewelpak’s challenge to the Court of International Trade’s 
determination as to the common meaning of “jewelry box” as used in 
the HTSUS.147  The Federal Circuit found the lower court had 
correctly determined the common meaning of “jewelry box” based 
on the GRIs and relevant caselaw, and that Jewelpak had failed to 
identify any errors in that reasoning.148  Finally, the Federal Circuit 
dismissed as meritless, without explaining its analysis, Jewelpak’s 
contention that action by the International Trade Commission and 
the President was necessary to justify Customs’ reclassification.149 
Judge Gajarsa dissented from the majority opinion, finding that 
Customs had indeed departed from an EUP, and that, because the 
effect of the change was to impose a higher tariff rate, the notice and 
comment requirement of 19 U.S.C. § 1315(d) applied.150  Judge 
Gajarsa also criticized the majority opinion for undermining the 
policy that § 1315(d) seeks to serve—to facilitate efficient 
international trade by permitting investors to rely on established 
practices and the knowledge that Customs will give notice before 
raising duty rates.151 
B. Valuation Issues 
During the three-year period being reviewed, three cases involving 
the valuation of imported merchandise for Customs appraisal 
purposes reached the Federal Circuit, and in two of the three 
instances, the Federal Circuit reversed.  The valuation statute, 19 
U.S.C. § 1401a, establishes that the baseline for appraisal of imported 
merchandise is its “transaction value.”152  The “transaction value” is 
defined as “the price actually paid or payable for the merchandise 
when sold for exportation to the United States,” and is subject to 
certain statutorily enumerated adjustments and exceptions.153 
First, Century Importers, Inc. v. United States154 involved the 
importation of Canadian beer by Century Importers.  Customs 
                                                          
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1336. 
 148. Id. at 1336-37. 
 149. Id. at 1337. 
 150. Id. at 1337-38 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 1340. 
 152. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 153. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1). 
 154. 205 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:31 PM 
1044 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1027 
initially assessed duties for the imported beer according to the 
invoice price.155  However, based on a separate agreement in which 
the Canadian exporter agreed to reimburse Century Importers for 
U.S. import duties, Century Importers initiated an action in the 
Court of International Trade seeking adjustment of the transaction 
value, and a partial refund of duties paid, to reflect the duty 
reimbursements from the Canadian exporter.156  Century Importers 
argued that, by agreeing to the duty reimbursement scheme, the 
exporter had actually reduced the price of the beer.157  The Court of 
International Trade agreed with Century Importers, ordering 
adjustment of the transaction value as sought by Century Importers,158 
but the Federal Circuit reversed.159  Noting that Customs decisions are 
entitled to a presumption of correctness,160 the Federal Circuit 
reviewed the applicable provisions of the valuation statute, including 
§§ 1401a(b)(3) and (4).161  The court determined that because 
Century Importers had not separately identified the duty amount to 
be reimbursed on its invoices, Customs had no authority to deduct 
this amount in calculating the transaction value.162  The court 
specifically noted that, under § 1401a(b)(4)(B), Customs was 
precluded from taking into account post-importation “rebates” in 
establishing transaction value.163  The court also found that 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1520(c)(1), which authorized revision of Customs entry papers for 
the correction of clerical and other inadvertent errors, did not apply 
because Century Importers had acted “negligently” rather than 
inadvertently.164 
Judge Newman dissented from the panel majority’s decision, 
pointing out that Customs had acknowledged it would have valued 
the merchandise as proposed by Century Importers when entry 
papers were filed if the invoices had expressly reflected the 
reimbursement agreement. 165  Judge Newman posited that the failure 
of the invoices to reflect this fact was the kind of error that section 
                                                          
 155. Id. at 1310. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Century Imps., Inc. v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1998), vacated, 205 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 159. Century Imps., 205 F.3d at 1309. 
 160. Id. at 1311. 
 161. 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(3)-(4) (2000) (stating that the transaction value does 
not include duties listed separately). 
 162. Century Imps., 205 F.3d at 1311-12. 
 163. Id. at 1311. 
 164. Id. at 1312-13. 
 165. Id. at 1313 (Newman,  J., dissenting). 
FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:31 PM 
2003] INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS 2000-2002 1045 
1520(c)(1) of the statute was designed to encompass.166  Judge 
Newman also charged the panel majority with misunderstanding the 
nature of the payments from the Canadian exporter to Century 
Importers, arguing these payments were not a rebate but part of the 
underlying agreement between the parties establishing the transfer 
price.167 
Second, Fabil Manufacturing Co. v. United States168 involved a 
Customs regulation authorizing post-importation reductions in the 
assessed valuation of merchandise if the merchandise is damaged 
when it is imported.169  The Court of International Trade rejected 
Fabil Manufacturing’s claim for a full reduction in the assessed value 
of certain defective merchandise because Fabil Manufacturing could 
not “tie” the allegedly defective merchandise to the specific entries 
for which it sought the reduction, and granted the government’s 
motion for summary judgment.170  The Federal Circuit, however, held 
that the regulation did not contain a “tying” requirement171 and 
found that Fabil Manufacturing’s evidence demonstrated a prima 
facie case for its right to receive a refund of duties paid for the 
defective merchandise.172  The Federal Circuit did not direct summary 
judgment for Fabil Manufacturing, but ordered the Court of 
International Trade to conduct further proceedings consistent with 
its decision.173  The Federal Circuit also criticized the Court of 
International Trade for requiring too high a standard of proof in its 
initial proceeding and clarified that the applicable standard for 
parties seeking revaluation of damaged merchandise is 
“preponderance of the evidence,” not “clear and convincing.”174 
Third, in Luigi Bormioli Corp. v. United States,175 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the United 
States in a dispute involving the treatment of certain interest charges 
in the valuation of glassware imported by Bormioli from its Italian 
                                                          
 166. Id. at 1314. 
 167. Id. at 1314-15. 
 168. 237 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 169. 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 (2002). 
 170. Fabil Mfg. Co. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999), 
rev’d, 237 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 171. Fabil Mfg., 237 F.3d at 1337. 
 172. Id. at 1339. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1339-41.  The court relied in large part on its decision in St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, which, it explained, holds that the civil preponderance 
of the evidence standard applies in cases challenging post-importation Customs 
decisions in the Court of International Trade, but not Customs rulings before 
importation.  Id. at 1340 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 
F.3d 763 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 175. 304 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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parent company.176  Specifically, Bormioli did not agree with 
Customs’ inclusion in the valuation at issue of a 1.25% interest 
charge specified in an agreement between Bormioli and its parent.177  
The principal issues on appeal to the Federal Circuit were whether 
Treasury Directive 85-111,178 which provided guidelines for the 
treatment of interest expenses in computing transaction value, 
applied in this instance and, if so, whether it was consistent with the 
valuation statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a.179  Bormioli argued that 
“separately invoiced” charges, as it claimed were at issue, were not 
governed by TD 85-111 but by earlier Customs policy 
pronouncements.180  Reviewing de novo, the Federal Circuit rejected 
this argument, explaining that “Bormioli confuses the legal inclusion 
of a charge in the ‘price actually paid or payable’ with the physical 
listing or invoicing of the ‘price actually paid or payable’”181 and that 
TD 85-111 in fact superseded the earlier pronouncements on which 
Bormioli relied.182  The court also rejected Bormioli’s attempt to show 
that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case due to 
material questions of fact.183  Noting that the record established that 
Bormioli and its parent company did not typically adhere to the 
interest payment terms in their agreement, the Federal Circuit found 
that the lower court correctly held that the financing arrangement 
with Bormioli Italy for the subject charges was not in a demonstrable 
writing, as required by TD 85-111.184 
                                                          
 176. Id. at 1363. 
 177. Id. at 1365. 
 178. Treatment of Interest Charges in the Customs Value of Imported 
Merchandise, 19 Cust. B. & Dec. 258 (1985), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,886 (July 8, 1985) (“TD 
85-111”).  TD 85-111 provides that interest payments, whether or not included in the 
price actually paid or payable for merchandise, should not be considered part of 
dutiable value provided the following criteria are satisfied: 
(1) The interest charges are identified separately from the price of the 
goods; 
(2)  the financing arrangement was in writing; and 
(3)  where required, the buyer can demonstrate that the goods undergoing 
appraisement are actually sold at the price declared, and the claimed rate of 
interest does not exceed the level for such transaction prevailing in the 
country where and when the financing was provided. 
Id. 
 179. Luigi Bormioli, 304 F.3d at 1365. 
 180. Id. at 1369. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1371. 
 183. Id. at 1372 (discussing Bormioli’s argument that three letters from Bormioli 
Italy to Bormioli satisfy TD 85-111’s writing requirement, despite the parties’ 
departure from the terms of those letters). 
 184. Id. at 1372-73. 
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C. Harbor Maintenance Tax 
During the period 2000 through 2002, the Federal Circuit 
considered a wide range of issues arising out of the Supreme Court’s 
1998 ruling in United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp.,185 where the court held 
that the so-called Harbor Maintenance Tax186 (“HMT”), as applied to 
exports, violated the Constitution’s Export Clause.187  Even with this 
issue settled by the Supreme Court in U.S. Shoe, implementation of 
that ruling generated scores of hotly litigated cases and accounted for 
a substantial portion of the international trade cases before the 
Federal Circuit during the past three years.  The Federal Circuit 
reversed or remanded to the Court of International Trade in roughly 
half of these cases. 
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States188 the Federal Circuit 
considered whether people—or more specifically, passengers on 
Carnival’s cruise ships—are subject to the HMT as applied to 
exports.189  Carnival Cruise Lines prevailed before the Court of 
International Trade, which held that application of the HMT to 
passengers violates the Constitution’s ban on export taxes.190  The 
U.S. Government appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit, which 
reversed.  The Federal Circuit first noted that cruise ship passengers 
are outside the scope of the Constitution’s Export Clause because 
they are “neither ‘articles’ nor ‘goods.’”191  The court further noted 
that, in enacting the HMT, Congress “could not and did not” 
transform the carriage of passengers into the export of goods and 
                                                          
 185. 523 U.S. 360 (1995). 
 186. 26 U.S.C. § 4461 (2000).  The HMT, enacted as part of the Water Resources 
Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (1986), placed an ad 
valorem tax on commercial vessel operators for their use of certain ports.  Id.  The Act 
imposed liability for payment of the HMT on the importer in the case of imports, on 
the exporter in the case of exports, and on the shipper in all other cases.  Id. 
 187. U.S. Shoe, 523 U.S. at 370 (finding that the HMT violates the Export Clause, 
but that exporters may be subject to user fees for harbor maintenance if those fees 
are proportionate to the exporter’s use of the harbor).  The Export Clause provides 
that “[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
 188. 200 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 189. Id. at 1362.  The HMT applies to “commercial cargo,” which is defined as 
including “passengers transported for compensation or hire.”  26 U.S.C. § 4462(a) 
(2000). 
 190. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 2d 877 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1998), rev’d, 200 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 191. Carnival Cruise Lines, 200 F.3d at 1364.  The court explained that delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention drafted the Export Clause to assure Southern States 
that Northern States would not oppress them through taxation of southern 
commercial exports, making application of the Export Clause to people inconsistent 
with the basic purpose of the Clause.  Id. (citing United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859 (1996)). 
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thereby bring this activity into the scope of the Export Clause.192  The 
Federal Circuit’s analysis then turned to the Water Resource 
Development Act’s severability clause and the question of whether, 
under Supreme Court severability precedent, the Act as a whole 
could function absent the unconstitutional export tax.193  Applying 
the principle that “the unconstitutional provision must be severed 
unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress 
would not have enacted,”194 the court found that the remaining 
portions of the Act (including the application of the HMT to 
passengers) could function as intended by Congress without the 
unconstitutional export tax clause.195  The court also rejected 
Carnival’s other contentions, including its argument that Congress 
would not have imposed the HMT without applying it to exports, that 
the Act’s severability clause does not apply to the HMT, and that 
severance of export taxes only from the HMT could lead to conflicts 
with U.S. trading partners under the General Agreements of Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”) rules.196  On the last point, the court noted that 
no trading partner of the United States had formally challenged the 
HMT, and that Congress or the executive branch will act in such a 
situation.197 
In Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States,198 the Federal Circuit upheld 
the application of the HMT to passengers, but also considered two 
other issues—the application of the HMT to passenger stopovers or 
layovers,199 and the assessment of the Arriving Passenger Fee (“APF”) 
on passenger cruises.200  As in Carnival Cruise Lines, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the Court of International Trade’s invalidation of the HMT 
                                                          
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1366-69. 
 194. Id. at 1367 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987)). 
 195. Id. (noting that Congress chose to include exports in the HMT despite its 
awareness that the Export Clause might invalidate that application). 
 196. Id. at 1367-69. 
 197. Id. at 1369. 
 198. 201 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 199. Id. at 1354.  The HMT provides that “when a passenger boards or disembarks 
a commercial vessel at a port within the definition of this section, the operator of 
that vessel is liable for the payment of the port use fee.”  Id. at 1356 n.4 (citing 19 
C.F.R. § 24.24(e)(3)(i) (2002)). 
 200. Id. at 1354; see 19 U.S.C. § 58c(a)(5) (2000) (imposing the APF fee on 
passengers arriving in the United States from abroad on commercial vessels or 
aircraft).  Section 58c creates an exemption for passengers arriving from Canada, 
Mexico, U.S. territories, or adjacent islands, as well as passengers whose travel 
originated in the United States but was limited to those destinations.  19 C.F.R. 
§ 24.24(g)(2)(i)(A) (2002).  The APF fee is assessed based on the place the journey 
“originated,” which Customs regulations define as “the location where the person’s 
travel begins under cover of a transaction . . . into the customs territory of the United 
States.”  19 C.F.R. § 24.22(g)(2)(i)(B). 
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as applied to passengers (the lower court did not reach the stopover 
issue) and remanded the APF claim for recalculation.201  On the issue 
of stopovers or layovers, Princess Cruises argued that, should the 
Federal Circuit uphold the HMT as applied to passengers, it must 
also hold that the HMT does not apply to mere stopovers or layovers, 
because these events do not, under 19 C.F.R. § 24.24, amount to 
“boarding” or “disembarking.”202  Citing Haggar Apparel and applying 
Chevron deference, the court found that application of the HMT to 
stopovers and layovers, as provided in the regulations, was consistent 
with congressional intent and therefore constituted a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.203  The court reasoned that discharging 
and reboarding passengers at a port for shopping and sight-seeing is 
no different from boarding or discharging passengers at a port at the 
beginning or end of a cruise.204  The court also rejected Princess’ 
claim of estoppel against the government, for which Princess Cruises 
relied on a fax from a Customs official stating that the HMT would 
not apply to stopovers.205  With respect to the APF, the Federal Circuit 
again reversed the lower court’s decision and upheld Customs’ 
regulatory interpretation of “journey” as including all stages of an 
itinerary, regardless of the mode of transportation.206  Again citing 
Haggar Apparel and applying Chevron deference, the court noted that 
Congress had not defined “journey,” thereby leaving this task to 
Customs.207  The court also rejected Princess’ argument that the APF 
statute exempts any passenger whose last port of call before arriving 
in the United States was an exempt port.208  As explained by the court, 
under the only reasonable reading of the statute, the origin of the 
journey raises the exemption and not the last port of call before 
discharging at port in the United States.209 
The Federal Circuit again reversed the Court of International 
Trade in International Business Machines Corp. v. United States,210 a test 
                                                          
 201. Princess Cruises, 201 F.3d at 1355. 
 202. Id. at 1358 (arguing that because neither term is defined in the statute, the 
court should rely on other Customs regulations for the definition). 
 203. Id. at 1360 (noting Congress’s intent to impose a fee for usage of ports and its 
failure to explicitly exclude stopovers or layovers with its exclusions for other uses, 
such as ferries). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 1361 (rejecting Princess’ argument that “journey” does not begin at the 
location from which the passenger left the United States, but rather at the starting 
point of the cruise). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1361-62. 
 209. Id. at 1362. 
 210. 201 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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case involving the right of parties owed HMT refunds from the U.S. 
Government to collect interest on those refunds.211  The lower court 
held that 28 U.S.C. § 2411, which provides for interest on tax refunds, 
also applies to HMT refunds, and the U.S. Government appealed.212  
The Federal Circuit noted at the outset that the issue before it was 
purely one of statutory construction, warranting full and 
independent review,213 and that its analysis would focus on whether 
Congress had expressly waived sovereign immunity by consenting to 
interest payments on HMT refunds.214  The court stated that it was 
“abundantly clear” that, notwithstanding the codification of the HMT 
as part of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”), Congress intended 
HMT to be administered and enforced as a customs duty, not a tax 
under the IRC.215  The analysis, thus, turned on whether 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2411, which expressly authorizes interest on tax refunds, is a 
provision related to “administration and enforcement” of the HMT.216  
Because the HMT statute did not define “administration and 
enforcement,” the court examined the ordinary meaning of those 
terms and interpreted them broadly.217  The court found that 
Congress intended “administration and enforcement” to include 
judicial enforcement and awards of tax refund interest, in addition to 
agency action.218  The court could find no other statutes expressly 
providing for interest on HMT refunds and concluded that the 
taxpayers could not receive interest on the HMT refunds without a 
specific grant of such relief by Congress.219 
In another post-U.S. Shoe test case, the Federal Circuit in Swisher 
International, Inc. v. United States220 reviewed whether Customs’ denial 
of a request for HMT refunds was a “protestable” decision for 
purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), such that subsequent Court of 
International Trade jurisdiction would be available under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(a), and reversed.221  The lower court held that denials of HMT 
                                                          
 211. Id. at 1369. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1370 (citing Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407, 1409 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 214. Id. (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986)). 
 215. Id. at 1371.  26 U.S.C. § 4462(f)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that the HMT 
“shall not be treated as a tax for purposes of subtitle F or any other provision of law 
relating to the administration and enforcement of internal revenue taxes.”   
 216. Int’l Bus. Machs., 201 F.3d at 1371. 
 217. Id. at 1372-73. 
 218. Id. at 1373. 
 219. Id. at 1375. 
 220. 205 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 221. Id. at 1360.  28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) provides that “[t]he Court of International 
Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the 
denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under § 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”   
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refund requests were not protestable and, accordingly, that such 
denials could only be challenged pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the 
court’s “residual” jurisdiction provision.222  As a result of the two-year 
statute of limitations for actions initiated under § 1581(i), the Court 
of International Trade found certain of Swisher’s refund claims time-
barred under the provision.223  The issue was novel because, in U.S. 
Shoe—where the Supreme Court found that the HMT violates the 
Constitution’s Export Clause—the challenge followed a different 
procedural path, i.e., no Customs protest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1514(a) and jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).224 
Noting the existence of considerable confusion concerning the 
appropriate jurisdictional basis for a challenge at the time of U.S. 
Shoe, the Federal Circuit held that Swisher, or other HMT 
challengers, are not restricted by U.S. Shoe and a two-year statute of 
limitations.225  The Federal Circuit also cited various grounds, 
including decisions of the Court of International Trade, to support its 
finding that HMT payment issues are protestable decisions with 
respect to a “charge or exaction” for purposes of 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1514(a)(2), the statute allowing for protests of customs decisions.226  
Finally, the Federal Circuit noted equitable considerations to support 
its holding, positing that: 
[I]f we were to hold that a request for refund was not a protestable 
decision, Swisher, and others, would be limited to recovering only 
that HMT paid within two years before filing suit in the Court of 
International Trade.  Given that the constitutionality of the HMT 
was not seriously questioned until 1994 and not completely resolved 
until 1998, such a holding would bar recovery of much of the 
unconstitutional HMT paid by exporters between 1987 and 1998.227 
In Florida Sugar Marketing & Terminal Ass’n v. United States,228 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the 
Constitution does not prohibit assessment of the HMT on shipments 
between the ports of different states.229  Noting that the question 
before it was purely legal, i.e., whether the term “exports” 
                                                          
 222. Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1998), rev’d, 205 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1362-63. 
 225. Id. at 1365. 
 226. Id. at 1365-67 (citing Eurasia Imp. v. United States, 31 C.C.P.A. 202, 211-12 
(1944); Thomson Consumer Elec., Inc. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 1999)). 
 227. Id. at 1368. 
 228. 220 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 229. Id. at 1341. 
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encompasses interstate shipments, the court applied a de novo 
standard of review230 and turned to various historical sources of law in 
attempting to ascertain the Framers’ intent as to the scope of the 
Export Clause.231  While Florida Sugar identified an abundance of 
materials contemporaneous with the Constitution showing that lay 
usage of the term “export” included interstate shipments,232 the 
Federal Circuit found that this lay usage was not dispositive in 
ascertaining the legal meaning of the term because a term’s lay 
meaning is often broader than its legal definition.233  Instead, relying 
primarily on records from the 1787 Federal Convention, the court 
found that the debate over the scope of the Export Clause was closely 
linked to the importation of slaves and clearly tied to overseas 
commerce.234  The court also found that the nature of the North-
South divide at the time of the Constitutional Convention, in 
particular the South’s opposition to the export tax, strongly indicated 
that the tax under discussion related exclusively to foreign 
commerce.235  The court found the constitutional context of the 
Export Clause provided further indicators that the Clause was 
intended to apply only to foreign shipments.236  These indicators 
included the fact that the Export Clause only proscribes the activities 
of the federal government, making the relevant jurisdiction the 
federal government and not the states.237  Finally, the court rejected 
Florida Sugar’s reading of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue, 
concluding that, aside from a single dissenting opinion that was 
arguably not germane, Florida Sugar had failed to cite a Supreme 
Court case supporting its interpretation of the Export Clause.238 
Stone Container Corp. v. United States239 raised the procedural issue of 
whether initiation of a class action lawsuit for recovery of 
                                                          
 230. Id. at 1333. 
 231. Id. at 1333-41 (examining the Constitutional Convention records and the 
applicable line of Supreme Court cases). 
 232. Id. at 1334 (explaining Florida Sugar offered newspapers, correspondence, 
advertisements and state statutes to demonstrate the meaning of the term “export”). 
 233. Id. at 1334-35 (illustrating that the current legal definition of export refers to 
international commerce, whereas, a contemporary New York Times article uses the 
term export to refer to the interstate shipment of trash). 
 234. Id. at 1335-36 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FED. CONVENTION 220 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1787) (statement of J. Madison, Aug. 8, 1787)). 
 235. Id. at 1336-37 (explaining that, because the South’s economy was based on 
exporting cash crops overseas and the North’s economy was based on the domestic 
sale of industrial products, the South’s fear that the North could discriminate against 
it with the export tax indicated that the tax could not have been on just interstate 
commerce but related to shipments from foreign countries). 
 236. Id. at 1337-38. 
 237. Id. at 1338. 
 238. Id. at 1339-41. 
 239. 229 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  Stone Container Corp. was designated by the 
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unconstitutional HMT payments tolled the applicable two-year statute 
of limitations codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i)240 and, if so, for how 
long.241  Applying a de novo standard of review,242 the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the Court of International Trade that, under the 
circumstances, tolling began with initiation of the class action, but 
ended upon dismissal of the class by the trial court.243  Stone 
Container argued the two-year statute was tolled by the 1994 filing of 
Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States,244 which sought the certification 
of a class of plaintiffs consisting of all persons who had paid the HMT 
on the export of commercial cargo.245  In 1996, the Court of 
International Trade denied class certification in Baxter Healthcare.246  
However, Stone Container argued that tolling continued until such a 
time as any aspect of Baxter Healthcare could no longer be appealed,247 
and that it would be unconstitutional to apply any statute of 
limitations to claims for the repayment of an unconstitutional tax.248  
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the latter argument, holding that 
Supreme Court precedent clearly allowed a “relatively short” 
limitation period after a tax is found unconstitutional.249  The Federal 
Circuit did agree with Stone Container that tolling of the statute of 
limitations was dictated by the rule promulgated by the Supreme 
Court in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, which suspends the 
                                                          
Court of International Trade as a test case to resolve the limitations issue for 
thousands of individual claims for recovery of improperly collected HMT payments.  
Id. at 1347. 
 240. 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i) provides that: 
A civil action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction 
under § 1581 of this title, other than an action specified in subsections (a)-
(h) of this section, is barred unless commenced in accordance with the rules 
of the court within two years after the cause of action first accrues. 
As discussed above, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) is the Court of International Trade’s 
“residual” grant of jurisdiction.   
 241. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1347. 
 242. Id. at 1349. 
 243. Id. at 1347. 
 244. 925 F. Supp. 794 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996). 
 245. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1348. 
 246. Baxter Healthcare, 925 F. Supp. at 796, 800. 
 247. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1348. 
 248. Id. at 1349. 
 249. Id. (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 
U.S. 18, 45 (1990)). The Federal Circuit observed, following its discussion of 
McKesson, that they were clearly required to follow the Court’s guidance because the 
Court’s statements regarding the statute of limitations were unambiguous and 
carefully measured.  Id. at 1350.  The Federal Circuit also disagreed with Stone 
Container’s claim that, due to uncertainty surrounding the available tax refund 
remedies, a longer, six-year statute of limitations should apply in lieu of the two-year 
period specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i). Id.  The court explained, however, that the 
confusion claimed by Stone Container was not regarding the applicable statute of 
limitations, but rather whether the Court of International Trade was granted 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) or 1581(i).  Id. at 1351. 
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statute of limitations for all members of a class when a class action is 
initiated.250  However, the Federal Circuit also held that the tolling 
ended upon dismissal of the class certification by the trial court, 
thereby significantly limiting the relief sought by Stone Container.251 
In Amoco Oil Co. v. United States,252 the Federal Circuit again 
addressed the severability of the export provision of the HMT and 
affirmed the Court of International Trade’s decision not to grant 
Amoco Oil’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.253  On appeal, Amoco Oil argued that 
severability is a question of fact, not of law, such that it should have 
been afforded the opportunity by the trial court to engage in 
discovery and offer additional evidence.254  Amoco Oil also argued 
that Congress had not intended the export provision of the HMT to 
be severable, as evidenced by its understanding that a tax solely on 
imports would breach U.S. international obligations under GATT.255  
Relying on recent and controlling precedent in Princess Cruises, Inc. v. 
United States256 and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States,257 the 
Federal Circuit quickly rejected both of Amoco Oil’s arguments.258  
The court also dismissed certain constitutional arguments made for 
the first time in Amoco Oil’s reply brief as having been waived.259  
Further, because Amoco Oil’s counsel had failed to acknowledge in 
their opening briefs the controlling precedent established in Princess 
Cruises and Carnival Cruise Lines, the Federal Circuit admonished 
Amoco Oil’s counsel for inappropriate conduct that plausibly 
violated their duty of candor toward the tribunal.260 
In BMW Manufacturing Corp. v. United States,261 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Court of International Trade’s holding that Customs was 
authorized to assess the HMT on goods imported into a Foreign 
                                                          
 250. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1354 (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 
U.S. 538, 554 (1974)). 
 251. Id. at 1355 (citing Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1378 
(11th Cir. 1998)). 
 252. 234 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 253. Id. at 1375. 
 254. Id. at 1376. 
 255. Id. 
 256. 201 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 257. 200 F.3d 1361, 1365-69 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 258. Amoco Oil, 234 F.3d at 1377. 
 259. Id. (stating the court would not address Amoco’s arguments regarding 
HMT’s violation of the Uniformity and Port Preference Clauses because the 
arguments were not introduced in Amoco’s opening brief). 
 260. Id. at 1377-78 (suggesting that in light of recent precedent, Amoco should 
have dropped the appeal after the cases were decided). 
 261. 241 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:31 PM 
2003] INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS 2000-2002 1055 
Trade Zone (“FTZ”).262  FTZs are defined as areas located at or near 
ports of entry into the United States which, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 81a-81u, receive preferential treatment under the U.S. customs 
laws.263  BMW argued that the FTZ statute’s bar on the collection of 
customs duties,264 one aspect of FTZ preferential treatment, 
precluded HMT import payments.265  Applying a de novo standard of 
review,266 the Federal Circuit rejected BMW’s arguments, holding first 
that the HMT does indeed apply to imports into FTZs because, while 
Congress had clearly provided certain exemptions from the HMT, it 
did not provide an exemption for FTZs.267  The court also found that 
HMT import charges were not custom duties exempted by the FTZ 
statute,268 reasoning that, among other things, Congress had clearly 
structured the HMT as a tax imposed for using ports and not for 
entering the United States’ customs territory.269 
In Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc. v. United States,270 the Federal 
Circuit again addressed the appropriate jurisdictional basis for the 
Court of International Trade’s review of HMT refund issues.271  
Thomson brought suit before the Court of International Trade 
challenging the constitutionality of the HMT as applied to imports, 
claiming residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).272  The Court 
of International Trade, however, dismissed Thomson’s suit for lack of 
jurisdiction, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which governs appeals 
of Customs protest decisions,273 provided the only jurisdictional 
basis.274  On appeal, resolution of the issue hinged on whether it 
would have been futile for Thomson to invoke standard Customs 
protest procedures to challenge the constitutionality of the HMT as 
applied to imports.275  The Federal Circuit agreed with Thomson that 
filing a Customs protest would have been futile,276 as Customs was 
powerless to do anything other than passively levy the HMT.277  No 
administrative procedure existed for Thomson to exhaust before 
                                                          
 262. Id. at 1359. 
 263. Foreign Trade Zones, 19 U.S.C. § 81b (2000). 
 264. 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a). 
 265. BMW Mfg., 241 F.3d at 1360. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 1361. 
 268. 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a). 
 269. BMW Mfg., 241 F.3d at 1362. 
 270. 247 F.3d 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 271. Id. at 1213. 
 272. Id. at 1212. 
 273. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (2000). 
 274. Thomson Consumer Elec., 247 F.3d at 1212. 
 275. Id. at 1213-14. 
 276. Id. at 1215. 
 277. Id. 
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initiating judicial review.278  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp.,279 Thomson was authorized 
to avail itself of § 1581(i) residual jurisdiction in challenging the 
constitutionality of HMT import payments.280 
In U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States,281 the Federal Circuit reversed the 
lower court’s decision requiring Customs to pay interest on refunds 
of impermissibly collected HMT payments.282  Applying a de novo 
standard of review,283 the Federal Circuit emphasized the 
longstanding rule that a party may only recover interest against the 
government if the government has explicitly waived sovereign 
immunity, either by contract or statute, or if the Constitution 
requires.284  Relying on its earlier decision in International Business 
Machines (“IBM”), the court ruled that no statute permitted the award 
of interest on refunded HMT payments.285  The court also rejected 
U.S. Shoe’s various arguments that failure of the government to pay 
interest on HMT refunds amounted to an unconstitutional taking.286  
The court noted in conclusion that, given the clarity of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence limiting the government’s payment of interest 
absent express waivers of sovereign immunity or violation of 
constitutional rights, it would be an abuse of discretion for a “judge-
fashioned” remedy to be applied here.287 
Finally, Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. United States288 involved a procedure 
developed by the Court of International Trade for Customs to 
provide HMT refunds.289  Under the procedure, each claimant, 
                                                          
 278. Id.  The court explained that: 
It is unsuitable to apply the exhaustion doctrine in the circumstances of the 
present case.  There are no facts that Customs could have developed 
regarding whether or not the HMT was constitutional, nor did it have 
discretion in applying the HMT to Thomson’s imports.  Moreover, judicial 
efficiency, administrative autonomy, and the weakening of Customs as an 
agency are not implicated by this case.  Thus, we are not faced here with a 
premature resort to the courts. 
Id. 
 279. 523 U.S. 360, 365 (1998) (holding that § 1581(i) was the proper 
jurisdictional basis for HMT disputes). 
 280. Thomson Consumer Elec., 247 F.3d at 1215. 
 281. 296 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 282. Id. at 1380. 
 283. Id. at 1381. 
 284. Id. (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 311 (1986)). 
 285. Id. at 1381-82 (citing Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 201 F.3d 1367, 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 286. Id. at 1383-85 (holding that no taking resulted in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment because no private property right existed in any interest associated with 
payment of the HMT). 
 287. Id. at 1386 (citing Int’l Bus. Machs., 201 F.3d at 1374). 
 288. 301 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 289. Id. at 1302. 
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including Hohenberg, executed a consent judgment for the return of 
HMT principal and interest, depending on the outcome of the IBM 
test case.290  The consent judgments identified that the Court of 
International Trade had residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(i).291  When the Federal Circuit in IBM determined that no 
interest could be paid on HMT refunds arising out of judgments 
under § 1581(i),292 Hohenberg and other exporters sought to amend 
their consent judgments to invoke jurisdiction under § 1581(a).293  
The lower court denied those motions.294  Hohenberg challenged the 
denial of the motion, arguing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Swisher International295 required the Court of International Trade to 
amend the jurisdictional statement in the consent judgment.296  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed, and affirmed the lower court’s denial of 
the motion to amend.297  The Federal Circuit reasoned that 
Hohenberg could have preserved jurisdiction under § 1581(a), but 
that it chose not to because it desired to obtain an immediate refund 
of its HMT payments.298  As the court noted, Hohenberg elected an 
immediate refund, gambling that the IBM case would not lead to 
advantageous resolution of the interest issue.299  The court also 
summarily dismissed Hohenberg’s other arguments, citing its recent 
decision in U.S. Shoe300 that neither the Constitution nor any statute 
mandated the payment of interest, leaving Hohenberg unable to 
demonstrate any entitlement to interest on HMT refunds.301 
D. Duty Drawback 
Since 2000, the Federal Circuit has decided two cases involving 
contracts for duty drawback under 19 U.S.C. § 1313, i.e., agreements 
                                                          
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. (noting that the original complaints asserted Court of International Trade 
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1581(a) and (i), but that the consent judgment was based 
solely on § 1581(i) jurisdiction). 
 292. Int’l Bus. Machs., 201 F.3d at 1374. 
 293. Hohenberg Bros., 301 F.3d at 1303 (noting that Hohenberg sought an award of 
post-summons interest under 28 U.S.C. § 2644, the section applicable to awards 
under 1581(a) jurisdiction). 
 294. Id. 
 295. 205 F.3d at 1358. 
 296. Hohenberg Bros., 301 F.3d at 1303. 
 297. Id. The applicable standard of review was whether the lower court had 
abused its discretion in denying the motion.  Id. (citing Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. 
United States, 254 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 298. Id. at 1305 . 
 299. Id. (noting that IBM can be read to allow interest on HMT refunds to 
claimants asserting jurisdiction under § 1581(a)). 
 300. 296 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 301. Hohenberg Bros., 301 F.3d at 1306. 
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between importers and Customs providing for refunds of duties paid 
on imported merchandise that is incorporated into articles for 
export.302  The Federal Circuit affirmed in both instances. 
In International Light Metals v. United States,303 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Court of International Trade decision, on remand, to 
direct Customs to repay certain duty drawback payments to 
International Light Metals (“ILM”) that the company had previously 
refunded.304  The decision involved certain drawback claims filed by 
ILM with respect to imports of titanium sponge.305  Customs first 
allowed the drawback claims, but later reversed in part.306  ILM repaid 
as required by Customs, and subsequently filed suit in the Court of 
International Trade challenging Customs’ recalculation of the 
drawback amount.307  The Court of International Trade affirmed 
Customs’ drawback recalculation, but was subsequently reversed by 
the Federal Circuit, which held that ILM was entitled to repayment of 
a portion of the refunded drawback.308  On remand, the Court of 
International Trade ordered Customs to repay ILM a specified 
amount of previously refunded drawback, with interest.309  The U.S. 
Government appealed this remand decision, contending that the 
lower court should not have directed Customs to repay a specified 
amount of drawback, but should instead have remanded the issue to 
Customs for action consistent with the court’s interpretation of the 
drawback statute.310  According to the government, the trial court’s 
order violated the settled principle of administrative law that a 
reviewing court may not dictate to the agency how it is to apply the 
law to the facts, where the agency has particular expertise.311  The 
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the only issue in 
the prior appeal had been Customs’ interpretation of the drawback 
                                                          
 302. 19 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (2000). 
 303. 279 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 304. Id. at 1000-01. 
 305. Id. at 1001. 
 306. Id. (Customs discovered ILM had been substituting titanium alloy scrap for 
titanium sponge in its production process, which it found was improper under the 
drawback contract). 
 307. Id. at 1002. 
 308. Id.  The specific question before the Federal Circuit in the earlier 
International Light Metals case was whether certain exported titanium products were 
“of the same kind and quality” as certain imported titanium products for purposes of 
19 U.S.C. § 1313(b).  Int’l Light Metals v. United States, 194 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999).  Under this provision, drawback may be requested with respect to certain 
merchandise substituted for the imported duty-paid merchandise, but only if the 
substitute merchandise is “of the same kind and quality” as the imported duty-paid 
merchandise.  19 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (2000). 
 309. Int’l Light Metals, 279 F.3d at 1002. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 1003. 
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statute, which determined the specific amount of drawback to be 
repaid to ILM.312  Accordingly, all that remained for Customs on 
remand was the ministerial act of repaying the amount of drawback 
initially approved, with interest, an action not requiring agency 
expertise.313 
In Hartog Foods International, Inc. v. United States,314 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s rejection of the exporter’s claim 
that Customs should have paid interest on certain grants of duty 
drawback.315  The dispute arose when the exporter, Hartog Foods, 
paid ad valorem316 duties on imported juice products and, upon export 
of the merchandise, filed for drawback.317  Customs initially denied 
the request.318  Hartog Foods then initiated protest actions and, five 
years later, Customs paid the requested drawback without interest.319  
After unsuccessfully seeking payment of interest through another 
protest action, Hartog Foods brought suit in the Court of 
International Trade.320  The Court of International Trade granted the 
U.S. Government’s request for summary judgment, finding that 
sovereign immunity principles precluded an interest award.321  Hartog 
Foods appealed.  The Federal Circuit’s decision turned on 
application of 19 U.S.C. § 1505, which requires Customs, inter alia, to 
“refund any excess moneys deposited, together with interest thereon, 
as determined on a liquidation or reliquidation.”322  Applying a de 
novo standard of review323 and emphasizing its obligation to construe 
waivers of sovereign immunity strictly in favor of the government,324 
                                                          
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. 291 F.3d 789 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 315. Id. at 790. 
 316. The definition of ad valorem is “proportional to the value of the thing taxed.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 53 (7th ed. 1999). 
 317. Hartog Foods Int’l, 291 F.3d at 790. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 790-91. 
 320. Id. at 791. 
 321. Id. (reporting that the Court of International Trade affirmed Customs’ denial 
of interest for two reasons:  (1) drawback moneys do not qualify as “excess moneys 
deposited” and (2) sovereign immunity for interest awards on drawback claims is not 
specifically waived under the United States Code). 
 322. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b) (2000).  Section 1505(c) further specifies that any 
qualifying interest accrues from the date estimated duties are deposited with 
Customs.  19 U.S.C. § 1505(c). 
 323. Hartog Foods Int’l, 291 F.3d at 791 (citing Mead, 283 F.3d at 1346) (explaining 
that while certain Customs rulings are entitled to deference proportional to their 
persuasiveness, Customs had decided the protest without issuance of a ruling in this 
case, such that no agency interpretation existed to which to defer). 
 324. Id. (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986)) (confirming 
applicability of the “no interest rule,” i.e., that absent an express statutory waiver, the 
United States is immune from any requirement to pay interest). 
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the Federal Circuit held that “excess moneys deposited” for purposes 
of § 1505 applied to the overpayment of estimated duties, but not to 
standard drawback claims.325  The court reasoned that Hartog Food’s 
interest claim was not a claim for “excess moneys deposited” because 
the company had not paid to Customs an amount “beyond legal 
requirements.”326  Additionally, Customs had not, as with all standard 
drawback situations, held or profited from excessive collections.327  
The court also found it significant that, in the Customs 
Modernization Act of 1993, Congress had declined to amend § 1505 
to expressly authorize interest awards on duty drawbacks.328  The 
Federal Circuit distinguished its drawback decision in International 
Light Metals, explaining that the grant of interest on the refund of the 
drawback amount reclaimed by Customs was merely a way to put ILM 
in its rightful position before Customs’ error.329  The court also stated 
that International Light Metals did not involve standard drawback 
claims or implicate the sovereign immunity principles governing 
awards of interest by the government.330 
E. Other Customs Issues 
Over the period 2000 through 2002, the Federal Circuit reviewed 
several other Court of International Trade decisions involving aspects 
of U.S. customs law outside of the general categories discussed above.  
These decisions reflect the richness and complexity of the U.S. 
customs laws, as well as the numerous exceptions to the free flow of 
goods and services across the U.S. border.  The Federal Circuit 
reversed in two of the three cases discussed below, in each case 
applying a different standard of review. 
In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States,331 the Federal Circuit 
considered certain due process issues arising under 19 U.S.C. § 1466, 
which authorizes Customs to impose duties on the value of certain 
repairs to U.S. vessels undertaken in foreign ports.332  In 1994, the 
Federal Circuit construed that statute in its decision for Texaco Marine 
Services, Inc. v. United States.333  The Texaco court modified an earlier, 
more restrictive interpretation of § 1466, holding that covered 
                                                          
 325. Id. at 792-93. 
 326. Id. at 793. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 794. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 794-95. 
 331. 239 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 332. Id. at 1367-68. 
 333. 44 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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expenses were those repair expenses that would not have been 
incurred “but for” the repair work.334  Following Texaco, Customs 
issued guidelines, published in the Customs Bulletin, announcing the 
required change in practice and adoption of the “but for” test.335  
Customs applied the test to certain of Sea-Land Service’s vessel repair 
expense entries.336  Sea-Land Service filed protests before Customs, 
and challenged the denial of its protests before the Court of 
International Trade.337  Sea-Land Service’s challenge was based on the 
theory that, in applying the “but for” test, Customs had violated the 
notice and comment procedures applicable to “interpretative rulings 
or decisions” as set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).338  The Court of 
International Trade granted the U.S. Government’s request for 
summary judgment, and Sea-Land Service appealed.339 
Applying a de novo standard of review,340 the Federal Circuit 
rejected Sea-Land Service’s arguments and affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.341  The court found that Customs was not required to apply 
the notice and comment procedures of § 1625(c) because it was the 
Federal Circuit, not Customs, that prompted the change in Customs’ 
pre-Texaco interpretation of the vessel repair statute.342  As the court 
stated, “Texaco wiped the slate of decisions under § 1466(a) clean, 
requiring the dutiability of all vessel repair expenses to be 
determined by the ‘but for’ test.”343  Accordingly, in the wake of 
Texaco, Customs was applying a new interpretation of § 1466(a) 
rather than modifying a “prior interpretative ruling or decision” for 
purposes of § 1625(c).344  Finally, the court noted that the policy 
reasons underlying § 1625(c) did not apply because the interested 
public was informed through publication of the Texaco decision that 
Customs would be required to administer § 1466(a) applying the “but 
for” test.345 
                                                          
 334. Id. at 1544-45. 
 335. Sea-Land Serv., 239 F.3d at 1369 (citing Customs Headquarters Memorandum 
113308 from the Assistant Commissioner for Customs Office of Regulations and 
Rulings, to Customs’ New Orleans Regional Director (Jan. 18, 1995)). 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 1370. 
 339. Id. at 1371. 
 340. Id.  
 341. Id.  
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 1372. 
 344. Id. at 1373. 
 345. Id. at 1373-74 (holding that although Customs’ individual evaluations of 
vessel repair expenses was the first time Customs used the new test, the new 
approach was first directed by the court’s decision in Texaco). 
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In Bestfoods v. United States,346 involving the application of federal 
marking rules to peanut slurry imported from Canada and used in 
the production of Skippy peanut butter, the Federal Circuit reversed 
the lower court’s invalidation of an implementing regulation.347  The 
federal marking statute provides that imported articles must be 
marked “in a conspicuous manner . . . to indicate to an ultimate 
purchaser the English name of the country of origin of the article.”348  
However, under 19 C.F.R. § 102.11, promulgated pursuant to the 
NAFTA, an imported article is deemed to be of U.S. origin if post-
importation manufacturing in the United States is sufficient to 
change the article’s tariff classification, i.e., to “shift” the tariff.349  
Applying § 102.11, Customs determined that Bestfood’s post-
importation processing did not change the tariff classification of the 
imported peanut slurry and, accordingly, that Bestfoods was required 
to mark the Canadian origin of the final product.350  Following an 
initial challenge to Customs’ application of § 102.11,351 Bestfoods 
raised a new argument that the imported peanut slurry should have 
qualified for a de minimis exception to the marking provisions, 19 
C.F.R. § 102.13(b).352  The Court of International Trade agreed with 
Bestfoods, and effectively extended § 102.13 to certain agricultural 
products, including Bestfoods’ peanut butter.353  The U.S. 
Government appealed from this decision.354 
Noting that the federal marking statute expressly delegates to 
Customs the authority to promulgate implementing regulations, the 
Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decision under the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA’s”) arbitrary and capricious 
standard, and reversed.355  The court reasoned that, in light of the 
broad statutory language of the marking statute, which requires 
marking of all articles with certain enumerated exceptions, it could 
not conclude that Customs was required to provide additional 
exceptions.356  The court also found that, by withholding the seven 
                                                          
 346. 260 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 347. Id. at 1322. 
 348. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2000). 
 349. See Bestfoods, 260 F.3d at 1322-23. 
 350. See id. (stating that since peanut slurry and peanut butter have the same tariff 
classification the tariff shift method does not apply). 
 351. See id. 
 352. Id. at 1323. This provision applies to non-agricultural products and excepts 
from the marking requirements imported material constituting less than seven 
percent of the overall value of the good into which it is incorporated.  Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 1322. 
 355. Id. at 1323-24 (citing, inter alia, 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
 356. Id. at 1324. 
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percent exception from agricultural products, the regulation tended 
to harmonize country-of-origin rules for marking purposes with 
country-of-origin rules under the NAFTA.357  Finally, the court 
rejected Bestfoods’ arguments that the regulation had been 
motivated by a misplaced concern for consumer safety and that it led 
to absurd results.358  Finally, citing pertinent provisions of the NAFTA, 
the court stated that it was not arbitrary or capricious for Customs to 
“consider substantially transformed ingredients to be products of the 
country of manufacture” even if the raw materials come from another 
country.359 
In Ford Motor Co. v. United States,360 the Federal Circuit reversed a 
factual determination of the Court of International Trade arising 
from a complex and longstanding dispute between Ford and 
Customs—including a fraud investigation—concerning the treatment 
of certain car and truck components imported by Ford into its 
Foreign Trade Subzone (“FTSZ”) in Louisville, Kentucky.361  Under 
19 U.S.C. § 1504(a), an entry not liquidated within one year of the 
date of entry is deemed liquidated at the rate of entry asserted by the 
importer at the time of entry.362  However, § 1504(b) authorizes 
Customs to extend the one-year deadline.363  On the basis of the 
ongoing fraud investigation, Customs issued three one-year 
extensions, ultimately liquidating the entries at issue at rates higher 
than originally asserted by Ford and claiming additional duties of 
over $5 million.364  Ford protested Customs’ liquidation and, 
following denial of the protest, filed suit with the Court of 
International Trade.365  That court granted summary judgment for 
the United States, holding that the ongoing fraud investigation 
justified Customs’ three extensions of liquidation.366  Ford appealed 
to the Federal Circuit, which remanded to the lower court for 
consideration of the reasonableness of Customs’ delays in 
liquidation.367  Thereupon the Court of International Trade 
                                                          
 357. Id. at 1325. 
 358. Id. at 1325-26 (noting that under the regulation, consumers would not be 
informed of any quantity of foreign material in a product where such foreign 
material had undergone substantial transformation and, therewith, a “tariff shift”). 
 359. Id. at 1326 (citing NAFTA Annex 311). 
 360. 286 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 361. Id. at 1337-40. 
 362. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (2000). 
 363. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b) (2000)  
 364. Ford, 286 F.3d at 1338. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. at 1338-39. 
 367. Id. at 1339. 
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conducted a three-day trial, and found the delay to constitute a 
reasonable exercise of Customs’ authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1504.368 
The Federal Circuit subsequently reversed.369  Recognizing at the 
outset Customs’ broad discretion to extend liquidation of entries 
under § 1504, and explaining that its review of lower court factual 
determinations are under a “clear error standard,” the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade’s individual 
findings of fact, but disagreed with its ultimate factual conclusion.370  
Reviewing in detail the record of the Customs investigation, the 
Federal Circuit stressed that Customs had pointed not to 
extraordinary circumstances to explain the delay of the fraud 
investigation, but only to typical workplace exigencies such as 
“competing responsibilities, an agent taking sick leave, and the 
various tasks associated with starting a new office.”371  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that affirmance under the circumstances “would 
be setting an unacceptably low bar for reasonableness.”372 
Judge Bryson dissented, noting that the Federal Circuit had 
previously held that Customs enjoys “very broad” discretion in 
extending liquidation so long as the total pre-liquidation period does 
not exceed four years.373  Judge Bryson reasoned that, given this high 
degree of discretion, combined with the “intensely factual” nature of 
the lower court’s inquiry, he would have affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.374  He also pointed out that a long period of inactivity in a 
particular investigation does not automatically render the delay 
unreasonable where, for example, busy agents are conducting 
multiple investigations simultaneously and are forced by heavy case-
loads to prioritize.375 
                                                          
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. at 1335. 
 370. Id. at 1340-41. 
 371. Id. at 1343 (contrasting the delays caused by typical workplace occurrences 
with delays caused by outside events such as national catastrophes). 
 372. Id. 
 373. See id. at 1343-44 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 767-68 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 374. Id. at 1345-46. 
 375. Id. (arguing that prioritization dictates putting less pressing matters off for 
more immediate deadlines throughout many professions). 
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II. TRADE REMEDY LAWS 
A. U.S. Department of Commerce 
U.S. industries are heavy users of the trade remedy laws,376 which 
authorize, among other things, the imposition of duties to offset 
certain foreign trading practices deemed unfair, such as dumping, 
i.e., sales in the U.S. market at unfairly low prices, and subsidization 
by foreign governments.  U.S. law provides for antidumping duties in 
the case of the former,377 and countervailing duties in the case of the 
latter.378 The vast majority of trade remedy cases before the Federal 
Circuit involve methodological decisions of the U.S. Commerce 
Department, and of these decisions, the majority concern the 
measurement of antidumping “margins,” or the extent to which the 
value of the imported product is below its fair value as defined under 
law. The margin, in turn, determines the duty liability of the 
importer, who is responsible for the payment of any antidumping or 
countervailing duties ultimately assessed on the imported products.379  
The considerable commercial implications of these methodologies 
ensure a constant stream of intensely litigated cases.380  Moreover, the 
overhaul of the U.S. trade remedy laws by the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 1994 (“URAA”) generated scores of new issues of 
statutory construction that have continued to occupy the Federal 
Circuit in recent years.381 
The standard of review applicable to most antidumping and 
countervailing duty determinations is dictated by statute, requiring 
the court to overturn any determination which it finds “to be 
                                                          
 376. See IMPORT ADMINISTRATION, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY 
STATISTICS, at www.ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/iastats1.html (last modified Jan. 17, 2003).   
 377. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. 
 378. 19 U.S.C. § 1671. 
 379. See 19 U.S.C. § 1505 (Supp. 2002) (providing for payment of duties and fees 
by importer of record). 
 380. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. United States, 289 F.3d 792 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding 
that where the scope of antidumping duty order was unambiguous and undisputed, 
the goods at issue clearly did not fall within the scope of the order); Novosteel SA v. 
United States, 284 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that petitions for 
investigation and antidumping and countervailing duty orders did not 
unambiguously exclude profile slabs from scope of orders issued); Wheatland Tube 
Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (arising out of claims dealing 
with the scope of merchandise subject to antidumping and countervailing duty 
investigations). 
 381. See, e.g., Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 F.3d 1330 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that Commerce found, based on the expanded affiliation 
provisions of the URAA, that Ta Chen and Sun were affiliated for a portion of the 
period covered by the third review); Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 243 F.3d 
1301, 1303-05 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing antidumping statute as it was amended by 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act). 
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unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law.”382  As discussed below, application of this 
standard during the last three years yielded frequent reversal of the 
Court of International Trade. 
1. Scope of merchandise covered by antidumping or countervailing duty 
 proceedings 
During the last three years, the Federal Circuit examined five 
decisions of the Court of International Trade involving the “scope” of 
the merchandise subject to an antidumping or countervailing duty 
investigation, that is, the specific products covered by the proceeding 
at issue.383  The Federal Circuit allowed the lower court decision to 
stand in only one of these five cases.384 
Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States385 involved the so-called “anti-
circumvention” provision of the trade remedy laws, 19 U.S.C.             
§ 1677j(c), which allows the Department of Commerce to include in 
the scope of a proceeding merchandise that is technically outside the 
scope of the proceeding, but has been “altered in form in minor 
respects.”386  In this case, the Commerce Department had imposed an 
antidumping duty order on corrosion-resistant steel from Japan, the 
scope of which described various technical aspects of the covered 
steel products, including a list of specified percentages by weight of 
fifteen listed elements.387  One of these elements was boron and, 
according to the scope, steel containing 0.0008% or more of boron 
was not covered by the investigation.388  Subsequently, a domestic steel 
producer alleged that Japanese exporters were circumventing the 
order by adding small amounts of boron to their product—an 
alteration apparently irrelevant to consumers of the steel, but which 
                                                          
 382.  19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994). 
 383. The trade remedy laws authorize the imposition of antidumping and 
countervailing duties with respect to “a class or kind of merchandise.”  19 U.S.C.       
§ 1673 (2000). 
 384. See Novosteel, 284 F.3d at 1261 (affirming the Court of International Trade’s 
decision holding that substantial evidence supported the scope determination by the 
Commerce Department). 
 385. 219 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 386. Id. at 1349.  Subsequent Commerce Department regulations provide that the 
Department “may include within the scope . . . articles altered in form or appearance 
in minor respects,” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(i), and specify procedures for determining 
whether a particular product is included in the scope.  19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a)-(c) 
(2000). 
 387. Id. at 1350-51; see also Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products 
from Japan, 58 Fed. Reg. 44,163 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 19, 1993) (antidumping 
duty order). 
 388. Nippon, 219 F.3d at 1350. 
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rendered it outside the literal scope of the order.389  The Commerce 
Department initiated an anti-circumvention inquiry based on the 
allegations, and Nippon shortly thereafter filed suit with the Court of 
International Trade, pursuant to the residual jurisdiction provision, 
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) 
against the Department, as well as preliminary and permanent 
injunctions.390  The court granted the TRO and preliminary 
injunction.391  The U.S. Government appealed, arguing that 
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1581(i) was not available to Nippon, as it 
could have awaited the Department’s final determination and, at that 
time, availed itself of jurisdiction pursuant to § 1581(c).392 
The Federal Circuit explained that the availability of jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) turned on whether Commerce’s initiation 
of the minor alterations inquiry was beyond its authority.393  If the 
court decided Commerce’s initiation was proper, then the Court of 
International Trade had no basis for its preliminary injunction.394 
Therefore, both the merits of the case and the jurisdictional question 
hinged on whether Commerce acted within its authority in initiating 
its inquiry.395  Noting, first, that courts ordinarily should decline to 
interfere with an agency until it has completed the action at issue, the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that the Commerce Department had 
responded to the anti-circumvention petition precisely as authorized 
by the statute and regulations.396  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
the lower court’s reasoning that its hands were bound by the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States.397  As the court 
explained, the major distinguishing factor between Wheatland Tube 
and this case was that, in Wheatland Tube, the very product for which 
domestic producers sought an anti-circumvention inquiry had been 
expressly excluded from the scope.398  Moreover, in Wheatland Tube, 
the issue was the propriety of the Department’s decision to conduct a 
                                                          
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. at 1351. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 1349. 
 393. Id. at 1353. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 1353-54.  The court further stated that Commerce was carrying out a 
function given to it by Congress when it initiated the inquiry to determine “if an 
antidumping duty order has been circumvented by making minor alterations in the 
form of the product otherwise subject to that order.”  Id. at 1354. 
 397. Id. at 1355-56 (citing Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 398. Id. at 1355. 
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scope inquiry rather than an anti-circumvention inquiry.399  For these 
reasons, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of International 
Trade had improperly enjoined the Commerce Department from 
conducting the anti-circumvention inquiry, and ordered that court to 
dissolve the injunction and dismiss Nippon’s complaint.400 
In Eckstrom Industries, Inc. v. United States,401 the Federal Circuit 
again reversed the Court of International Trade, this time in a 
dispute arising out of an administrative scope ruling purporting to 
clarify the scope of the antidumping duty order covering certain 
stainless steel, butt-welded pipe fittings imported from Taiwan.402  The 
Court of International Trade decision at issue affirmed the 
Commerce Department’s scope ruling that Eckstrom’s cast pipe 
fittings were covered by the order.403  According to Eckstrom, its cast 
pipe fittings, produced by molding molten steel into the desired 
shape, were entirely different from the fittings covered by the order, 
produced by shaping and welding sheets of steel.404  Applying the 
substantial evidence standard, the Federal Circuit agreed with 
Eckstrom’s arguments that the Commerce Department had, in its 
scope ruling, impermissibly expanded the scope of the antidumping 
duty order to include Eckstrom’s cast fittings.405  The court followed 
the analytic framework set forth in the Commerce Department’s 
scope regulation—19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1)—and examined “the 
descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the initial 
investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary (including 
prior scope determinations) and the Commission.”406  The Federal 
Circuit found that each factor confirmed that the scope did not 
include Eckstrom’s cast fittings.407  In reviewing these factors, the 
court was critical of the Department’s reliance on the fact that 
Eckstrom’s pipe fittings happened to meet one of the conditions of 
use specified in the order,408 and found that petitioners had described 
a process “never used to manufacture cast fittings.”409  The Federal 
Circuit also rejected the Department’s remand scope determination 
based on the so-called Diversified Products factors enumerated at 19 
                                                          
 399. Id. at 1356. 
 400. Id. at 1357. 
 401. 254 F.3d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 402. Id. at 1069. 
 403. Id. at 1071. 
 404. Id. at 1072. 
 405. Id. at 1072-1073. 
 406. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) (2000).  See Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1072. 
 407. Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1072-76. 
 408. Id. at 1073.   
 409. Id. at 1074. 
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C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2), reasoning that the Department should not 
have reached these factors because the (k)(1) factors were dispositive 
in clarifying the scope.410  The court concluded, “the overwhelming 
evidence indicates that the Order does not cover cast pipe fittings,” 
and reversed the scope determination.411 
In Novosteel SA v. United States,412 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
Court of International Trade’s decision upholding the Commerce 
Department’s ruling that certain carbon steel profile slabs were 
covered by the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on cut-to-
length carbon steel plates from Germany.413  In the scope 
determination at issue, the Commerce Department found the 
existing scope record to be ambiguous with respect to whether the 
profile slabs, imported by Novosteel, were “flat-rolled” or “further 
worked,” and therefore within the scope.414   Commerce then 
conducted a Diversified Products analysis pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 
§ 351.225(k)(2).415  Emphasizing the Commerce Department’s 
substantial discretion in interpreting and clarifying the scope of 
antidumping and countervailing duty orders,416 the Federal Circuit 
first concluded that the orders did not, as contended by Novosteel, 
unambiguously exclude the profile slabs.417  The court also rejected 
Novosteel’s contention that the petitions’ and orders’ omission of the 
HTSUS subheading covering the profile slabs was dispositive because 
“the petitions hardly defined the scope of the products in terms of 
the HTSUS; rather, they described the products covered by the 
Orders using ‘dimensional’ criteria and references to non-HTSUS 
sources . . . .”418  The Federal Circuit then considered two evidentiary 
issues central to the Commerce Department’s scope ruling: first, 
whether the profile slabs were “flat-rolled,” a characteristic of 
                                                          
 410. Id. at 1075-76. 
 411. Id. at 1076. 
 412. 284 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The underlying antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders were published, respectively, in 58 Fed. Reg. 43,756 
(Dep’t Commerce Aug. 17, 1993) (antidumping duty order) and 58 Fed. Reg. 44,170 
(Dep’t Commerce Aug. 19, 1993) (countervailing duty order). 
 413. Id. at 1265. 
 414. As explained in the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the Commerce Department 
applied a definition of “flat-rolled” based on the HTSUS, which defines flat-rolled 
steel products as products that have been “further worked [beyond] . . . primary hot-
rolling.”  Id. at 1267 (citing HTSUS, Notes 1(k) and 1(j)). 
 415. Id. at 1266. 
 416. Id. at 1269 (citing, inter alia, Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. 
United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (pointing out that while the 
Commerce Department may not change the scope of its antidumping orders, it has 
substantial freedom to interpret and clarify the coverage of those orders). 
 417. Id. at 1269-70. 
 418. Id. at 1270. 
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merchandise covered by the orders, and second, what weight to 
accord to the German producer’s sales brochure describing the 
profile slabs.419  On the first issue, the court found that Novosteel had 
failed to establish error in the Commerce Department’s or lower 
court’s definition of that term;420 on the second, it found that 
descriptions of the product and production process set forth in the 
producer’s sales brochure “provide the requisite substantial evidence” 
in support of the scope ruling.421 
Judge Dyk dissented from the majority opinion, explaining that 
while appellant’s briefs were “awash” in frivolous arguments, the 
“single meritorious argument” has been lost.422  This single 
meritorious argument, he further explained, was Novosteel’s 
argument with respect to “further working” of the profile slabs.423  
According to Judge Dyk, the Commerce Department’s analysis on 
this point was speculative and “necessarily fails.”424  Judge Dyk further 
expressed his view that the record was undeveloped with respect to 
any “further working” that the profile slabs might have undergone, 
and that this gap in the record should not be seen as proof of 
ambiguity in the coverage of the scope, but as warranting a remand 
for further investigation of this point.425 
The dispute before the Federal Circuit in Xerox Corp. v. United 
States426 involved a ministerial error by Customs in administering the 
scope of the antidumping duty order on certain photocopier belts 
from Japan.427  Xerox filed a protest with Customs following Customs’ 
levy of a 93.16 percent antidumping duty on certain belts imported 
by Xerox, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(2), contending that its 
merchandise was clearly outside the scope of the antidumping duty 
order.428  Customs denied the protest, and Xerox appealed to the 
                                                          
 419. Id. at 1270-72. 
 420. Id. at 1271-72. 
 421. See id. at 1272-73 (noting that the scope ruling did not turn on the sales 
brochure, but that the brochure provided the Commerce Department with a basis 
for deciding to conduct a Diversified Products analysis pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 
§ 351.225(k)(2)). 
 422. Id. at 1274 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. at 1276. 
 425. Id. at 1276-77 (admonishing the majority not to uphold a situation where the 
Commerce Department failed to perform the required factual investigation and 
subsequently declared the scope to be ambiguous).  
 426. 289 F.3d 792 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 427. See Industrial Belts and Components and Parts Thereof, whether Cured or 
Uncured, from Japan, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,314 (Dep’t Commerce June 14, 1989) 
(antidumping duty order) (describing the scope as covering “industrial belts used for 
power transmission . . . and containing textile fiber (including glass fiber) or steel 
wire, cord or strand”). 
 428. Xerox, 289 F.3d at 793. 
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Court of International Trade pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).429  The 
court dismissed Xerox’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
holding that Xerox should have sought a scope determination from 
the Commerce Department, and then it could have appealed 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).430  Reviewing the lower court’s 
decision de novo,431 the Federal Circuit reversed.432  The court first 
explained that, under well-settled law, the appropriate remedy where 
the scope is unclear is to seek a scope ruling from the Commerce 
Department.433  However, where, as in this case, the merchandise at 
issue is “facially outside” of the pertinent scope, a scope ruling is 
unnecessary, and the power to correct the error lies within Customs’ 
ministerial authority.434  The court also clarified that “misapplication 
of the order by Customs is properly the subject of a protest under 19 
U.S.C. § 1514(a)(2).”435 
The Federal Circuit again reversed the Court of International 
Trade in Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States,436 a case arising out of a 
Commerce Department scope ruling that certain steel floor plate 
with “patterns in relief” imported by Duferco was covered by the 
antidumping and countervailing duty orders on cut-to-length carbon 
steel plate from Belgium.437  The relevant scope language included 
“flat-rolled products of nonrectangular cross-section where such 
cross-section is achieved subsequent to the rolling process,” and 
clarified that “[o]nly those products whose nonrectangular cross-
sections are achieved subsequent to the rolling process are included 
within the scope of the investigations.”438  In its scope ruling, the 
Commerce Department stated that the existence of patterns in relief 
did not alter the rectangularity of the product, and further supported 
its conclusion based on evidence of petitioner’s intent from the early 
stages of the investigations.439  The Court of International Trade 
                                                          
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. 
 433. Id. at 795 (citing Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) and Fujitsu Steel Co. v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 245 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997)). 
 434. Id. at 792. 
 435. Id. 
 436. 296 F.3d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 437. See Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Belgium, 58 Fed. Reg. 
37,083 (Dep’t Commerce July 9, 1993) (final antidumping determination) and 
Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,273 (Dep’t Commerce July 9, 
1993) (final countervailing duty determination). 
 438. Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Appendix I to final antidumping and 
countervailing determinations, setting forth scope descriptions). 
 439. Id. at 1094. 
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affirmed the scope ruling, and Duferco appealed.440  Beginning by 
confirming the considerable deference owed the Commerce 
Department in ascertaining the scope of antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders,441 the Federal Circuit defined the issue as 
“an issue of first impression—whether the scope orders can be 
interpreted to cover subject merchandise even if there is no language 
in the orders that includes or can be reasonably interpreted to 
include the merchandise.”442  The answer, implied in the court’s 
construction of the issue, was no.443  In reaching this answer, the 
Federal Circuit first examined the Court of International Trade’s 
characterization of the § 351.225(k)(1) scope analysis framework, 
finding it to be “exactly backwards.”444  Rather than begin with an 
evaluation of petitioner’s intent, any scope analysis should look 
primarily to the Commerce Department’s final determination, which 
“reflects the decision that has been made as to which merchandise is 
within the final scope of the investigation and is subject to the 
order.”445  While citing its earlier guidance in Novosteel that scope 
language must necessarily be in general terms,446 the court explained 
that review of the petition and agency pronouncements during the 
investigations “cannot substitute for language in the order itself.”447  
Therefore, because the scope ruling at issue did not explain how the 
antidumping and countervailing duty orders themselves could be 
read to include the patterned floor plate at issue, the scope ruling 
constituted an invalid expansion of the scope as provided in the 
orders.448 
2. The right to sue 
The jurisdictional scheme defining judicial review of final agency 
determinations under the trade remedy laws is broad, providing in 19 
U.S.C. § 1516a, that any “interested party who is a party to the 
proceeding in connection with which the matter arises may 
commence an action in the United States Court of International 
                                                          
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. at 1094-95 (citing Ericsson, 60 F.3d at 782 and Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1072) 
(noting that Commerce may not interpret an order so as to modify its scope or in any 
other manner contrary to its terms). 
 442. Id. at 1095. 
 443. Id. at 1096. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. at 1096-1097 (citing Novosteel, 284 F.3d at 1271). 
 447. Id. at 1097. 
 448. See id. at 1097-98 (emphasizing the importance of the language in the order 
in construing its scope). 
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Trade.”449  This provision was the subject of one dispute that reached 
the Federal Circuit during the last three years. 
In JCM, Ltd. v. United States,450 the Federal Circuit held that § 1516a 
could not be circumvented by an interested party—JCM—that had 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before the Commerce 
Department.451  During the antidumping investigation of pasta from 
Italy, certain Italian producers and exporters and certain U.S. 
importers challenged the Department’s extension of provisional 
measures following the preliminary antidumping determination.452  In 
one of these challenges, the Court of International Trade held that 
the extension was unlawful and ordered a refund of cash deposits, 
with interest, of applicable entries.453  Following that decision, JCM, 
which had not participated in the previous challenges to the 
extension of provisional measures, filed suit also seeking a refund, 
asserting jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the residual 
jurisdiction provision.454  Agreeing with the Government that JCM 
could have, but did not, participate in the administrative proceeding 
and the challenge under § 1581(c), the Court of International Trade 
dismissed JCM’s suit for lack of jurisdiction.455  JCM subsequently 
appealed.456  Reviewing the lower court’s analysis on a de novo basis,457 
the Federal Circuit explained that, because Congress has set out an 
administrative process for the resolution of antidumping disputes, 
failure of a claimant to follow this process precludes it from obtaining 
review of the resulting antidumping determination in the Court of 
International Trade.458  The court further explained that 1581(i) 
                                                          
 449. This provision is cross-referenced in the Court of International Trade’s 
jurisdictional provisions, with 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) providing that the Court of 
International Trade “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced 
under § 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930,” and § 1581(i) providing that that subsection 
“shall not confer jurisdiction over an antidumping or countervailing duty 
determination which is reviewable . . . by the Court of International Trade under 
§ 516A(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930.” 
 450. JCM, Ltd. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 451. Id. at 1360. 
 452. See id. at 1358 (challenging Commerce’s authority to impose such an 
extension).  Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d), provisional measures, i.e., security 
required on subject imports following a preliminary determination of dumping, may 
only remain in effect for four months—unless exporters representing a significant 
portion of exports of the subject merchandise request an extension.  Id.  The 
determination at issue here is Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,326 (Dep’t 
Commerce June 3, 1996) (final antidumping determination). 
 453. See F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara San Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 21 
C.I.T. 1130 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997). 
 454. JCM, 210 F.3d at 1358. 
 455. Id. at 1359. 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. 
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jurisdiction is not available if the plaintiff could use other subsections 
under 1581, unless the remedy under those subsections would be 
“manifestly inadequate.”459  JMC failed to make such a showing and, 
additionally, the court rejected JCM’s contention that the Commerce 
Department denied it “party to the proceeding” status when it did not 
select JCM as a respondent in the antidumping investigation.460  As 
the court explained, by limiting the number of respondents, the 
Commerce Department did not preclude any interested parties from 
participation through written submissions, and in fact had obtained 
written submissions from other interested parties that, like JCM, had 
not been chosen to participate as respondents.461  The court ruled 
against JCM’s argument that it should be allowed to share in the 
relief given to those who did participate in the proceeding before the 
agency and, additionally, JCM’s failure to do so denied subject matter 
jurisdiction to the Court of International Trade.462 
3. Interaction of trade remedy and customs laws 
During the last three years, the Federal Circuit twice considered 
cases presenting conflicts arising from the interaction of the trade 
remedy laws with Customs’ procedures for liquidating entries of 
imported merchandise, and in both instances affirmed the 
disposition of the Court of International Trade. 
International Trading Co. v. United States463 involved the interaction of 
the antidumping law with the “deemed liquidation” statute, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1504(d), which requires Customs to liquidate entries suspended 
due to antidumping measures “within 6 months after receiving notice 
of the removal [of suspension] from the Department of 
Commerce.”464  Section 1504(d) also provides that any entry not 
liquidated within this timeframe “shall be treated as having been 
liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty 
asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record.”465  In this 
case, Customs did not liquidate the entries at issue (entered at an 
antidumping duty deposit rate of less than three percent but assessed 
with antidumping duties of over forty-two percent) within the six-
                                                          
 459. Id. (quoting Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F.2d 356, 359 
(Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 460. See id. at 1360 (holding that JCM failed to pursue its claim via the 
congressionally established path). 
 461. See id. (noting that had JCM participated in the administrative proceeding, it 
would have been entitled to judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)). 
 462. Id. 
 463. 281 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 464. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).  See Int’l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1270-71. 
 465. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). 
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month period because it did not receive timely, definitive liquidation 
instructions from the Commerce Department.466  International 
Trading Company (“ITC”), the importer of the merchandise at 
issue—shop towels from Bangladesh—challenged Customs’ 
liquidation at the higher antidumping assessment rate as a violation 
of § 1504(d).467  The Court of International Trade agreed with ITC’s 
contention that Customs should have liquidated the entries at the 
deposit rate.468  The U.S. Government appealed this decision, arguing 
that removal of suspension of liquidation, for purposes of § 1504(d), 
occurs only when the Commerce Department instructs Customs to 
liquidate—however long after completion of an administrative review 
that may be.469  The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, rejecting the government’s arguments and holding that 
publication of the final results of administrative review in the Federal 
Register triggers the six-month period.470  Notably, in reaching its 
decision, the Federal Circuit declined to defer to a series of Customs 
rulings setting forth Customs’ view that the six-month liquidation 
period commences upon receipt of liquidation instructions from the 
Commerce Department.471 
Fujitsu General America, Inc. v. United States472 also involved the 
liquidation of entries subject to antidumping duties—in this case, 
color televisions from Japan—and in particular three protests by 
Fujitsu challenging Customs’ assessment of interest on antidumping 
duty liability.473  At issue were entries that Fujitsu made between 
                                                          
 466. Id. at 1270 (noting that Commerce explicitly instructed Customs not to 
liquidate any entries until it received liquidation instructions).  Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1675(a)(1), the Commerce Department establishes definitive antidumping and 
countervailing duties on a retrospective basis in so-called administrative reviews, and 
publishes the final results of review in the Federal Register. 
 467. Int’l Trading Co., 281 F.3d at 1271 (asserting that the appropriate deposit rate 
was 2.72%). 
 468. Id. at 1277. 
 469. Id. at 1273 (basing its assertion on the ministerial nature of Customs’ 
liquidation of antidumping duties). 
 470. Id. at 1275 (reasoning that “the date of publication provides an unambiguous 
and public starting point for the six-month liquidation period”).  The court further 
noted that keying the liquidation requirement off of publication in the Federal Register 
“does not give the government the ability to postpone indefinitely the removal of 
suspension of liquidation (and thus the date by which liquidation must be 
completed) as would be the case if the six-month liquidation period did not begin to 
run until Commerce sent a message to Customs advising of the removal of 
suspension of liquidation.”  Id. 
 471. Id. at 1274 n.2 (citing Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (2001)) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court has established that such rulings are not entitled 
to deference but rather are entitled to weight “to the extent that they are carefully 
considered, consistent, and persuasive”). 
 472. 283 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 473. Id. at 1367. 
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March 20, 1986 and March 11, 1988, with respect to which the 
Commerce Department, at the conclusion of extensive litigation, on 
September 16, 1997, published a final antidumping duty rate of 
26.17% ad valorem.474  Customs liquidated the entries in installments 
over the next six months.475  Fujitsu subsequently filed three 
protests.476  The first two protests, filed on the same day, challenged 
Customs’ assessment of interest in connection with the liquidation of 
entries in late 1997.477 Fujitsu also argued, in supplemental 
submissions, that the entries should be deemed liquidated at the 
much lower rates asserted at the time of entry, over a decade 
earlier.478  Fujitsu’s third protest advanced similar assertions with 
respect to liquidation of entries in February 1998, but unlike the first 
two protests, the supplemental deemed liquidation claim was filed 
within ninety days of the protested liquidation.479  Customs denied all 
three protests, and Fujitsu appealed the denials to the Court of 
International Trade.480  That court upheld Customs’ denial of the 
protests, and held, with respect to the first two protests, that it lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the deemed liquidation claims because they 
had not been timely raised.481  With respect to the third protest, the 
court held that, while the deemed liquidation claim had been timely 
raised, Customs had properly liquidated the entries within six months 
of the Commerce Department’s notice of removal of suspension of 
liquidation, as required by § 1504(d).482 
Fujitsu appealed to the Federal Circuit.483  The first issue it 
considered, with respect to the second protest, was whether the lower 
court had jurisdiction over the deemed liquidation claim pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), on the theory that Fujitsu had presented a “new 
ground” in support of the original protest that triggered one of the 
exceptions to the ninety-day filing requirement of 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1514(c)(3).484  The Federal Circuit rejected Fujitsu’s “new ground” 
                                                          
 474. Id. at 1368-69.  See 62 Fed. Reg. 48,592 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 16, 1997) 
(publishing notice of the Fujitsu decision). 
 475. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1368-69. 
 476. Id. at 1369. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id.  
 479. Id. at 1369-70. 
 480. Id. at 1369-70. 
 481. Id. at 1370. 
 482. Id. at 1370.  See Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2000) (rejecting Fujitsu’s claim on the merits). 
 483. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1370. 
 484. Id. at 1372 (noting that a party may assert “new grounds” in support of an 
objection at any time prior to the disposition of the protest in accordance with          
§ 1515). 
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argument, holding that the underlying supplemental Customs filing 
setting forth the deemed liquidation claim did not qualify as a “new 
ground” in support of Fujitsu’s interest claim because it involved 
“different Customs decisions for purposes of § 1514.”485  The court 
explained that the statute differentiates between charge or exaction 
decisions, such as the interest assessments in this case, and 
liquidation decisions.486  Accordingly, the lower court correctly found 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Fujitsu’s claim based on the second 
protest.487  The Federal Circuit next turned to Fujitsu’s alternative 
argument that the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction over 
the deemed liquidation claims relating to the first and second 
protests pursuant to the residual jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(i).488  The court rejected this argument as well, noting that 
Fujitsu could have invoked jurisdiction pursuant to subsection 
1581(a) if it had timely filed its protests, as demonstrated by the fact 
that it had successfully done so in its third protest.489  Finally, the 
Federal Circuit considered Fujitsu’s deemed liquidation claims 
relating to the entries covered by the third protest.490  As framed by 
the court, the issue before it was “[w]hen, as a matter of law, did 
Customs receive notice of the removal of the suspension of 
liquidation?”491  According to Fujitsu, Customs received this notice on 
July 3, 1996, the date of issuance of the final judicial decision in the 
litigation concerning the amount of antidumping duties owed on the 
1986-88 entries.492  Citing its decision in International Trading Co. 
discussed above, the Federal Circuit held that the rationale applied 
equally here.493  Accordingly, it concluded that Customs received 
notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation on September 16, 
                                                          
 485. Id. at 1372-73 (citing New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377 
(Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 486. Id. at 1372. 
 487. Id. at 1373 (holding that Fujitsu failed to file its deemed liquidation claim in 
a timely manner and that the claim did not constitute a “new ground” in support of 
the challenge to the assessment of interest in Protest 2). 
 488. Id. at 1373-74. 
 489. Id. at 1374. 
 490. Id. at 1376. 
 491. Id. at 1379. 
 492. Id.  The court explained: 
If, as Fujitsu argues, notice was received on July 3, 1996, when Fujitsu 
General issued, Fujitsu wins.  The reason is that more than six months passed 
before Customs liquidated the entries on February 27, 1998.  If, as the Court 
of International Trade held, notice was received on September 16, 1997, 
when Commerce published notice of the removal in the Federal Register, 
the government wins.  The reason is that Customs liquidated the entries 
within six months of that date, on February 27, 1998. 
Id. 
 493. Id. at 1381. 
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1997, the date of publication in the Federal Register of the Commerce 
Department’s notice of the conclusion of the litigation concerning 
the 1986-88 entries.494 
4. Antidumping duty methodologies 
The majority of the trade remedy law cases before the Federal 
Circuit in the last three years involved fine points of statutory 
construction guiding the measurement of antidumping margins.495  
While the Commerce Department’s discretion is broadest in this area 
(the courts often referring to it as the “master” of the antidumping 
law),496 its discretion is not boundless and courts have, in many 
instances, reversed its determinations on appeal.497  Also, in many of 
these cases—as in the other areas of international trade 
jurisprudence reviewed in this Article—the Federal Circuit frequently 
reversed the Court of International Trade.498  Given the often 
substantial impact of these cases on the duty liability of importers, 
these cases highlight the uncertainties and pitfalls that can be 
associated with the movement of goods across the U.S. border. 
a. Product comparisons 
Because most antidumping cases involve ranges of related products 
(e.g., cold-rolled carbon steel products within certain size parameters 
and quality ranges) rather than fungible commodities (e.g., crude 
oil), a threshold question in antidumping analysis is how to define 
product categories for purposes of comparing a U.S. price (i.e., the 
export price or constructed export price) with a normal value.  
Moreover, in many cases, products sold by foreign exporters in the 
                                                          
 494. Id. at 1382 (explaining that the publication of notice of Fujitsu constituted 
“the first notification that Commerce had removed the suspension of liquidation”). 
 495. See, e.g., Timken Co. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 608 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2001) (determining whether Commerce correctly interpreted the provisions of the 
antidumping statute applicable to non-market economy exporters as allowing it to 
use Indonesian import statistics as a substitute value for raw material costs of steel 
paid by Chinese producers). 
 496. See, e.g., Daewoo Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Int’l Union of Elec., Electrical, Tech., 
Salaried & Mach. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (recognizing the 
International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce as the “master” 
of the antidumping law). 
 497. See, e.g., Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1098 (reversing Commerce’s determination 
regarding antidumping and countervailing duty orders on the ground that it 
impermissibly modified the orders to include products beyond the intended scope). 
 498. See, e.g., Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1076 (reversing Court of International Trade 
decision on the ground that cast stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings were outside 
antidumping order’s scope); U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 225 F.3d 1284, 1292 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing Court of International Trade ruling that Commerce’s 
interpretation of antidumping statute to include movement expenses as part of total 
expenses in the constructed export price profit calculation was unreasonable). 
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United States differ significantly from products sold by the same 
companies at home or in other export markets; sometimes, the 
product alleged to be dumped in the U.S. market is produced 
exclusively for export to the United States.  Accordingly, one problem 
arising regularly is the definition of the “foreign like product,” i.e., 
the product or products sold in the foreign comparison market and 
providing the basis for normal value.  The antidumping statute 
provides a definition of “foreign like product” at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(16), which establishes a three-level hierarchy for the 
identification of the foreign like product, ranging from the specific 
(“identical in physical characteristics”) to the general (“of the same 
general class or kind”).499  During the last three years, two cases 
involving the definition of the foreign like product reached the 
Federal Circuit, and in both, the court affirmed the original agency 
determination.500 
In Pesquera Mares Australes Ltd. v. United States,501 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s holding concerning two product 
comparison issues in the antidumping investigation of salmon from 
Chile.502  First, the court found that the Commerce Department had 
reasonably interpreted the phrase “identical in physical 
characteristics” for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16)(A) by reference 
to commercial practices,503 and second, that the Commerce 
Department had properly compared the Chilean exporter’s U.S. sales 
of “premium” grade salmon to Japanese sales of “premium” and 
“super-premium” salmon.504  The Federal Circuit discussed at length 
the applicable standard of review, and specifically whether the court 
should apply Chevron principles to the Commerce Department’s 
administrative rulings—even though no formally promulgated 
regulations were at issue—or whether it should apply a less 
deferential standard consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent 
                                                          
 499. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (1999). 
 500. Cases involving the interaction of the foreign-like product provision with the 
statute’s prescribed methodologies for calculating constructed value, as arose in SKF 
USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001), are discussed below. See 
discussion infra notes 494-514 and accompanying text. 
 501. 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 502. Id. at 1374.  See Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,411 (Dep’t 
Commerce June 9, 1998) (final antidumping determination). 
 503. Id. at 1376.  Section 1677(16)(A) provides that the foreign like product may 
be identified on the basis of “other merchandise which is identical in physical 
characteristics with, and was produced in the same country by the same person as, 
that merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16)(A). 
 504. Id.  The antidumping law permits the Commerce Department to base normal 
value on third-country sales (i.e., sales in countries other than the exporting country) 
in the absence of satisfactory sales data in the exporting country.  See 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1999). 
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decision in Mead.505  Citing a variety of factors, including the Mead 
holding that antidumping determinations are “adjudications that 
produce . . . rulings for which deference [under Chevron] is 
claimed,”506 and its recent holding in American Silicon Technologies, the 
court concluded that Chevron deference continued to be warranted, 
following Mead, with respect to antidumping proceedings.507 
The Federal Circuit then turned to the question of statutory 
interpretation—the meaning of “identical in physical characteristics” 
for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16)(A).508  Reviewing a variety of 
dictionary definitions, the court found that some dictionaries define 
“identical” as requiring exact identity, and others as providing, more 
broadly, for near identity; this, the court noted, left “the question of 
which of the two common usages was intended by Congress: exactly 
the same or the same with minor differences?”509  Given this 
ambiguity, the Federal Circuit reasoned that Chevron required 
deference to the Commerce Department’s interpretation, which 
permitted “identical” treatment of products having minor differences 
in physical characteristics.510  The Federal Circuit also found the 
Commerce Department’s inclusion of both “premium” and “super-
premium” salmon in its antidumping analysis to be supported by 
substantial evidence.511  In reviewing the evidence relied upon by the 
Commerce Department in rejecting its preliminary determination to 
treat the “super-premium” salmon as a distinct product,512 the Federal 
Circuit noted, in particular, the fact that other exporters to the 
Japanese market (from Norway, Scotland, Canada, and the United 
States) did not distinguish between “premium” and “super-premium” 
grades.513 
The Federal Circuit again affirmed the Court of International 
Trade in Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. v. United States,514 a case 
brought by Japanese producers of Large Newspaper Printing Presses 
                                                          
 505. See Pesquera, 266 F.3d at 1379-82. 
 506. Id. at 1382 (citing Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2171). 
 507. Id. (citing Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 508. 19 U.S.C § 1677(16)(A) (1999). 
 509. Id. at 1382-83. 
 510. Id. at 1383-84. 
 511. Id. at 1384. 
 512. Id.  As explained by the court, in its preliminary antidumping determination, 
“Commerce compared the prices charged by Mares Australes for premium salmon in 
the United States only to the prices charged for premium salmon in Japan.”  Id. at 
1377.  The Commerce Department did not include the higher-priced “super-
premium” salmon sold in Japan in the foreign like product until its final 
determination.  Id. 
 513. Id. at 1384-85. 
 514. 275 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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(“LNPPs”) who contended that LNPPs sold in Japan could not 
reasonably be compared to LNPPs sold in the United States for 
purposes of calculating an antidumping rate.515  The Court of 
International Trade rejected this contention, affirming the 
underlying agency determination as supported by substantial 
evidence.516  Citing the statutorily prescribed standard of review,517 the 
Federal Circuit noted that Japanese appellants had “chosen a course 
with a high barrier to reversal” given the jurisprudence defining 
substantial evidence.518  The Federal Circuit rejected appellants’ 
argument that the Commerce Department had failed to properly 
weigh the record evidence concerning the many differences between 
LNPPs sold in Japan and those sold in the U.S. market.  The court 
acknowledged that LNPPs are custom-made, and that each individual 
LNPP contains a unique combination of features, but stressed that, 
due to the “long list of shared features,” the Commerce Department 
could reasonably compare the Japanese and U.S. models.519  The 
court concluded that, while the appellants would draw different 
inferences from the evidence of differences between individual 
LNPPs, it did not mean that the Commerce Department’s conclusion 
warranted reversal under the substantial evidence standard.520 
The Federal Circuit then turned to appellants’ claim that the 
Commerce Department had misinterpreted 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16), 
defining “foreign like product.”521  More specifically, it considered 
that it was inconsistent for the Commerce Department to rely on this 
provision to reject actual Japanese market prices in favor of 
constructed value, on the one hand, and, on the other, to use actual 
Japanese market sales as the basis for the profit component of the 
constructed value calculation.522  The court, however, determined that 
                                                          
 515. Id. at 1059.  Appellants objected in particular to the Commerce Department’s 
use, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(A), of Japanese home market LNPP profits 
in the constructed value calculation used to determine normal value.  Id.  
 516. Id. at 1060.  See Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, 
Whether Assembled or Unassembled, from Japan, 61 Fed. Reg. 38139 (Dep’t 
Commerce July 23, 1996), amended 61 Fed. Reg. 46621 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 4, 
1996) (antidumping duty order and amended final antidumping determination). 
 517. Mitsubishi, 275 F.3d at 1060 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1999)). 
 518. Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951), Am. 
Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 519. Id. at 1061.  The Federal Circuit asked, with respect to one LNPP for which 
the record contained a product brochure, “[t]he critical point is, given that 
individual differences exist from order to order, can the custom-made merchandise 
from Japan and the United States be reasonably compared?”  Id. at 1062.  The court 
answered in the affirmative—“not perfectly, not identically, but reasonably.”  Id. 
 520. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 
(Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 521. Id. at 1063-64. 
 522. Id.  
FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:31 PM 
1082 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1027 
this issue was “not ripe for decision,” as appellants had failed to show 
evidence of an inconsistent interpretation of the statute, and that 
appellants were “chasing a phantom inconsistency in this case.”523  As 
explained by the court, review of the Commerce Department’s 
determination revealed that it “certainly did not decide that the 
home market LNPPs, in general, could not be a foreign like 
product,” and thus that there was no inconsistent application of 
§ 1677(16).524 
b. Calculation issues 
A series of trade remedy law cases before the Federal Circuit 
during the last three years involved the calculation of normal value 
and U.S. price (i.e., export price or constructed export price), the 
real “nuts and bolts” of the antidumping law.  Many of these cases 
arose out of disputes about the interpretation of statutory 
amendments introduced by the URAA.  As in other areas of Federal 
Circuit international trade jurisprudence, this area experienced a 
high rate of reversal of the Court of International Trade. 
As explained above, the URAA amendments base U.S. price on 
either export price or constructed export price.  Certain adjustments 
to the U.S. starting price are required to reach both export price and 
constructed export price, while certain additional adjustments—
typically reflecting the activities of affiliated U.S. importers, including 
profit—apply only to a constructed export price calculation.  In U.S. 
Steel Group v. United States,525 the Federal Circuit examined the profit 
element of constructed export price (“CEP profit”), i.e., the 
deduction for profit associated with the activities of affiliated U.S. 
importers.  More specifically, the court examined whether the 
statutory formula for determining CEP profit (“total actual profit” 
times the ratio of “total U.S. expenses” to “total expenses”) included, 
as part of the total expenses denominator, foreign exporters’ 
movement expenses.526  In an administrative review of AG der 
Dillinger Hüttenwerke’s duty liability under the antidumping duty 
order on carbon steel plate from Germany, the Commerce 
Department, consistent with its policy, interpreted 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677a(f)(2)(C) to include movement expenses as part of “total 
expenses.”527  The Court of International Trade agreed with domestic 
                                                          
 523. Id. at 1064. 
 524. Id. at 1065. 
 525. 225 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 526. Id. at 1285.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(f) (1999).   
 527. Id.  See Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Germany, 62 Fed. Reg. 
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producers’ challenge to the Commerce Department’s inclusion of 
movement expenses in total expenses, and reversed.528  The 
Government appealed. 
Applying a Chevron analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s judgment, finding that it had failed to accord sufficient 
deference to the Department’s reasonable interpretation of a 
statutory ambiguity.529  Finding, first, that the statute defines “total 
expenses” in a “complex, ambiguous manner,”530 the Federal Circuit 
turned to a “‘holistic’ review of the relevant provisions,”531 and 
concluded that they equated “total expenses” with “all expenses.”532  
The court further reasoned that there was no basis for the 
“symmetry” argument advanced by domestic parties and embraced by 
the Court of International Trade, i.e., that the express exclusion of 
movement expenses from the “total U.S. expenses” numerator 
mandated exclusion of movement expenses from the “total expenses” 
denominator.533  On this point, the court concluded that “the 
definitions in the Act themselves undercut symmetrical treatment of 
‘total U.S. expenses’ and ‘total expenses.’”534  The court also found 
the Department’s interpretation to comport with commercial reality 
and basic accounting principles, and noted that, if movement 
expenses were to be excluded from the “total expenses” 
denominator, that would “unduly skew the U.S. profit computation 
against importers because the computation would exclude their 
heaviest expense category, leaving them with a disproportionately 
high dumping margin.”535 
Judge Lourie dissented from the panel majority’s opinion, arguing 
that there is no ambiguity in § 1677a(f)(2)(C) because “all expenses” 
is modified by the phrase “with respect to the production and sale,” a 
clear indication, in his view, that Congress intended movement 
expenses to be excluded from “all expenses.”536  Judge Lourie further 
reasoned that the structure of the statute, and in particular the 
definition of “total U.S. expenses” in § 1677a(f)(2)(B), support a 
                                                          
18,390 (Dep’t Commerce Apr. 15, 1997) (final admin. review). 
 528. Id. at 1286. 
 529. Id. at 1289. 
 530. Id. 
 531. Id. (citing Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 532. Id. 
 533. Id. 
 534. Id. 
 535. Id. at 1291. 
 536. Id. at 1292 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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parallel reading of the numerator and denominator in which both 
exclude movement expenses.537 
AK Steel Corporation v. United States538 involved both sides of the 
dumping analysis—the determination of U.S. price and normal 
value—and again resulted in reversal of the lower court’s decision.  
The issues arose in the Commerce Department’s second 
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on cold-rolled 
and corrosion-resistant steel products from Korea, and with respect to 
several Korean producers, including Pohang Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 
(“POSCO”) and certain of its affiliates.539  In that review, and over the 
objections of the U.S. petitioning industry, the Commerce 
Department classified the Korean producers’ U.S. sales as export 
price (rather than constructed export price) sales pursuant to 19 
U.S.C. § 1677a(a)-(b)540 and its longstanding methodology for 
distinguishing between the two types of sales, the so-called PQ test.  
Under this test, developed prior to the URAA, the Commerce 
Department classified sales made by U.S. affiliates of foreign 
producers as export price sales if three criteria were met:  (1) the 
subject merchandise was shipped directly from the producer to the 
unaffiliated U.S. buyer; (2) direct shipment from the producer to the 
unaffiliated U.S. buyer was the customary channel for sales of the 
merchandise at issue; and (3) the U.S. affiliate acted merely as a 
“paper-pusher,” or processor of sales-related documentation.541  The 
                                                          
 537. Id. 
 538. 226 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 539. See Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products 
from Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,404 (Dep’t Commerce Apr. 15, 1997) (final admin. 
review). 
 540. Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 18,434.  19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) defines “export price” as: 
the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold) 
before the date of importation by the producer or exporter of the subject 
merchandise outside of the United States to an unaffiliated purchaser in the 
United States or to an unaffiliated purchaser for exportation to the United 
States, as adjusted under subsection (c) of this section. 
Section 1677a(b) defines “constructed export price” as: 
the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be 
sold) in the United States before or after the date of importation by or 
for the account of the producer or exporter of such merchandise or by a 
seller affiliated with the producer or exporter, to a purchaser not 
affiliated with the producer or exporter, as adjusted under subsections 
(c) and (d) of this section. 
Thus, export price sales are sales made prior to importation and outside of the United 
States; constructed export price sales are sales made either prior to or following 
importation, but only inside the United States. 
 541. Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 18,432.  The Commerce Department developed the PQ three-
part test in 1987, on remand from the Court of International Trade in PQ Corp. v. 
United States, 652 F. Supp. 724, 733-35 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1987).  See AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 
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Department also, and again over the objections of the U.S. industry, 
determined to “collapse” POSCO and its affiliates, thereby treating 
them as a single entity for purposes of its antidumping analysis.542  
Based on this collapsing determination, the Department did not 
apply 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2) and (3), the so-called “fair-value” and 
“major-input” provisions—used to revalue certain transactions 
between affiliated parties for purposes of establishing normal value—
to transactions among POSCO and its affiliates.543  On appeal, the 
Court of International Trade sustained these aspects of the 
Commerce Department’s determination.544  On further appeal to the 
Federal Circuit, U.S. producers raised two legal issues: whether the 
PQ test represents a reasonable interpretation of the URAA’s 
definitions of export price and constructed export price, and 
whether the Commerce Department has the discretion under the 
statute not to apply the fair-value and major-input provisions to 
transactions between affiliated producers that have been collapsed.545 
Applying a de novo standard of review and the Chevron two-step 
analysis,546 the Federal Circuit rejected the PQ test, but affirmed the 
Department’s interpretation of the fair-value and major-input 
provisions.547  The issue before the Federal Circuit was “whether a sale 
to a U.S. purchaser can be properly classified as a sale by the 
producer/exporter, and thus an EP sale, even if the sales contract is 
between the U.S. purchaser and a U.S. affiliate of the 
producer/exporter and is executed in the United States.”548  The 
Federal Circuit answered in the negative, agreeing with the U.S. 
petitioners that such a scenario, allowed by the PQ test, was in fact 
precluded by the URAA’s definitions of export price and constructed 
                                                          
1365. 
 542. Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 18,430. 
 543. Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 18,430.  Pursuant to § 1677b(f)(2), the fair-value provision, 
the Department is authorized to revalue, based on market conditions, any 
transaction between affiliated persons.  Where the transaction involves a major input, 
§ 1677b(f)(3) authorizes the Department to revalue the transaction based on the 
higher of market value or cost of production.  These provisions apply to the 
determination of cost of production (§ 1677b(b)) and constructed value 
(§ 1677b(e)). 
 544. See AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 2d 756 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998). 
 545. AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1363-64. 
 546. Id. at 1366 (citing Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994), Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 
& n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1992), Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
 547. Id. at 1364. 
 548. Id. at 1368. 
FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:31 PM 
1086 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1027 
export price.549  Turning to the statutory language, the court 
reasoned that, when read without reference to the pre-URAA U.S. 
price definitions, “the plain meaning of the language enacted by 
Congress in 1994 focuses on where the sale takes place and whether 
the foreign producer or exporter and the U.S. importer are affiliated, 
making these two factors dispositive of the choice between the two 
classifications.”550  The court further reasoned that, when read 
together, the export price and constructed export price definitions 
made clear that the key distinction drawn by the statute is the 
geographic “locus of the transaction.”551  This geographic distinction, 
the court explained, meant that the statute precludes what the PQ 
test allows, i.e., classification of U.S. sales made through U.S. 
affiliates—sales made “in the United States” for purposes of the 
statute—as export price sales.552  In rejecting the PQ test, the Federal 
Circuit explained that “Commerce does not require a cumbersome 
test, examining the activities of the affiliate, to determine whether or 
not the U.S. affiliate is a seller, when the answer to that question is 
plain from the face of the contracts governing the sales in 
question.”553   
The Federal Circuit also rejected the Korean producers’ arguments 
that the SAA evinced Congress’s intent that the PQ test continue to 
apply in distinguishing between export price and constructed export 
price sales.554  The court found that:  (1) the PQ test “is hardly 
consistent with the pre-1994 statute, read as a whole,” as well as even 
earlier versions of the antidumping law;555 (2) the Federal Circuit has 
never endorsed the PQ test;556 (3) the Court of International Trade 
has only affirmed the test in scenarios involving constructed export 
price, rather than export price, sales;557 and (4) there is no other 
indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to endorse 
the PQ test and the amendments to the statute suggest that it did 
not.558 
Turning to the Commerce Department’s application of the fair-
value and major-input provisions, the Federal Circuit emphasized 
                                                          
 549. Id. at 1364. 
 550. Id. at 1369. 
 551. Id. 
 552. Id. at 1370. 
 553. Id. at 1372. 
 554. Id. 
 555. Id. at 1373. 
 556. Id. 
 557. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 2d 807, 
815 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998)). 
 558. Id. at 1374. 
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that, given the uncontested decision of the Department to “collapse” 
POSCO and affiliated producers, the only issue for review was 
whether the Department had discretion not to apply these provisions 
as between these companies.559  The court accepted the Department’s 
defense that “a decision to treat affiliated parties as a single entity 
necessitates that transactions among the parties also be valued based 
on the group as a whole.”560  Noting that both the fair-value and the 
major-input provision only apply to transfers between “persons,” the 
court reasoned that once the Commerce Department has properly 
determined to treat affiliated parties as a single person, it need not 
apply these provisions.561  The court also noted favorably the 
consistency between this methodology and the Department’s practice 
of not applying these provisions between divisions of the same 
company, as well as that the statute would not have required 
application of the fair-value and major-input provisions even if 
POSCO and its affiliates had not been collapsed.562 
The Federal Circuit considered additional U.S. starting price 
adjustment issues in Micron Technology, Inc. v. United States,563 and again 
disagreed with the Court of International Trade’s interpretation of 
the statute as amended by the URAA.564  The case involved two aspects 
of the adjustments required under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) for 
constructed export price sales: the types of expenses covered by 
subsection (d)(1)(D)’s reference to “any selling expenses not 
deducted under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),” and the statutory 
provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i), requiring the Commerce 
Department to establish normal value “at the same level of trade as 
the export price or constructed export price.”565  The issues arose in 
the second administrative review of the antidumping duty order on 
dynamic random access memory semiconductors (“DRAMs”) from 
Korea,566 and in the context of sales made by LG Semicon Co., the 
Korean producer, and its affiliated U.S. importer, LG Semicon 
America, Inc.567  On the first issue, the Commerce Department 
                                                          
 559. Id. at 1375. 
 560. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 561. Id. at 1376. 
 562. Id. (citing Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts from the United Kingdom, 61 
Fed. Reg. 54,613, 54,614 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 26, 1996)). 
 563. 243 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 564. Id. at 1314-16. 
 565. Id. at 1304-05. 
 566. See Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or 
Above from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. 965, 968 (Jan. 7, 1997) (final admin. 
review). 
 567. Micron Technology, Inc., 243 F.3d at 1306. 
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determined not to include in its constructed export price 
adjustments under § 1677a(d)(1)(D) certain indirect selling 
expenses incurred by LG Semicon in Korea that were not directly 
related to sales to unaffiliated U.S. purchasers.568  Micron appealed, 
and the Court of International Trade affirmed the Department’s 
methodology.569  On the second issue, the Commerce Department, 
also applying its policy at the time, conducted its level-of-trade 
analysis after adjusting the U.S. price to obtain the constructed export 
price.570  As a consequence, the Department compared LG Semicon’s 
Korean sales to adjusted U.S. sales, determining that the former 
represented a more advanced level of trade than the latter, and 
accounting for this disparity by allowing LG Semicon a “constructed 
export price offset” to normal value.571  Micron also appealed this 
issue.  The Court of International Trade agreed with Micron, and 
rejected the Department’s methodology.572  Micron appealed the first 
issue to the Federal Circuit, and LG Semicon cross-appealed as to the 
second.573 
Applying de novo review and Chevron principles,574 the Federal 
Circuit rejected Micron’s arguments that the statute and legislative 
history clearly mandate the deduction of all (rather than just U.S.) 
selling expenses related to constructed export price sales.575  The 
Federal Circuit first construed the phrase in § 1677a(d)(1) requiring 
the deduction of “any selling expenses not deducted under 
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C),” and framed the question before it as 
the following:  “While we agree that the word ‘any’ necessarily 
                                                          
 568. Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above 
from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 967 (explaining that these indirect 
selling expenses did “not result from or bear relationship to selling activities in the 
United States”).  As explained by the Federal Circuit, its record did not contain a 
detailed description of the indirect selling expenses at issue, but they appeared to 
include “the rents on LG Semicon’s sales offices incurred in Korea, the salaries for 
LG Semicon’s salesmen incurred in Korea, and certain inventory carrying costs.”  
Micron, 243 F.3d at 1306.  Micron contended that all these selling expenses should be 
included in the section 1677a(d)(1)(D) adjustments to the constructed export price.  
Id. at 1307. 
 569. Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1999). 
 570. Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above 
from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 966. 
 571. Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above 
from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed. Reg. at 966. 
 572. Micron, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 
 573. Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 243 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 574. Id. at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The Federal Circuit emphasized that it reviews 
issues of statutory construction “without deference.”  Id. (quoting U.S. Steel Group v. 
United States, 225 F.3d at 1286). 
 575. Id. at 1309-10. 
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includes ‘all,’ the real question here is ‘all of what’?”576  The court 
then applied the statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis which, it 
reasoned, supported the conclusion that Congress intended 
subsection D to encompass the same types of expenses as included in 
subsections A, B, and C—i.e., expenses incurred in the United 
States.577  Thus, to the extent subsection (D) was ambiguous, the 
Commerce Department’s interpretation was reasonable.578   
The Federal Circuit next rejected Micron’s argument that, as 
revealed by the URAA’s legislative history, Congress intended the pre-
URAA treatment of indirect selling expenses—in Micron’s view, 
capturing all expenses—to continue.579  As the court explained, the 
legislative history did not show that Congress intended the 
Commerce Department’s treatment of indirect selling expenses to 
remain the same; rather, Congress, if anything, continued an 
“existing ambiguity.”580  Moreover, in rejecting Micron’s argument, 
the Federal Circuit emphasized that Congress cannot be presumed to 
have intended to “freeze an administrative interpretation of a 
statute;” such an approach would violate Chevron’s recognition of the 
power of administrative agencies to change their interpretations of 
the statutes they are charged with administering.581 
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Micron’s argument that 
deduction of all indirect selling expenses would serve the statute’s 
purpose of preventing the false characterization by foreign producers 
                                                          
 576. Id. at 1308. 
 577. Id. (citing Sports Graphics, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (“Under the rule of ejusdem generis, which means ‘of the same kind,’ where an 
enumeration of specific things is followed by a general word or phrase, the general 
word or phrase is held to refer to things of the same kind as those specified.”)). 
 578. Id. at 1309.  The Federal Circuit further explained that the Commerce 
Department’s construction of subsection 1677a(d)(1) was strongly supported by 19 
U.S.C. § 1677a(f), providing for the deduction in determining the constructed 
export price of U.S. profit.  Id. The court stated, “subsection (f) assumes that the 
expenses at issue are indeed those expenses arising specifically out of the sale of the 
subject merchandise in the United States.”  Id.  The Federal Circuit also noted the 
SAA’s instruction that the profit deduction applies only to profit amounts “allocable 
to selling, distribution and further manufacturing activities in the United States.”  Id.  
 579. Id. at 1309. 
 580. Id. at 1310.  Notably, the court rejected Micron’s contention that Congress 
should have been aware, when it enacted the URAA, of a Court of International 
Trade decision supposedly supporting Micron’s interpretation of the Commerce 
Department’s pre-URAA practice with respect to indirect selling expenses.  See id. at 
1310-11 (citing Silver Reed Am., Inc. v. United States, 683 F. Supp. 1393 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 1988) (“We are unwilling to apply the presumption relied upon by Micron 
when there is no evidence that Congress’ attention was directed to the decision in 
Silver Reed when the statute was re-enacted.”)). 
 581. Id. at 1312 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
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of their selling expenses.582  In response, the court noted that the 
Commerce Department did indeed sometimes include in its 
constructed export price deductions certain indirect selling expenses 
incurred outside of the United States but with some nexus to the 
activities of the U.S. importer and reseller.583  The court concluded 
that Micron’s interpretation of § 1677a(d)(1) “makes no sense in 
terms of the statutory purpose.”584  This purpose, the court noted, was 
served in this case by deducting only those expenses incurred by LG 
Semicon in connection with sales, through its U.S. affiliate, to 
unaffiliated U.S. purchasers.585 
The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade on 
the second issue—whether to undertake the level of trade analysis 
before or after the constructed export price deductions enumerated 
in § 1677a(d).586  The Federal Circuit reasoned that the statutory 
scheme clearly contemplated the level of trade analysis to be 
performed at the level most closely corresponding to the export 
price.587  Any deductions required to “construct” an export price, 
thus, were required to be made before the level of trade analysis.588  
Relying heavily on the SAA, the court concluded that  
Congress’ intent is clear: when making a level of trade comparison 
for EP sales, Commerce is to use the ‘starting price,’ i.e., the 
unadjusted price.  In contrast, when making a level of trade 
comparison for CEP sales, Commerce is to use the ‘constructed’ 
price, i.e., the price that reflects the deductions made pursuant to § 
1677a(d).589 
The Federal Circuit also dismissed Micron’s concern that, under 
the Commerce Department’s methodology, in virtually every case 
there would be either a level of trade adjustment to normal value or a 
constructed export price offset to normal value.590  The court noted 
that the Department had specifically explained in promulgating its 
                                                          
 582. Id. at 1312-13. 
 583. Id. at 1313 (citing Certain Stainless Steel Wire Rods from France, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 47,874, 47,881-82 (Sept. 11, 1996) (final admin. review)). 
 584. Id.  The court described it as making an apples-to-apples comparison between 
U.S. price and normal value by “adjusting CEP so that it is at the same level of trade 
as EP and then making a comparison to normal value.” Id. 
 585. Id. at 1313-14. 
 586. Id. at 1314-15. 
 587. Id. at 1314. 
 588. Id.  The court explained that, while the Commerce Department’s 
methodology resulted in a comparison of an adjusted constructed export price with 
an adjusted normal value, this seemingly asymmetric comparison is consistent with 
the statutory purpose to determine if an adjustment to normal value (the 
constructed export price offset) is warranted.  Id. 
 589. Id. at 1315. 
 590. Id. at 1314. 
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regulations that the constructed export price offset would not be 
automatic,591 and that in several antidumping investigations involving 
constructed export price sales, the Department’s methodology did 
not result in either a level of trade adjustment or a constructed 
export price offset.592 
In SKF USA Inc. v. United States,593 the Federal Circuit considered 
the authority of the reviewing court to remand an antidumping 
calculation issue to the Commerce Department in light of the 
Department’s claim that it had erred in its underlying 
determination.594  The specific calculation issue involved the 
treatment of the exporting company’s general and administrative 
(“G&A”) expenses as a component of constructed value, for purposes 
of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(B), in an administrative review of the 
antidumping duty order on antifriction bearings (“AFBs”) from 
Germany.595  During the administrative proceeding, the German 
respondent and its affiliated U.S. importer had argued that the G&A 
expense calculation should not have taken into account a loss related 
to the sale of a Korean subsidiary, but the Commerce Department 
disagreed and included these expenses in the G&A calculation.596  On 
appeal, however, rather than defend its G&A calculation, the 
Commerce Department argued that the calculation should not have 
reflected the loss associated with the sale of the Korean subsidiary, 
and it sought a remand for recalculation.597  The Court of 
International Trade rejected the remand request, affirming the G&A 
calculation.598  The Federal Circuit reversed.  Noting first that the 
Federal Circuit had acknowledged “Commerce’s special expertise”599 
                                                          
 591. Id. at 1316. 
 592. Id. (citing Fresh Kiwifruit from New Zealand, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,844, 36,845-46 
(July 8, 1999) (prelim. admin. review)). 
 593. 254 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 594. Id. at 1025. 
 595. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,472 (Dec. 17, 1996) (final admin. reviews and partial term. 
of admin. reviews).  Because this administrative review was initiated prior to the 
effective date of the URAA amendments, the Commerce Department applied the 
pre-URAA antidumping law. 
 596. Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, 61 Fed. Reg. at 66,497. 
 597. See SKF, 254 F.3d at 1026. 
 598. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345-46 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1999).  The Court of International Trade held that it could not “rely on the post-hoc 
position advanced by Commerce in its brief as the basis to uphold or overturn its 
administrative action.”  Id. at 1345 n.3. 
 599. SKF, 254 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 
1386, 1394 (Fed.Cir. 1997). 
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in administering the antidumping law, and that “factual 
determinations” were owed considerable deference,600 the court went 
on to review the various scenarios in which a remand to the agency 
may be appropriate under the applicable standard of review.  In 
surveying the law applicable to remand requests based on agency 
claims that the underlying determination is incorrect, the Federal 
Circuit distinguished between “step one” Chevron issues and “step 
two” Chevron issues.  With respect to the former, where “the agency is 
either compelled or forbidden by the governing statute to reach a 
different result,” it is up to the reviewing court to decide the statutory 
issue and whether a remand is warranted.601  With respect to the 
latter, as applied in this case given the broad discretion delegated to 
the Commerce Department under the statute to calculate G&A 
expenses, “a remand to the agency is required, absent the most 
unusual circumstances verging on bad faith.”602  The Federal Circuit 
concluded that, because there was no evidence of the agency acting 
in bad faith in seeking the remand, it was required to return the issue 
to the Commerce Department for recalculation.603 
In Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States,604 the Federal Circuit 
again considered the distinction between export price and 
constructed export price sales, as well as the proper calculation of 
constructed value.  On the first issue, the German producer of the 
subject LNPPs, and its affiliated U.S. importer, argued that the 
Commerce Department had erred in treating its two U.S. sales during 
the period of investigation as constructed export price sales.605  The 
Court of International Trade sustained the agency determination.606  
However, the lower court decision was made before the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in AK Steel, which invalidated the longstanding PQ 
                                                          
 600. Id. (quoting F.lli De Cecco di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 
216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 601. Id. at 1029 (citing Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 602. Id. at 1030 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).  The court also cited its earlier holding that 
“any assumption that Congress intended to freeze an administrative interpretation of 
a statute, which was unknown to Congress, would be entirely contrary to the concept 
of Chevron—which assumes and approves the ability of administrative agencies to 
change their interpretation.”  Id. (citing Micron, 243 F.3d at 1312). 
 603. Id.  Notably, the Federal Circuit did not include in its analysis a discussion of 
finality of agency decision-making as a factor weighing against a remand under the 
circumstances. 
 604. 259 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 605. See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:  Large 
Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or 
Unassembled, from Germany, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,166 (July 23, 1996). 
 606. Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 2d 384 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 1998). 
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test for classifying U.S. sales as export price or constructed export 
price.  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit granted the request of the 
Government and appellants for a remand for the Commerce 
Department to reconsider classification of the U.S. sales in light of 
the AK Steel test.607  The Federal Circuit further instructed that the 
Commerce Department should reconsider the proper treatment of 
certain U.S. LNPP installation expenses and, more specifically, 
determine whether they are movement expenses under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677a(c)(2)(A) (deducted from the U.S. starting price regardless of 
how the U.S. sales are classified) or “further manufacturing” expenses 
under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2) (deducted from the starting price only 
if the U.S. sales are classified as constructed export price sales).608   
The Federal Circuit also considered appellants’ argument that, in 
its constructed value calculations, the Commerce Department should 
have excluded one of the German producer’s home market sales as 
being outside “the ordinary course of trade,” for purposes of 19 
U.S.C. §§ 1677b(e) and 1677(15), because that sale carried a 
substantially higher profit margin than the other sales included in the 
constructed value calculation.  The Federal Circuit disagreed, and 
upheld the lower court’s affirmance of the Commerce Department 
on this issue.  The Federal Circuit reasoned that, given “permissive 
language” in the SAA underscoring the Department’s broad latitude 
in determining when sales are outside the ordinary course of trade, it 
was reasonable for the Department to conclude that the higher profit 
margin on the single sale for which appellants sought exclusion did 
not require exclusion of that sale from the constructed value 
calculation.609 
In American Silicon Technologies v. United States,610 the Federal Circuit 
upheld the lower court in affirming the Commerce Department’s 
treatment of a Brazilian producer’s depreciation expenses—a 
component of constructed value—in an administrative review of the 
antidumping duty order on silicon metal from Brazil.611  The statutory 
provision at the heart of the case, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A), 
                                                          
 607. Koenig, 259 F.3d at 1344. 
 608. Id. 
 609. Id. at 1345.  As the court noted, the SAA “provides several exemplary types of 
sales that could be outside the ordinary course of trade, including ‘sales with 
abnormally high profits.’ . . . [h]owever, the SAA only states that Commerce ‘may’ or 
‘could’ consider such sales to be outside the ordinary course of trade.”  Id.  
 610. 261 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 611. Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 2000 WL 278290 (Ct. Int’l Trade Mar. 9, 
2000).  The final results of the administrative review at issue in this case are 
published at Silicon Metal from Brazil, 63 Fed. Reg. 6,899 (Feb. 11, 1998) (final 
admin. review). 
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requires costs, including depreciation costs, to “normally be 
calculated based on the records of the exporter or producer of the 
merchandise.”612  Such costs, however, may be rejected where they do 
not “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and 
sale of the merchandise.”613  According to the U.S. petitioners, 
appellants in this case, the Commerce Department had erred in 
accepting the Brazilian producer’s five-year, straight-line depreciation 
methodology because the actual useful life of the industrial assets at 
issue was at least twenty years.614   Accordingly, the Brazilian 
producer’s depreciation methodology did not reflect its true cost of 
producing silicon metal, and should be rejected as mandated by 
§ 1677b(f)(1)(A).615  Appellants also urged the Federal Circuit to take 
account of a recent decision of the Court of International Trade in 
which that court had decided, with respect to a different Brazilian 
producer of silicon metal, that a five-year depreciation methodology 
was contrary to law.  Accordingly, appellants argued, the doctrine of 
intra-court comity required the same result to be reached in this 
case.616  The Federal Circuit disagreed.  Noting that an administrative 
determination can be supported by substantial evidence, even if it is 
possible to draw a different conclusion from the record evidence.617  
Also noting that neither the statute nor the SAA dictated a particular 
depreciation methodology,618 the Federal Circuit found that the 
record made clear that the Brazilian producer’s depreciation 
methodology was consistent with both Brazilian GAAP and Brazilian 
income tax law.619  Invoking a heightened standard of deference with 
respect to “determinations of the agency that turn on complex 
economic and accounting inquiries,”620 the court held “that 
determining whether a depreciation practice comports with Brazilian 
GAAP is one such complex economic and accounting inquiry, as is 
                                                          
 612. Am. Silicon, 261 F.3d at 1376.   
 613. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A) (1999).  As the court explained, constructed 
value, as a general matter, comprises a respondent’s general expenses, including 
overhead.  Am. Silicon, 261 F.3d at 1376 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1999) and 
IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).  Overhead, in 
turn, includes depreciation.  Further, “[i]f depreciation is not included in 
production costs, the CV is lowered, thereby lowering the minimum price level at 
which imported goods may be sold without incurring antidumping duties, i.e., 
lowering the dumping margin calculations.”  Id. 
 614. Id. at 1378-79. 
 615. Id.  
 616. Id. at 1379.   
 617. Id. at 1376 (citing Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1044 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996)). 
 618. Id. at 1378 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A) (1999)). 
 619. Id. at 1379. 
 620. Id. at 1380 (citing Fujitsu, 88 F.3d at 1044). 
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determining whether reported costs reconcile to financial statements, 
particularly where monetary corrections are involved.”621  The court 
also rejected the argument based on intra-court comity, noting that it 
was not clear that the facts and issues of the two cases were identical, 
and that the court was compelled to assume that the lower court 
judge in this case “through her independent analysis found the issues 
not to be identical or was convinced that her brother judge was 
wrong.”622 
SKF USA Inc. v. United States623 involved a different aspect of 
constructed value—the profit component of constructed value, as 
defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2), and its relationship to the 
foreign like product provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16).624  In this 
installment of the heavily litigated AFBs proceeding625 the specific 
question before the Federal Circuit was whether the Commerce 
Department may define “foreign like product” to include only 
identical AFBs (or AFBs from the same “family” grouping) in making 
its price-based comparisons; but then define “foreign like product” to 
include aggregate date for multiple AFB “families” in calculating 
constructed value.626  In the reviews at issue, the Commerce 
Department sought first to conduct price-based comparisons, 
pursuant to § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i),627 defining the foreign like product 
as including only identical AFBs, or AFBs from the same family 
grouping.628  Employing this narrow definition of the foreign like 
product, the Department found no “usable sales” and turned to 
constructed value.629  In calculating constructed value, however, the 
                                                          
 621. Id. at 1380-81. 
 622. Id. at 1381. 
 623. 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 624. Id. at 1379-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 625. The issue before the court arose in two related administrative reviews of the 
AFBs order:  Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (June 18, 1999) (final admin. review) and 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 35,590 (July 1, 1999) (final admin. review). 
 626. SKF, 263 F.3d at 1372. 
 627. This provision directs the Commerce Department to determine normal value 
in the first instance on “the price at which the foreign like product is first sold (or, in 
the absence of a sale, offered for sale) for consumption in the exporting country, in 
the usual commercial quantities and in the ordinary course of trade and, to the 
extent practicable, at the same level of trade as the export price or constructed 
export price.”  19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1999). 
 628. SKF, 263 F.3d 1375. 
 629. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. 6512-03, 6516 (Feb. 9, 1998) (prelim. review); 
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from 
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Department used a different definition of the foreign like product, 
aggregating “all foreign like products,” i.e., AFBs from multiple 
family groupings, purportedly in keeping with § 1677b(e)(2)(A).630  
The foreign AFB producers challenged the Department’s 
methodology before the Court of International Trade, contending 
that § 1677(16) obligated the Department to attempt to use 
“identical” or “like” merchandise in the constructed value profit 
calculation before turning to aggregated data.631  The Court of 
International Trade disagreed, affirming the Department’s 
methodology.632 
On appeal brought by the foreign AFBs producers, the Federal 
Circuit reversed.633  Reviewing the lower court’s decision de novo,634 
and emphasizing the Department’s “special expertise” in 
administering the antidumping law,635 the Federal Circuit began its 
analysis by focusing on the “source of the confusion”—the 
relationship between § 1677(16), defining “foreign like product,” and 
the constructed value provisions at § 1677b(e), also employing that 
term.636  As the court noted, § 1677(16) appeared to apply only to 
Part II of Subtitle IV (“Imposition of Antidumping Duties”), while § 
1677b(e) was part of Part IV of Subtitle IV (“General Provisions”).637  
However, “its reference to part II was obviously designed to require 
that Commerce use the definition in making the part IV calculation 
                                                          
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, 64 Fed. Reg. 8790-04, 8795 (Feb. 23, 1999) (prelim. review). 
 630. See 63 Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. at 33,333; Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered 
Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,610.  Section 1677b(e)(2)(A) 
provides for the determination of constructed value based on “the actual amounts 
incurred and realized by the specific exporter or producer being examined in the 
investigation or review for selling, general, and administrative expenses, and for 
profits, in connection with the production and sale of a foreign like product, in the 
ordinary course of trade, for consumption in the foreign country.” 19 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1677b(e)(2)(A) (1999).  The methodology set forth in § 1677b(e)(2)(A) is the 
preferred methodology; where the required data are not available, the statute 
provides three alternate methodologies, set forth at subsections 1677b(e)(2)(B)(i)-
(iii).  19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 
 631. SKF, 263 F.3d at 1377. 
 632. Id. at 1371. 
 633. Id. at 1372. 
 634. Id. at 1378. 
 635. Id. (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1394 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). 
 636. Id. at 1379. 
 637. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(16) (1999). The chapeau to § 1677(16) provides that the 
definition of foreign like product relates to “a determination for the purposes of part 
II of this subtitle . . . .”  Id. 
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for purposes of part II.”638  The Federal Circuit then proceeded to 
address appellants’ statutory construction arguments.  While 
dismissing their arguments that the statute precludes aggregation of 
more than one product into the “foreign like product” under the 
circumstances,639 the Federal Circuit did find persuasive the argument 
that, when Congress uses a technical term in more than one part of a 
statutory scheme, it is intended to carry the same meaning in each 
instance.640  The court concluded that the Commerce Department, in 
defending its varying interpretations of the term, had failed to rebut 
the presumption “that Congress intended that the term have the 
same meaning in each of the pertinent sections or subsections of the 
statute. . . .”641  Dismissing the Government’s Chevron-based arguments 
in defense of its determination, the Federal Circuit cited broader 
administrative law jurisprudence and concluded “it is well-established 
that ‘an agency action is arbitrary when the agency offers insufficient 
reasons for treating similar situations differently.’”642  In remanding 
for reconsideration, the Federal Circuit further reasoned that while 
the antidumping statute is “highly complex and often confusing,”643 
that fact only increases the burden on the Commerce Department to 
make sense of its provisions.644  The court was careful not to direct the 
agency to adopt identical interpretations of “foreign like product” in 
the different parts of the statute where it applied, suggesting that this 
case might present one of the rare scenarios in which perfect identity 
of interpretations within the same statutory scheme was not 
warranted.645  The court left this analysis for the agency on remand. 
Thai Pineapple Canning Industry Corp. v. United States646 presented two 
issues—the methodology for determining cost of production and 
constructed value in an environment of rising costs, and whether the 
Department properly computed a single assessment rate for the 
entire period of review.647  The Federal Circuit reversed the lower 
                                                          
 638. SKF, 263 F.3d at 1379. 
 639. Id. at 1380.  As the court explained, § 1677(16)(C) does permit aggregation, 
because it “makes clear that Commerce may use aggregate data relating to 
merchandise that is ‘of the same general class or kind as the subject merchandise.’”  
Id. at 1380-81. 
 640. Id. (citing, inter alia, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 576 (1995)). 
 641. Id. at 1382. 
 642. Id. (quoting Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 237 (D.C. Cir. 
1996)). 
 643. Id. 
 644. Id. at 1382-83.  The court posited, “[t]he more complex the statute, the 
greater the obligation on the agency to explain its position with clarity.”  Id. at 1383. 
 645. Id. at 1383 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992)). 
 646. 273 F.3d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 647. Id. at 1079. 
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court on the first issue, and affirmed on the second.648  In its first 
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on canned 
pineapple from Thailand, the Commerce Department found the 
Thai home market for the foreign like product to be too small for the 
determination of normal value, and turned instead to the Thai 
producer’s sales in Germany.649  The Department further found that 
some of these third-country sales were made at prices below the cost 
of production and used constructed value for these sales as the basis 
for normal value, calculating a single average cost of production for 
the entire period of review.650  The Thai producer objected to this 
methodology, arguing that the Department should, due to rising 
pineapple costs over the period of review, calculate separate costs of 
production based on the company’s fiscal calendar, and also account 
for the long lag time between production and sale.651  The 
Department did not alter its cost methodology, and the Thai 
producer appealed to the Court of International Trade.652  That court 
required the Commerce Department to recalculate cost of 
production, taking into account the two fiscal periods overlapping 
with the period of review, but it did not—as urged by the Thai 
company—require the Department to base the cost of production on 
merchandise sold (rather than produced) during the applicable 
period.653  The Court of International Trade also sustained the 
Department’s decision to calculate a single assessment rate for the 
entire period of review, rather than two rates, i.e., one for the so-
called “cap period” preceding the final injury determination, and one 
for the remainder of the period of review.654  An appeal to the Federal 
Circuit followed. 
                                                          
 648. Id. 
 649. See Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand, 62 Fed. Reg. 42,487, 42,488 (Aug. 
7, 1997) (prelim. results and partial term. review). 
 650. Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand, 62 Fed. Reg. at 42,491.  Pursuant to 
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(3), the Commerce Department determines cost of production 
by summing the cost of materials, fabrication, containers, coverings, and other 
processing costs, and selling, general, and administrative expenses.  19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(b)(3) (1999). 
 651. See Canned Pineapple Fruit from Thailand, 63 Fed. Reg. 7,392, 7,399 (Feb. 
13, 1998) (final admin. review). 
 652. Thai Pineapple, 273 F.3d at 1081. 
 653. See Thai Pineapple Canning Indus. Corp. v. United States, 1999 WL 288772 
(Ct. Int’l Trade May 5,1999) (“Thai Pineapple I”) and Thai Pineapple Canning Indus. 
Corp. v. United States, 2000 WL 174986 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 10, 2000) (“Thai 
Pineapple II”). 
 654. Entries of merchandise between the Commerce Department’s preliminary 
antidumping determination and the International Trade Commission’s affirmative 
injury determination are, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a), subject to an assessment 
“cap.”  19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a) (1999).  Specifically, if the deposit of the preliminary 
estimated duty during this period is higher than the amount ultimately required by 
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Applying the lower court’s standard of review,655 the court 
addressed the Thai producer’s contention that its dumping margin 
was distorted by the Commerce Department’s refusal to address the 
delay between production and sale.656  The Federal Circuit rejected 
the argument that the statute itself required closer matching of sales 
with costs, finding that the statute did not dictate any particular 
methodology in this regard.657  However, turning to the question of 
whether the Department’s interpretation was reasonable, the Federal 
Circuit identified a series of instances in which the Commerce 
Department had, in fact, adjusted its methodology to better match 
production costs with prices.658  Accordingly, it reasoned, “the 
standard methodology may not be permissible in all scenarios 
because Commerce has recognized that certain circumstances 
warrant exceptions.”659  Because the Department had departed from 
its standard methodology in other cases presenting special 
circumstances, the court reasoned that the Department was required 
to do so in this case, which presented similar circumstances.660  The 
court remanded for reconsideration, ordering the Court of 
International Trade to instruct the Commerce Department “to match 
sales of goods to costs based on the period in which those goods were 
manufactured, taking into account the inventory period.”661 
The Federal Circuit, however, upheld the Court of International 
Trade’s decision affirming the agency’s calculation of a single 
assessment rate for the entire period of review.662  The court quickly 
disposed of the argument that the statutory scheme, read as a whole, 
requires assessment on an entry-by-entry basis.663  As the court 
explained, while 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) requires dumping margins to 
be determined on an entry-by-entry basis, § 1675(a)(2)(C) provides 
                                                          
the antidumping duty order, the difference is refunded; if, however, the preliminary 
duty is lower, the difference is disregarded.  Accordingly, the preliminary estimated 
duty functions as a “cap” on the importer’s antidumping duty liability for entries 
made during this period.  Thai Pineapple I, 1999 WL 288772 at 11. 
 655. Thai Pineapple, 273 F.3d at 1083. 
 656. As the court explained, the other distortion alleged by the Thai producer—
the calculation, notwithstanding rising costs, of a single average cost of production 
covering the entire period of review—was corrected on remand following the lower 
court’s decision in Thai Pineapple I.  Id. at 1081. 
 657. Id. at 1084 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(3) (1999)). 
 658. Id. (citing, inter alia, Static Random Access Memory Semiconductors from 
Taiwan, 62 Fed. Reg. 51,422, 51,424 (Oct. 1, 1997) (prelimin. determination) (using 
quarterly cost reporting periods during periods of significant price declines)). 
 659. Id. at 1084-85. 
 660. Id. at 1085. 
 661. Id. 
 662. Id. 
 663. Id. at 1086. 
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considerable discretion with respect to the determination of 
assessment rates, requiring only that calculated dumping margins 
“shall be the basis” for antidumping duty assessment.664 
Finally, certain technical aspects of the dumping calculations in the 
Commerce Department’s AFBs proceedings reached the Federal 
Circuit in RHP Bearings Ltd. v. United States,665 and again the court 
reversed part of the determination before it.666  The issues—one 
involving the “special rule” for calculating constructed export price 
when substantial value is added to the merchandise by affiliated 
importers post-importation,667 and the other involving the 
determination of constructed value—arose in the eighth 
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on AFBs from 
the United Kingdom.668  On the first issue, the Commerce 
Department, during its administrative review, sought and obtained 
information from the U.K. producers regarding the value of further 
processing of their merchandise in the United States prior to resale 
to unaffiliated customers.669  Notwithstanding the substantial value 
that the Department found was added by the post-importation 
further processing, it did not apply the special rule to the U.K. 
producers’ sales.670  Over the objections of the U.K. producers, the 
Department explained in its final results of review that the rule was 
discretionary, and that it was unnecessary to apply it where, as here, 
the value added in the United States could be readily calculated.671  
                                                          
 664. Id. at 1085. 
 665. 288 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 666. Id. at 1347. 
 667. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e), the special rule applies where “the value 
added in the United States by the affiliated person is likely to exceed substantially the 
value of the subject merchandise.”  19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e) (1999).  Where the 
Commerce Department finds this to be the case, and where the data permit, it must 
base the constructed export price on either “[t]he price of identical subject 
merchandise sold by the exporter or producer to an unaffiliated person,” or “[t]he 
price of other subject merchandise sold by the exporter or producer to an 
unaffiliated person.”  § 1677a(e)(1)-(2).  Section 1677a(e) also permits the 
Department, where the U.S. value added is substantial, to employ “any other 
reasonable basis” for determining the constructed export price. 
As explained by the Federal Circuit, § 1677a(e), unlike § 1677a(d)(2) (requiring 
the U.S. starting price to be reduced by the cost of any further manufacture or 
assembly in the United States), “provides for calculating constructed export price 
without reference to the price at which the further manufactured goods are sold to 
an unaffiliated purchaser.”  Id. at 1338. 
 668. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (June 18, 1999) (final admin. review). 
 669. See id. at 33,345. 
 670. Id. at 33,338. 
 671. Id. at  33,338. 
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The Court of International Trade affirmed this determination.672  On 
the second issue, the Commerce Department applied the same 
normal value methodology at issue in SKF, discussed above; i.e., it 
determined it could not, using a narrow definition of the foreign like 
product (identical AFBs or AFBs within the same family grouping), 
base normal value on home-market prices; but then, for purposes of 
establishing constructed value, it applied a broader measure of the 
foreign like product.673  The Court of International Trade also 
affirmed this aspect of the Commerce Department’s determination.674  
U.K. producers appealed both issues to the Federal Circuit. 
Stressing that its review of issues of statutory construction is 
“without deference,”675 and applying Chevron676 principles, the Federal 
Circuit turned first to the U.K. producers’ argument that the statute 
mandates application of the special rule for determining constructed 
export price under the circumstances because this result is explicitly 
required by 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2), which applies except where the 
circumstances identified in § 1677a(e) are present.677  Parsing the 
statute, the court determined that Congress had directly addressed 
the issue, in that it had left to the agency’s discretion to determine 
when the “triggering circumstances” for application of the special 
rule are present.678  The court also found that the legislative history to 
the special rule made clear Congress’ intent to “ease administrative 
burden” associated with the calculation of constructed export price, 
in scenarios complicated by extensive value-added activities of U.S. 
affiliated importers, by granting to the Commerce Department 
practical alternatives to the complex task of isolating the value of the 
                                                          
 672. See RHP Bearings, Ltd. v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2000). 
 673. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, 63 Fed. Reg. at 33,333.   
 674. See RHP, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-27. 
 675. RHP, 288 F.3d at 1343 (citing U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 225 F.3d 
1284, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 676. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (establishing a two step inquiry into administrative interpretation of statutes 
which first examines the clarity of the statute and, absent clarity, examines whether 
the administrative construction was reasonable and permissable). 
 677. RHP, 288 F.3d at 1343. 
 678. Id. at 1345.  In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit focused on two 
aspects of § 1677a(e)—first, that the Commerce Department was required to turn to 
the two types of sales described in the special rule only if it “determines that the use 
of such sales is appropriate,” and second, that the final sentence of the provision 
empowers the Department to base constructed export price “on any other 
reasonable basis.”  Id.  The court further noted, “[w]e do not think that the language 
of the statute could present a clearer grant of discretion to Commerce.”  Id. 
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post-importation activities.679  Having determined that Congress had 
spoken directly to the issue, the court noted that it might have been 
expected to turn to the question whether the Commerce 
Department’s application of the special rule in this instance was 
reasonable.680  However, the court reasoned, appellants had not 
raised the reasonableness of the Department’s methodology, arguing 
before the court only that the statute dictated application of the 
special rule:  “[a]ccordingly, as far as the special rule is concerned, 
the only thing left for us to do is affirm the conclusion of the Court of 
International Trade.”681  With respect to the constructed value issue, 
the Federal Circuit vacated the lower court decision based on its 
recent holding in SKF, and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
that decision.682 
c. Non-market economy exporters 
The antidumping law provides a distinct methodology for the 
calculation of normal value for exporters in non-market economy 
(“NME”) countries.683  The Commerce Department presumes that 
NME producers and exporters operate under the control of the state, 
and therefore does not determine normal value based on the home 
market sales of such companies; rather, it constructs normal value 
based on a “factors of production” methodology,684 which identifies 
surrogate market economy values for the factors in countries at a 
level of economic development comparable to the NME country.685  
During the last three years, two cases involving NME issues reached 
the Federal Circuit—one involving the valuation of certain inputs, or 
                                                          
 679. Id. (noting that the special rule “establishes a simpler and more effective 
method for determining export price in situations where an affiliated importer adds 
value to subject merchandise after importation”). 
 680. Id. at 1345-46. 
 681. Id. at 1346. 
 682. Id. (citing SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 683. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (1999) (providing that “the administering 
authority shall determine the normal value of the subject merchandise of the basis of 
the value of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise and to 
which shall be added an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of 
containers, coverings, and other expenses.”). 
 684. Id. 
 685. See id. (providing further that “valuation of the factors of production shall be 
based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a 
market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by the 
administering authority”).  Subsection (c)(4) further instructs the Commerce 
Department to “[u]tilize, to the extent possible, the prices or costs of factors of 
production in one or more market economy countries that are (A) at a level of 
economic development comparable to that of the non-market economy country, and 
(B) significant producers of comparable merchandise.”  19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) 
(1988). 
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material factors, used by an NME producer,686 and the other involving 
the circumstances pursuant to which resellers of NME-produced 
merchandise are entitled to their own antidumping duty rates.687  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court in both cases. 
In Shakeproof Assembly Components, Inc. v. United States, the petitioner 
in the investigation of helical spring lock washers from the People’s 
Republic of China (“PRC”) challenged the Commerce Department’s 
valuation, and the Court of International Trade’s affirmance, of steel 
wire rod used by the PRC producer in manufacturing the subject 
merchandise.688  The Federal Circuit sustained the lower court’s 
affirmance of the Commerce Department determination.689  Applying 
Chevron deference,690 and noting that constructing normal value for a 
producer in a non-market economy country is a “difficult” and 
“imprecise” process,691 the Federal Circuit sustained the Commerce 
Department’s methodology for valuing steel wire rod, based on 
certain actual purchases of steel wire rod made by the PRC producer 
from a British company.692  Shakeproof contended that the 
Commerce Department should have rejected this methodology 
because the steel purchases at issue represented only one third of the 
PRC producer’s total purchases of steel wire rod (the remainder 
having been purchased from PRC suppliers).693  The Federal Circuit 
rejected this argument, agreeing with the Government that the 
purchase price of the UK steel constituted the most accurate 
information to determine the normal value of the domestically 
obtained steel.694 
In Transcom, Inc. v. United States,695 the Federal Circuit again 
affirmed the Court of International Trade.696  This time it affirmed 
                                                          
 686. Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United 
States, 268 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 687. See Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 294 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 688. Shakeproof, 268 F.3d at 1378-80. 
 689. See id. at 1383 (agreeing with lower court that Commerce did not abuse its 
discretion); see also Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. 
United States, 102 F. Supp. 2d 486 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000); Certain Helical Spring 
Lock Washers from the Peoples Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,794 (Dep’t 
Commerce Nov. 19, 1997) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review) 
(upholding the use of actual imported steel prices to value steel inputs). 
 690. See Shakeproof, 268 F.3d at 1380-81 (addressing whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the issue and whether the statutory interpretation is “based on a 
permissive construction of the statute”). 
 691. Id. at 1381 (citing Nation Ford Chem. Co. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1373, 
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 692. Id. at 1382-83. 
 693. Id. at 1382. 
 694. Id. at 1383. 
 695. 294 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 696. See Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 2d 690, 709 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
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with respect to a dispute arising out of the Commerce Department’s 
longstanding methodology of applying single, countrywide NME 
antidumping rates unless individual exporters could demonstrate 
legal, financial, and economic independence from the NME 
government.697  At issue in Transcom was the PRC-wide rate calculated 
by the Commerce Department in connection with the seventh 
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on tapered 
roller bearings (“TRBs”) from the PRC.698  Transcom sought to avoid 
application of the seventh review rate—calculated on the basis of the 
best information available (“BIA”)—to two of its Hong Kong-based 
resellers of Chinese TRBs.699  Transcom argued first, that under the 
statutory and regulatory scheme in effect at the time of initiation of 
the seventh review, requesters were required to identify all companies 
for which review was requested, and second, that the Commerce 
Department was required to limit any review to the companies 
identified in the review request.700  The Federal Circuit rejected these 
arguments, emphasizing that neither the statute nor the regulations 
required this approach.701  The Federal Circuit next rejected 
Transcom’s argument that its resellers had not received adequate 
notice that their U.S. sales would be affected by the seventh 
administrative review of the TRBs order.702  The court noted that a 
“reasonably informed party” should be able to comprehend from 
Commerce’s published notice whether the particular entries in which 
the company has an interest may be affected by the administrative 
review.703  The court analyzed the Department’s initiation notice in 
                                                          
2000) (finding Commerce’s determination of antidumping duty rates to be 
unreasonable under the relevant statutes). 
 697. Id. at 1381 (finding the statute to be silent regarding whether Commerce may 
presume that parties are entitled to independent treatment).  See generally Sigma 
Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing presumption that a 
company that fails to establish independence from the NME entity is subject to the 
country-wide rate, while a company that demonstrates its independence is entitled to 
an individual rate). 
 698. See Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, 
from the Peoples Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 6,189 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 11, 
1997) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review and revocation in part 
of antidumping duty order) (finding that non-PRC exporters of merchandise from 
the PRC will be subject to the cash deposit rate applicable to the PRC supplier). 
 699. Transcom, 294 F.3d at 1376.  Under the pre-URAA antidumping law, 
Commerce was authorized to resort to BIA when a party “refused or is unable to 
produce information requested in a timely manner and in the form required, or 
otherwise significantly impedes an investigation.”  19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1988). 
 700. Id. at 1377. 
 701. Id. at 1377-78 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1988) and 19 C.F.R. § 353.22, 
provisions that have been superseded). 
 702. Id. at 1379. 
 703. Id. at 1378 (quoting Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 876, 882-83 
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
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this case and found that, notwithstanding certain ambiguities in the 
notice, it clearly announced that all exporters of TRBs from the PRC 
were subject, in the first instance, to the review.704  The Federal 
Circuit further identified specific steps that Transcom’s resellers 
could have taken to protect themselves from the possible adverse 
effects of unfavorable final results of review.705  Finally, the court 
rejected Transcom’s argument in the alternative that, even if the 
Commerce Department had properly subjected all exporters to the 
review, its resort to BIA was improper.706  As reasoned by the court, 
Transcom’s contentions in this respect lacked merit because they 
proceeded from the assumption that its resellers’ PRC producers 
were independent of the PRC-wide entity, “when in fact the NME 
presumption begins with the assumption that the producers are part 
of the NME entity until they prove otherwise.”707 
d. Determinations on the basis of the “facts available” 
Antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are 
complicated and fact-intensive, and usually entail the submission of 
multiple rounds of questionnaires completed by respondents.  
However, respondents sometimes do not—or cannot—provide 
requested information, leaving gaps in the investigative record.  The 
statute, at 19 U.S.C. § 1677e, addresses the problem by authorizing 
the Department to fill such gaps with the “facts available.”708  The 
statute also authorizes the Department to employ adverse inferences 
in selecting from the facts available—but only if it finds that the party 
has not acted “to the best of its ability” to comply with the 
information request.709  The statute also imposes on the Commerce 
Department the obligation to corroborate any secondary information 
(i.e., information not obtained from the respondents) used as facts 
available.710  During the last three years, two cases involving the limits 
                                                          
 704. Id. at 1378. 
 705. Id. at 1379.  As the court explained, Transcom could have protected itself by 
making sure that its Chinese suppliers proved their entitlement to separate rates by 
participating in the review, or Transcom could have made sure that its Hong Kong 
resellers verified their entitlement to intermediate country rates under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(f).  Id. 
 706. Id. at 1380-81. 
 707. Id. at 1381. 
 708. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (2000) (providing that when necessary information 
is not available the administering authority should use the facts available when 
reaching a determination under this subtitle). 
 709. Id. § 1677e(b). 
 710. See § 1677e(c) (requiring that if the administering authority must rely on 
secondary information instead of information received directly from a party in an 
investigation or review, the administering authority should attempt to corroborate 
that information with other, independent sources “reasonably at [its] disposal”). 
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of the Commerce Department’s authority to employ facts available 
came before the Federal Circuit, and in both instances the court 
affirmed the lower court.711 
In F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States,712 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade’s decision 
requiring the Commerce Department to reset an adverse facts 
available rate found for De Cecco in the antidumping duty 
investigation of pasta from Italy.713  The Commerce Department, in its 
original antidumping determination, found that De Cecco had not 
cooperated with the investigation, and, based on information 
supplied in the underlying petition, imposed on it an adverse rate of 
46.67%.714  De Cecco challenged this determination in the Court of 
International Trade, which remanded the determination and 
ultimately affirmed the Department’s use of a lower rate, 24.31%, as 
had been calculated and verified for another respondent.715  The 
Government appealed, and the Federal Circuit reviewed the lower 
court decision pursuant to the substantial evidence standard.716  First, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade’s 
outright rejection of the 46.67% rate originally applied to De 
Cecco.717  The court found that there had been substantial evidence 
before the lower court discrediting that rate, and that to permit 
Commerce to impose such a high punitive rate, which has been 
discredited by Commerce’s own investigation, would exceed the 
agency’s already broad discretion.718  The Federal Circuit then turned 
to the lower court’s suggestion that the Commerce Department use 
the lower rate of 24.31%—the highest verified margin for another 
pasta producer.719  The Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s 
contention that the lower court had ordered the Commerce 
Department to apply this rate, finding the remand imposed no limit 
                                                          
 711. See, e.g., F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 
F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 
F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 712. F.lli De Cecco, 216 F.3d 1027. 
 713. See id. at 1035 (finding that the Court of International Trade did not impose 
on Commerce a required rate simply by suggesting a rate that would withstand 
judicial scrutiny). 
 714. See Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,326 (Dep’t Commerce June 17, 
1996) (final determination). 
 715. See Borden, Inc. et al. v. United States, 1998 WL 895890 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 
16, 1998) (holding that, pursuant to CIT Rule 54(b), there was no reason to delay 
entering a separate judgement concerning DeCecco’s claim). 
 716. F.lli De Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1031 (providing that the court would uphold 
Commerce’s determination unless there was a finding of insufficient evidence). 
 717. See id. at 1033 (establishing that the rate was uncorroborated by Commerce). 
 718. Id. at 1033. 
 719. Id. 
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on Commerce.720  However, the Federal Circuit also held that, even if 
the Court of International Trade had specifically ordered use of the 
24.31% rate, such an order would have been within the court’s 
authority because the facts of the case so clearly showed that De 
Cecco’s actual antidumping margin would have been even lower.721  
The court further emphasized that the corroboration requirement of 
§ 1677e(c) demonstrated that Congress intended any adverse facts 
available rates to be reasonable and grounded in reality.722 
In Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States,723 the Federal 
Circuit again affirmed the Court of International Trade’s holding 
concerning the limits of the Commerce Department’s authority to 
apply adverse facts available.724  The case involved the third 
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on welded 
stainless steel pipe from Taiwan725—the first of the reviews initiated 
under the URAA provisions—and, specifically, the Commerce 
Department’s determination, on remand, to apply an adverse facts 
available rate to Ta Chen in light of its failure to supply information 
about sales through a U.S. distributor, Sun Stainless, Inc.726  The 
Department found, based on the expanded affiliation provisions of 
the URAA,727 that Ta Chen and Sun were affiliated for a portion of 
the period covered by the third review.728  The Department applied 
an adverse facts available rate of 30.95% to Ta Chen, based on data 
                                                          
 720. Id.  Judge Schall issued a separate opinion on this point, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part.  Id. at 1035-37.  In his view, the Court of International Trade 
had set a ceiling on the adverse facts available rate that the Commerce Department 
was allowed to use in setting De Cecco’s rate and, in doing so, had erred as a matter 
of law by improperly limiting the agency’s discretion on remand.  Id.  As Judge Schall 
explained, he would have remanded to the Commerce Department with instructions 
to set a rate lower than 46.67%, but without specifying which rate to apply.  Id. at 
1036-37. 
 721. Id. at 1034.  The court reasoned that De Cecco was considered a high-end 
producer and “the other high-end producers, Delverde and De Matteis, received 
dumping margins of only 2.80 percent and 0.67 percent (de minimis) respectively.”  
Id.  When compared to low-end producers who had higher dumping margins, those 
averaged 16.71%.  Id.  The maximum of the “low-end rates was 24.31 percent; the 
‘all-others’ rate was 12.09 percent;” therefore, “applying the highest low-end 
producer rate to high-end producer De Cecco [was], in itself, an adverse inference.”  
Id. 
 722. Id. 
 723. 298 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 724. Id. at 1340. 
 725. See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe from Taiwan, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,543 
(Dep’t Commerce July 14, 1997) (final admin. review). 
 726. See Ta Chen, 298 F.3d at 1334 (noting further that pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677m(d), Commerce should have provided adequate notice to Ta Chen regarding 
the requirement to furnish Sun’s sales data for the United States). 
 727. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33) (2000) (defining individuals that shall be considered 
“affiliated” or “affiliated persons.”). 
 728. Ta Chen, 298 F.3d at 1333. 
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derived from Ta Chen’s own sales during the third review period.729  
The Court of International Trade affirmed the Department’s remand 
determination,730 and Ta Chen appealed. 
Ta Chen raised three claims before the Federal Circuit related to 
the Commerce Department’s imposition of adverse facts available 
and the Federal Circuit rejected each.731  First, Ta Chen argued that 
the record of the third review did not contain substantial evidence of 
affiliation with Sun.732  The Federal Circuit, however, found that Ta 
Chen had the burden to create an accurate record,733 and that it had 
been on notice since the first administrative review that information 
pertaining to its relationship with Sun might be requested, such that 
it could have taken steps to preserve relevant records.734  Second, Ta 
Chen argued that the Court of International Trade had 
impermissibly affirmed the third review final results on grounds other 
than those relied upon by the Commerce Department, but the 
Federal Circuit held that the reasoning of the Court of International 
Trade was consistent with the grounds invoked by Commerce.735  
Third, Ta Chen argued that the Commerce Department had violated 
19 U.S.C. § 1677m by failing to notify it of deficiencies in the record 
while those deficiencies could have been addressed.736  The Federal 
Circuit, however, held that where, as here, a party informs the 
Commerce Department that it will not provide the requested 
information, the Department is under no obligation to provide 
subsequent deficiency notices.737  As explained by the court, § 1677m 
applies only when a “response to a request” is insufficient, and an 
absolute failure to respond is not a “response” for purposes of the 
statute.738  Finally, the Federal Circuit upheld the Court of 
International Trade’s decision affirming the 30.95% adverse facts 
                                                          
 729. Id. at 1334. 
 730. Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe v. United States, 2000 WL 1225799 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade Aug. 25, 2000). 
 731. Ta Chen, 298 F.3d at 1336-41. 
 732. Id. at 1336. 
 733. See id. (citing Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1583 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (explaining that the burden of production belongs to the party in 
possession of the required information). 
 734. Id. (explaining that Ta Chen assumed the risk that Commerce would need 
the sales data alleged to be evidence of dumping activity when Sun was sold without 
preserving the records of sale). 
 735. Id. at 1337. 
 736. Id. at 1337-38. 
 737. Id. at 1338. 
 738. Id. at 1338.  19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d) provides that if Commerce finds a 
response to an information request is deficient in that it does not address the 
request, Commerce must inform the party submitting the response and provide that 
person with an opportunity to correct the deficiency within the time limits 
established for the completion of investigations and reviews.  Id. 
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available margin found by the Commerce Department, reasoning 
that, unlike the situation before the court in De Cecco, this rate was 
corroborated by actual Ta Chen sales data.739 
Judge Gajarsa issued a strong and lengthy dissent from the majority 
opinion, arguing in essence that the Court of International Trade 
and the panel majority had expected too much of Ta Chen and 
Sun.740  As he explained, Ta Chen could not reasonably have been 
expected to know that the Commerce Department might in the 
future request U.S. sales information based on a finding of affiliation 
with Sun.741  Judge Gajarsa concluded that, if Commerce would like to 
require all importers to keep sales records from any U.S. distributor 
that might someday be deemed an affiliate, it must create a 
regulation pursuant to statutory authority.742 
e. Duty absorption 
The URAA also amended U.S. antidumping law to provide for so-
called “duty absorption inquiries,” pursuant to which the Commerce 
Department is authorized to determine whether foreign producers 
and exporters subject to antidumping duties are “absorbing” the cost 
of antidumping duties through affiliated U.S. importers and resellers, 
rather than passing this cost along to U.S. purchasers in the form of 
higher prices.  Specifically, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4), the 
Commerce Department must, if requested in administrative reviews 
initiated two or four years following the imposition of an 
antidumping duty order, “determine whether antidumping duties 
have been absorbed by a foreign producer or exporter subject to the 
order if the subject merchandise is sold in the United States through 
an importer who is affiliated with such foreign producer or 
exporter.”743  If the Commerce Department finds that duty absorption 
                                                          
 739. Id. at 1339 (citing ., F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United 
States, 216 F.3d 1027, at 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 740. Id. at 1340-50 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
 741. Id.  Judge Gajarsa observed, among other things, that during the third 
administrative review, Commerce did not make clear to Ta Chen that under the new 
statutory definition, Sun would be considered an affiliate, or even a potential 
affiliate.  Id. at 1344.  Gajarsa went on to explain that “[a]lthough I agree with the 
panel majority and the CIT that substantial evidence supports Commerce’s 
determination that Sun and Ta Chen were affiliated within the meaning of 
§ 1677(33)(G) for the early part of the third review period, I do not agree that any 
statutory or regulatory authority authorizes the imposition of an adverse inference 
against Ta Chen for Ta Chen’s failure to predict that Commerce would reach this 
determination.”  Id. at 1343-44. 
 742. Id. at 1349. 
 743. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) (1999).  See FAG Italia S.P.A. v. United States, 291 
F.3d 806 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the purpose of this provision is “to ensure 
that foreign exporters identified by Commerce as dumping goods in the United 
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has occurred, it is instructed by § 1675(a)(4) to notify the U.S. 
International Trade Commission, which in turn is required to take 
such a finding into account in conducting the required five-year, or 
“sunset,” review of the antidumping order pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1675(c).744  In the two duty absorption cases that reached the 
Federal Circuit in the last three years, the court affirmed the Court of 
International Trade in overturning the Commerce Department’s 
interpretation of the duty absorption statute. 
In FAG Italia,745 the Federal Circuit considered the legality of the 
Commerce Department’s policy with respect to duty absorption 
inquiries for so-called “transition orders,” i.e., antidumping duty 
orders that entered into effect before January 1, 1995, the effective 
date of the URAA.746  Pursuant to its policy at the time, and as 
reflected in its regulation promulgated in 1997 to implement 
§ 1675(a)(4), the Commerce Department conducted duty absorption 
inquiries for post-URAA orders, as well as for transition orders,747 even 
though the statutory authority to conduct duty absorption inquiries 
does not, on its face, apply to transition orders.748  At issue in FAG 
                                                          
States do not undermine the purpose of the antidumping laws by ‘absorbing’ the 
duty rather than passing the duty on to United States purchasers in the form of 
higher prices”).  In such circumstances, dumping continues despite the assessment 
of the duty, and, as a result, “‘the remedial effect of an antidumping order may be 
undermined . . . .’”  Id. at 809 (citing Joint Report of the Committee on Finance, 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Committee on Governmental 
Affairs of the United States Senate to accompany S. 2467, S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 44 
(1994)). 
 744. See FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 810 (“[t]he consequence of a finding of duty 
absorption by Commerce is that the anti-dumping order is less likely to be revoked as 
a result of a sunset review.”).  U.S. antidumping law as amended by the URAA 
requires orders to be revoked five years after their imposition unless the Commerce 
Department determines that revocation “would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping” and the U.S. International Trade Commission determines 
that revocation “would be likely to lead to . . . material injury.”  See 19 U.S.C. § 
1675(c)(1) (1999). 
 745. FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 806. 
 746. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6)(C) (1999) (defining “transition order” as “an 
antidumping duty order . . . which is in effect on the date the WTO Agreement 
enters into force with respect to the United States,” i.e., January 1, 1995). 
 747. See FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 811-12 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(j) (1998)); see 
also § 351.213(j)(2) ( “For transition orders defined in § 751(c)(6) of the Act, the 
Secretary will apply (j)(1) of this section to any administrative review initiated in 
1996 or 1998.”). 
 748. In response to the Commerce Department’s proposed duty absorption 
regulation, one commentor questioned the applicability of the regulation to 
transition orders.  Preamble to Proposed 19 C.F.R. § 351.213, 62 Fed. Reg. 27296, 
27317 (May 19, 1997).  The Commerce Department responded as follows:  “Under 
§ 751(c)(6)(D) of the Act, the Department is to treat transition orders, such as the 
1993 orders in question, as being issued on January 1, 1995.  Therefore, paragraph 
(j)(2) properly permits absorption inquiries for transition orders to be requested in 
any administrative review initiated in 1996 or 1998, because these are the second and 
fourth years after the date on which transition orders are deemed to be issued.”  Id. 
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Italia was the transition order on AFBs from Italy, which had been 
imposed in 1989.749  In its seventh administrative review of this order, 
initiated in 1996, the Department conducted a duty absorption 
inquiry and found that two Italian producers and exporters of subject 
AFBs had engaged in duty absorption.750  The Court of International 
Trade determined that the Department lacked statutory authority to 
conduct duty absorption inquiries for transition orders,751 and the 
Government appealed. 
In articulating its standard of review, the Federal Circuit stated that 
it would review this issue of statutory interpretation without 
deference, except to the extent that deference might be warranted 
under Chevron.752  The court then turned to § 1675(a)(4), noting that 
the authority to conduct duty absorption inquiries was expressly 
limited to reviews “initiated two years or four years after the 
publication of an antidumping duty order” (i.e., 1991 and 1993 for 
the AFBs order), and that the provision deeming transition orders to 
be issued on January 1, 1995 operated, on its face, only with respect 
to sunset reviews.753  The court rejected the Government’s arguments 
that the Commerce Department was authorized to conduct two and 
four-year reviews of transition orders based on the absence in the 
statute of an express prohibition to do so, noting that “Commerce 
seriously misunderstands its role under Chevron.”754  The court went 
on to stress that, notwithstanding the Commerce Department’s view 
that application of the duty absorption statute was consistent with the 
overall statutory scheme, “the absence of a statutory prohibition 
cannot be the source of agency authority.”755 
                                                          
at 27318. 
 749. See Ball Bearings and Cylindrical Roller Bearings, and Parts Thereof, from 
Italy, 54 Fed. Reg. 20,903 (Dep’t Commerce, May 15, 1989). 
 750. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts 
Thereof From France et al., 62 Fed. Reg. 31,566 (Dep’t Commerce, June 19, 1997) 
(preliminary admin. review) and Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France et al., 62 Fed. Reg. 54,043 (Dep’t 
Commerce, Oct. 17, 1997) (final admin. review). 
 751. See FAG Italia S.P.A. v. United States, 2000 WL 978462 (Ct. Int’l Trade Ju. 13, 
2000). 
 752. FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 814. 
 753. Id. at 814.  The court observed that “[t]here is no provision creating a 
‘treated as’ date for transition orders for purposes of subsection (a), the subsection 
governing duty absorption inquiries.”  Id. 
 754. Id. at 815 (“Commerce can identify no ambiguities in the statute, nor any 
statutory ‘gaps’ that Commerce is entitled to fill.”). 
 755. Id. at 816 (citing So. Cal. Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 195 
F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).  The court explained that “the statutory silence as to 
Commerce’s power to initiate duty absorption inquiries for transition orders does 
not give Commerce authority to conduct such inquiries.  The fact that Commerce is 
empowered to take action in certain limited situations does not mean that 
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Judge Michel concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding 
that Congress did intend to provide to the Commerce Department 
authority to conduct the requested duty absorption inquiry.756  
Explaining, among other things, that “[w]e read statutes not in 
isolation but as a whole,”757 and that “where our construction involves 
multiple statutory sections that were enacted simultaneously as part 
of the same Act, ‘the duty to harmonize them is particularly acute,’”758 
Judge Michel reasoned that the various statutory provisions 
connecting sunset review procedures with the authorization for duty 
absorption inquiries could be reconciled by reading the statute to 
authorize duty absorption inquiries in reviews of all orders, including 
transition orders.759 
Duty absorption also arose in NTN Bearing Corporation, but the 
Court of International Trade had already held that the Commerce 
Department had no authority under the statute to conduct a duty 
absorption inquiry for the transition order at issue,760 and so the 
Federal Circuit merely referenced its earlier decision on this point in 
FAG Italia, and affirmed.761 
f. Assessment 
While calculation of an antidumping rate typically is already 
complex, actual assessment of the rate with respect to individual 
entries of merchandise can present additional complexity.762  During 
the last three years, in addition to the assessment issue that arose in 
Thai Pineapple, the Federal Circuit was presented with one case—Koyo 
Seiko Co. v. United States—involving the Commerce Department’s 
assessment regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1), and specifically 
whether this regulation constituted a reasonable interpretation of the 
antidumping statute.763  Section 351.212(b)(1) provides, in pertinent 
                                                          
Commerce enjoys such power in other instances.”  Id. at 817. 
 756. Id. at 822. 
 757. Id. at 820 (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984)). 
 758. Id. (quoting U.S. West Comm., Inc. v. Hamilton, 224 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
 759. Id. at 821. 
 760. See NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 2d 110, 157-58 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2000) (ordering annulment of the Department’s duty absorption 
findings). 
 761. NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 295 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 762. See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(explaining the wide range of numbers that can occur when calculating the 
assessment rate by linking it to specific entries of imported merchandise, but 
ultimately upholding Commerce’s use of entered value of imported merchandise in 
the assessment calculation). 
 763. Id. at 1341-42.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 2002) (providing that 
“the determination . . . shall be the basis for the assessment of countervailing or 
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part, that the Department will “calculate the assessment rate by 
dividing the dumping margin found on the subject merchandise 
examined by the entered value of such merchandise for normal 
customs duty purposes.”764  As explained by the court, “the assessment 
rate is calculated ‘as a percentage of entered value’ of the subject 
merchandise sold in the United States during the review period.”765  
Such a methodology is required because a respondent’s sales and 
imports are not the same during any particular review period—and in 
fact may be significantly different.766  Koyo Seiko challenged the 
Department’s assessment regulation before the Court of 
International Trade,767 which upheld the regulation and the 
Department’s assessment methodology.768  This appeal followed. 
Koyo argued before the Federal Circuit in Koyo Seiko that because 
the numerator of the Commerce Department’s assessment formula is 
based on sales values (i.e., the difference between home market and 
United States sales values), the denominator must also be based on 
sales values.769  Beginning its Chevron analysis with the express 
language of the statute, the Federal Circuit noted at the outset that 
nothing in the statute required Koyo’s methodology or invalidated 
the Department’s methodology.770  The Federal Circuit acknowledged 
that Koyo’s preferred methodology appeared logical, but explained 
that its burden was to show that the Department’s regulation was 
arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable; and it failed to do so.771  The 
                                                          
antidumping duties on entries of merchandise”). 
 764. 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(b)(1) (2000).  As explained by the Federal Circuit, 
“entered value” is typically defined as being “equal to the invoice value of the subject 
merchandise less freight, insurance premium costs, and other non-dutiable charges.”  
Koyo Seiko, 258 F.3d at 1243 n.3 (quoting Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 110 F. 
Supp. 2d at 934, 938 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000)). 
 765. See Koyo Seiko, 258 F.3d at 1343 (citing Torrington Co. v. United States, 44 
F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 766. Id. at 1342. 
 767. The underlying administrative determination is the Commerce Department’s 
final results of the 1996-97 administrative review of the antidumping order on 
Tapered Roller Bearings from Japan.  See Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, 
Finishing and Unfinished, from Japan, and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or 
Less in Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, from Japan, 63 Fed. Reg. 
63,875 (Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 17, 1998).  In this determination, the Department 
explained that, “[i]n accordance with 19 C.F.R. 351.212(b)(1), we will calculate 
importer-specific ad valorem assessment rates for the merchandise based on the ratio 
of the total amount of antidumping duties calculated for the examined sales made 
during the [period of review] to the total customs value of the sales used to calculate 
those duties [i.e., the entered value].”  Id. at 63,875.  This rate will be assessed 
uniformly on all entries each importer made during the period of review.  Id. 
 768. Koyo Seiko, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 943. 
 769. Id. at 1346. 
 770. Koyo Seiko, 258 F.3d at 1346. 
 771. Id. at 1347. 
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court reasoned that if, alternatively, the Department’s methodology 
were to be applied to a base of constructed export price sales, such a 
methodology would be unreasonable “since an accurate assessment 
rate using sales figures would recover the dumping margin, and no 
more and no less.”772  However, it further reasoned, the assessment 
rate is not applied to a respondent’s sales during the period of review 
but, as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a), to its customs entries during 
this period.773  The court also noted that “since the assessment rate is 
applied to entries and not to sales, there is at least a certain symmetry 
in using entered value as the denominator.”774  Finally, the court 
posited that Koyo’s strongest argument might have been that the 
Commerce Department’s assessment methodology is unreasonable 
because the Department uses a different methodology for cash 
deposits; however, it concluded that the statute does not require 
assessment rates and cash deposit rates to be calculated in the same 
manner.775 
5. Countervailing duty methodologies 
During the three years under review, the Federal Circuit issued a 
single published decision concerning the calculation of 
countervailing duties, Delverde, SrL v. United States,776 and reversed the 
Court of International Trade on one of the most hotly disputed 
countervailing duty issues of recent years—whether subsidies 
benefiting a firm’s productive assets can “pass through” to new 
owners of those assets when they are sold in an arm’s-length 
transaction.777  Delverde, a respondent in the Commerce 
Department’s countervailing duty investigation of Pasta From Italy, 
had purchased certain assets prior to initiation of the Department’s 
investigation from an unrelated company that had previously 
received subsidies from the Italian government.778   Applying its 
standard methodology, the Commerce Department quantified a “pass 
through” benefit amount representing a residuum of the subsidies to 
                                                          
 772. Id. at 1348. 
 773. Id. 
 774. Id. 
 775. See id. (citing Torrington Co. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)). 
 776. 202 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rehearing granted with modification June 20, 
2000; rehearing en banc denied June 20, 2000, reported at 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15215). 
 777. Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1369-70 (vacating the Court of International Trade’s 
decision and instructing that court to remand the case for the Department to 
determine if Delverde received a subsidy). 
 778. Id. at 1362 (describing Delverde’s assets from the purchase as including a 
pasta factory, related products assets, name, and trademark rights). 
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the previous owner of the assets and imputed that benefit amount to 
Delverde.779  Delverde challenged the Department’s methodology, 
and the Court of International Trade eventually affirmed, on 
remand.780  Delverde appealed to the Federal Circuit. 
At the core of the Federal Circuit’s analysis was the “Change of 
Ownership” provision added by the URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F).781  
Section 1677(5)(F) provides that “[a] change in ownership of all or 
part of a foreign enterprise or the productive assets of a foreign 
enterprise does not by itself require a determination by an 
administering authority that a past countervailable subsidy received 
by the enterprise no longer continues to be countervailable, even if 
the change of ownership is accomplished through an arm’s length 
transaction.”782  Reviewing this provision, its statutory context, and the 
legislative history, the Federal Circuit concluded that the meaning of 
the statute was clear, such that it was not necessary to defer to the 
Department’s interpretation under Chevron, but to determine if the 
Department’s interpretation was in accordance with the statute.783  
Because the statute barred the operation of a pass-through 
presumption, while the Department had “conclusively presumed that 
Delverde received a subsidy from the Italian government,” the court 
struck down the Department’s interpretation.784  The court also 
distinguished the facts of the case at bar from the “privatization” 
cases785 in which courts had reviewed a series of government 
divestitures of industrial assets, and whether those transactions had 
endowed the new owners of the assets with countervailable benefits.786  
                                                          
 779. Id. (citing Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,288 (Dep’t of Commerce 
June 14, 1996) (final affirmative countervailing duty determination). 
 780. Delverde, SrL v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 314 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998). 
 781. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) (2000). 
 782. Id. 
 783. Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1367. 
 784. Id.  The court found that the Department had applied a per se rule in that it 
had deemed the facts and circumstances surrounding the sale to be irrelevant, and 
that it had not identified any evidence that Delverde received a financial 
contribution and benefit for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(D) and (E).  Id.  As 
summarized by the court, “[n]owhere following its methodology did Commerce 
determine whether Delverde directly or indirectly received a financial contribution 
and benefit from one of the acts enumerated.”  Id. 
 785. See, e.g., Saarstahl AG v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“Saarstahl II”) (finding reasonable Commerce’s determination that subsidies were 
not extinguished by privatization through arm’s-length sale, but could be partially 
repaid by the purchase price); British Steel PLC v. United States, 127 F.3d 1471 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (holding that Commerce developed “reasonable interpretation of 
countervailing duty statute to account for repayment of prior subsidies during 
privatization of government owned entity”). 
 786. See generally Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1369-70 (analyzing related Federal Circuit 
precedent and distinguishing it from the case at bar). 
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As the court noted:  
[T]here are significant differences between privatization and 
private-to-private sales.  The government has different concerns 
from those of a private seller.  Unlike a private seller who seeks the 
highest market price for its assets, the government may have other 
goals, such as employment, national defense, and political 
concerns, which may affect the terms of a privatization 
transaction.”787 
In concluding its discussion, the court also noted that a WTO 
dispute settlement panel had recently found the same methodology, 
as applied in the privatization context, to be inconsistent with U.S. 
obligations under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement.788  However, the court dismissed the relevance of that 
panel ruling to its analysis in this case.789  The court remanded to the 
Court of International Trade, ordering it to instruct the Commerce 
Department to determine, based on the specific facts and 
circumstances surrounding the Delverde transaction, whether that 
company had indirectly received a financial contribution and benefit 
through the transaction and if it did not, to recalculate Delverde’s 
countervailing duties without regard to subsidies bestowed on the 
previous owner of the assets.790 
B. U.S. International Trade Commission 
Finally, during the last three years, three decisions of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission reached the Federal Circuit.  Under 
U.S. trade remedy law, antidumping and countervailing duties may 
be imposed only if the Commission finds, following an investigation 
as prescribed by law, that the imports under investigation (or subject 
imports) cause material injury, or threaten to cause material injury, 
to the U.S. industry seeking relief.791  However, notwithstanding the 
                                                          
 787. Id. at 1369. 
 788. See id. at 1369 (citing WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States—
Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, No. WT/DS138/R, at 39-
50 (Dec. 23, 1999)) (finding that the privatization of a government-owned company 
in an arm’s-length, fair market value transaction extinguishes any pre-privatization 
subsidies, such that the new owner of the company does not benefit from the 
previously bestowed subsidies). 
 789. Id. (explaining that the court did not consider the relevance of the WTO 
panel decision, except to say the decision was not inconsistent with the current 
decision, since Commerce’s methodology was invalid under the Tariff Act). 
 790. Id. at 1369-70. 
 791. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673 (1999).  Current U.S. law recognizes one 
exception to the general requirement that duties may be imposed only upon a 
finding by the Commission of injury or threat of injury.  Specifically, with respect to 
countervailing duties only, the requirement applies only “in the case of merchandise 
FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:31 PM 
2003] INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS 2000-2002 1117 
considerable commercial implications of Commission injury 
determinations—affirmative injury determinations allow 
antidumping and countervailing duties to stand, while negative injury 
determinations preclude their imposition—they are appealed far less 
frequently than antidumping and countervailing duty determinations 
of the Commerce Department.792  In the three cases discussed below, 
the Federal Circuit applied the same level of rigorous review as seen 
in its review of other trade remedy cases—resulting in two 
affirmances of the Court of International Trade, and one reversal.793 
In Goss Graphics Systems, Inc. v. United States,794 the Federal Circuit 
quickly disposed of a challenge brought by German and Japanese 
producers of Lareg Newspaper Printing Presses (“LNPP”s) to two 
aspects of the Commission’s determination involving this 
merchandise.795  The producers contended, first, that the Commission 
had improperly “cumulated” German and Japanese imports in 
assessing the effects of the imports on the U.S. industry pursuant to 
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i) and (H)796 and, second, that the 
                                                          
imported from a Subsidies Agreement country.”  19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1999).  
U.S. law defines a “Subsidies Agreement country” as:  (1) any Member of the WTO; 
(2) any country with respect to which the United States has assumed obligations 
“substantially equivalent” to obligations under the WTO SCM Agreement; and (3) 
any country with respect to which the President of the United States has made 
certain enumerated findings.  19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1999). 
At the heart of the Commission’s analysis is a statutorily mandated three-part test, 
which requires the Commission, in an injury investigation, to consider:  (1) the 
volume of imports of the subject merchandise; (2) the effect of subject imports on 
U.S. prices; and (3) the impact of subject imports on the U.S. industry seeking relief.  
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1999). 
 792. The fact that appeals of Commission determinations are infrequent when 
compared to appeals of Commerce Department determinations may reflect, in part, 
the sense that appeals are unlikely to lead to reversal of the challenged 
determination.  For example, even if the reviewing court finds certain aspects of a 
Commission determination to be unlawful, a remand determination correcting the 
error or errors can reach the same result as the underlying, challenged 
determination. 
 793. The standard of review prescribed by statute requires the reviewing court to 
“hold unlawful” a determination that is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the 
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) 
(1996)  In applying this standard (the same standard applied by the Court of 
International Trade), the Federal Circuit does not defer to the lower court.  
Nevertheless, in one of the decisions discussed the Federal Circuit cited an earlier 
decision holding that, in performing its review, it “will not ignore the informed 
opinion of the Court of International Trade.”  See Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. 
Ass’n v. United States, 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Suramerica de 
Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 794. 216 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 795. Id. at 1359. 
 796. Section 1677(7)(G)(i), which applies to material injury, and § 1677(7)(H), 
which applies to threat of material injury, both provide, with respect to petitions filed 
on the same day, for cumulative assessment of the “volume and price effects of 
imports of the subject merchandise . . . if such imports compete with each other and 
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Commission’s threat-of-injury determination was unsupported by 
record evidence.797  Applying the substantial evidence standard of 
review,798 the Federal Circuit upheld the Court of International 
Trade’s affirmance of the Commission’s determination on both 
counts.799  On the cumulation issue, the Federal Circuit stated at the 
outset of its analysis that the Commission enjoys considerable 
flexibility in determining whether there is overlapping competition 
between subject imports and the domestic like product for purposes 
of § 1677(7)(G) and (H), and hence that cumulation is warranted.800  
The court reviewed the various factors that the Commission had 
examined,801 and noted that the challenge was based on purported 
misapplication of only one of these factors, i.e., that the German and 
Japanese LNPPs competed directly with each other in the final stage 
of the bidding process.802  The court rejected this argument, agreeing 
with the Commission that “no single indicator for weighing 
competitive overlap is dispositive,” and that the record as a whole 
provided “sufficient evidence of overlap in the end-use market to 
justify cumulation.”803  In its review of the Commission’s threat 
determination, the Federal Circuit emphasized that, under 
§ 1677(7)(F), “[a]n affirmative finding of threat of material injury 
requires substantial evidence on the entire record that the domestic 
industry faces a real threat of imminent material injury from the 
subject imports.”804  The court also stressed that, pursuant to 
§ 1677(7)(F)(ii), a threat determination requires findings of both a 
“temporal relationship” and a “causal connection” between the 
                                                          
with domestic like products in the United States market.”  In other words, in certain 
injury investigations involving imports from more than one country, the Commission 
does not examine the effects of the imports on the U.S. industry on a country-by-
country basis, but considers the effects on an aggregated, or cumulative, basis.  19 
U.S.C. 1677(7)(G)(i), (7)(H) (1996). 
 797. Goss, 216 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 798. Id. at 1361 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1999) and Suramerica de 
Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 799. See Goss Graphic Sys., Inc. v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1104 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 1998); see also Large Newspaper Printing Press and Components Thereof, 
Whether Assembled or Unassembled, from Germany and Japan, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-
736 and 737, 61 Fed. Reg. 46824 (Sept. 1996). 
 800. Goss, 216 F.3d at 1361 (citing Fundicao Tupy, S.A. v. United States, 859 F.2d 
915 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (stating that, while a Fundicao analysis helps identify 
overlapping competition, “other ways may apply in future cases”). 
 801. Id. at 1361-62 (noting that the Commission found that German and Japanese 
LNPPs:  (1) were generally sold through similar channels of trade, (2) occupied the 
market simultaneously, and (3) were not limited by geographic boundaries within 
the United States). 
 802. Id. at 1362. 
 803. Id. 
 804. Id. (citing Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 
F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
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subject imports and the threat of material injury.805  The court then 
found that the Commission had examined all pertinent factors—
including all factors required to be examined under § 1677(7)(F)(i), 
such as the ability of importers to shift future production to the 
United States, the rate of increase of subject producers’ U.S. market 
penetration, and factors likely to contribute to price suppression and 
depression—and that the Commission’s findings were supported by 
substantial evidence.806 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Taiwan Semiconductor concluded 
lengthy litigation involving two remands from the Court of 
International Trade to the Commission and the ultimate reversal of 
the Commission’s original determination that imports of Taiwanese 
static random access memory chips (“SRAMs”) materially injured the 
U.S. SRAMs industry.807  Based on an antidumping petition filed by 
Micron Technology, Inc., a U.S. semiconductor producer, the 
Commission in its original investigation found that imports of 
Taiwanese SRAMs injured the U.S. industry.808  On review, the Court 
of International Trade neither affirmed nor reversed, but remanded 
to the Commission for further explanation of the causal nexus 
between the subject imports and injury to the U.S. industry.809  On 
remand, the Commission again found that subject the imports 
injured the domestic industry, and on review, the Court of 
International Trade again held that more explanation was required, 
and remanded for a second redetermination.810  In its third decision, 
the Court of International Trade upheld the Commission’s 
determination.811  Micron appealed.  Applying the substantial 
evidence standard of review—but also noting that the lower court’s 
opinion “deserves due respect”812—the Federal Circuit first addressed 
Micron’s claim that the Court of International Trade had improperly 
                                                          
 805. Id. at 1362 (citing NEC Corp. v. Dept. of Commerce, 36 F. Supp. 2d 380, 391 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1998)). 
 806. Id. at 1363.  Section 1677(7)(F)(i) enumerates nine factors that the 
Commission “shall consider, among other relevant factors.”  19  U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7)(F)(i) (1999). 
 807. Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Ass’n v. United States, 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 808. Id. at 1341 (citing Static Random Access Memory Semiconductors from 
Taiwan, 63 Fed. Reg. 8909 (Dept. of Commerce, Feb. 23, 1998)). 
 809. See Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Assoc. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1324 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1999). 
 810. See Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Assoc. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1283 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2000). 
 811. See Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Assoc. v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 2d 
1250 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000). 
 812. Taiwan Semiconductor, 266 F.3d at 1343-44 (quoting Suramerica de Aleaciones 
Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
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remanded the Commission’s initial affirmative injury decision.813  The 
Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s reasons for seeking 
additional explanation from the Commission and, citing its decision 
in Gerald Metals, stressed the requirement for the Commission to 
determine that the subject imports are causing the injury, “not simply 
contributing to the injury in a tangential or minimal way.”814  The 
Federal Circuit then turned to the substance of the Commission’s 
second remand determination that the subject imports did not make 
a material contribution to the injury suffered by the U.S. SRAMs 
industry.  Noting, among other things, that during the time of 
greatest injury to the U.S. industry, Taiwanese imports tended to be 
priced higher than U.S.-produced SRAMs, and also that Taiwanese 
market share had remained relatively constant while non-subject 
imports, predominantly of Japanese and Korean origin, had 
increased substantially, the Federal Circuit held that substantial 
evidence supported the Commission’s finding that the Taiwanese 
imports did not contribute materially to the injury caused by the 
other factors.815  The Federal Circuit concluded that “the high volume 
and low price of Taiwanese SRAMs had some injurious impact on 
United States industry,” but also that substantial evidence before the 
Commission demonstrated the existence of multiple causes of injury 
to the U.S. industry other than the Taiwanese imports.816 
In Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States,817 the Federal Circuit 
vacated and remanded the decision of the Court of International 
Trade, finding that it had improperly sustained the Commission’s 
analysis with respect to each of the three factors that the Commission 
must consider under § 1677(B)(i), i.e., the volume of subject imports, 
the price effects of subject imports, and the impact of subject imports 
on the domestic industry.818  In its underlying injury investigation, the 
                                                          
 813. Id. at 1344.  While the court applied the substantial evidence standard of 
review, stating that it was “stepping into the shoes of the Court of International 
Trade and duplicating its review,” the court also noted that the standard of review 
applicable to a Court of International Trade request for further information “is a 
matter of first impression for this court.”  Id.  Citing decisions of the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Federal Circuit concluded that a 
remand for further explanation was within the lower court’s discretion, and was 
reviewable for abuse of discretion.  Id. (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 
U.S. 729, 744 (1985) and Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 814. Id. at 1345 (citing Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 722 
(Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 815. Id. at 1346-47.  The Federal Circuit also identified an oversupply caused by 
industry-wide mis-estimation of demand for certain types of SRAMs in personal 
computers as a significant factor in the injury experienced by U.S. producers.  Id. 
 816. Id. at 1347. 
 817. 287 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 818. Id. at 1368.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(B)(i) (1999). 
FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:31 PM 
2003] INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS 2000-2002 1121 
Commission determined that the merchandise covered by the 
petition, coiled stainless steel plate, encompassed two distinct 
domestic like products—hot-rolled plate and cold-rolled plate—and 
found injury with respect to the former but not the latter.819  The 
Court of International Trade affirmed,820 and Allegheny appealed 
that portion of the decision affirming the Commission’s finding that 
the U.S. cold-rolled steel plate industry was not injured by subject 
imports.821  Citing its articulation of the applicable standard of review 
in Taiwan Semiconductor822 and Gerald Metals,823 the Federal Circuit 
turned first to Allegheny’s contention that the Court of International 
Trade had improperly affirmed the Commission’s application of 
§ 1677(4)(D)—the so-called “product line provision”824—in analyzing 
the effect of subject imports on product prices and their impact on 
the domestic industry.825  Specifically, because of the scarcity of 
separate data for the very small cold-rolled segment of the stainless 
steel coiled plate market, the Commission invoked the product line 
provision and based key portions of its injury analysis on data 
pertaining not to the narrow cold-rolled sector, but to the entire 
stainless steel coiled plate market.826   
The Federal Circuit agreed with Allegheny, however, that the 
Commission should have done more in attempting to obtain data 
specific to the cold-rolled portion of the stainless steel coiled plate 
market.827  Citing Court of International Trade precedent requiring 
                                                          
 819. Allegheny, 287 F.3d at 1368.  Central to the Commission’s determination of 
two like products was its finding that the industry producing cold-rolled plate was 
very small in comparison to the industry producing hot-rolled plate, and that the 
cold-rolled plate industry served a small, niche market.  The court explained that 
“[a]s cold-rolled plate requires additional processing, it is more costly than hot-rolled 
plate,” and also that “[o]ver 99.9 percent of domestic steel plate production is hot-
rolled plate.”  Id. 
 820. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2000). 
 821. Allegheny, 287 F.3d at 1369. 
 822. 266 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 823. 132 F.3d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 824. The “product line provision” provides as follows: 
The effect of dumped imports . . . shall be assessed in relation to the United 
States production of a domestic like product if available data permit the 
separate identification of production in terms of such criteria as the 
production process or the producer’s profits.  If the domestic production of 
the domestic like product has no separate identity in terms of such criteria, 
then the effect of the dumped imports . . . shall be assessed by the 
examination of the production of the narrowest group or range of products, 
which includes a domestic like product, for which the necessary information 
can be provided. 
19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(D) (1999). 
 825. Allegheny, 287 F.3d at 1370-72. 
 826. Id. at 1370-71. 
 827. Id. at 1375-76. 
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“the Commission to actively attempt to obtain relevant data before 
resorting to the product line provision,”828 and noting, among other 
things, that the Commission (unlike the Commerce Department) has 
the authority to issue subpoenas in connection with its investigations, 
the Federal Circuit held that the Commission should have attempted 
to obtain additional information specific to the cold-rolled sector 
before resorting to the product line provision.829  The Federal Circuit 
also found fault in the Commission’s analysis of the effect of subject 
imports on domestic prices, finding in particular that the 
Commission had drawn the wrong inference from the decline, 
during the period of investigation, of the average unit value (“AUV”) 
of the subject imports,830 and that reliance on AUV data was 
questionable given that these data were “strongly influenced by a few 
orders of particular grade or size.”831  Finally, the Federal Circuit 
considered whether the Court of International Trade had properly 
based its affirmance of the Commission’s finding of no material 
injury with respect to cold-rolled coiled stainless steel plate on the 
domestic industry’s apparent lack of interest in the production and 
sale of this specialized product.832  The Federal Circuit held that the 
lower court had erred.  While it was proper for the Commission to 
assess economic factors other than those specifically enumerated in 
the statute, such an analysis “cannot replace the mandatory elements 
of the analysis {i.e., price, volume, and impact}, absent a showing that 
those elements, in a given case, simply cannot be assessed.”833  The 
Federal Circuit further clarified that a reviewing court may uphold a 
Commission determination containing some errors, but that a 
determination resting on flawed application of each of the three 
mandatory statutory factors cannot stand under the substantial 
evidence standard—particularly where, as here, the Commission has 
not met its obligation to seek the necessary information.834 
                                                          
 828. Id. at 1371 (citing Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 479 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1981)). 
 829. Id. at 1372 (citing Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1565, 
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 830. Id. at 1374.  While the Commission had concluded that declining subject 
import AUVs over the period of investigation did not cause the concurrent domestic 
price declines (because subject import prices were higher than domestic prices), the 
Federal Circuit found that “the falling prices of the imported merchandise would 
seem to support a finding of material injury to domestic producers, despite the fact 
that the subject imports were priced higher than corresponding domestic like 
products.”  Id. 
 831. Id. 
 832. Id. at 1375-76. 
 833. Id. at 1375-76 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1999)). 
 834. Id. at 1376-77 (citing, inter alia, Angus Chem. Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 
1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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III. TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The recent international trade jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit 
also reflects—as would be expected given the sweeping nature of the 
Court of International Trade’s residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1581(i)—initiatives by Congress to restrict or control foreign trade 
based on environmental considerations.835  As with many of the 
international trade cases described above, the disputes discussed 
below played out over many years, were hotly contested, and 
generated substantial commercial uncertainty prior to final 
disposition by the Federal Circuit.  These cases also present a mixed 
record of affirmance and reversal of the lower court. 
First, in The Humane Society of the United States v. Clinton,836 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a decision of the Court of International 
Trade denying relief sought by a coalition of animal protection 
organizations under the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement 
Act (“Driftnet Act”).837  The Driftnet Act, enacted by the United States 
in 1992 to implement various U.N. resolutions calling for a global 
ban on certain driftnet fishing practices, authorizes the United States 
to take certain actions against foreign countries—in this case, Italy—
in response to continued use of large-scale driftnet fishing practices 
on the high seas.838  The Driftnet Act provides, among other things, 
that whenever the Secretary of Commerce has reason to believe that 
vessels or nationals of any nation are conducting large-scale driftnet 
fishing on the high seas, the Secretary must identify that nation, and 
notify the President and the offending nation of the identification.839  
Upon such notification, the President is obligated to consult with the 
foreign government “for the purpose of obtaining an agreement that 
will effect the immediate termination of large-scale driftnet fishing by 
the nationals or vessels of that nation.”840  Unless such consultations 
are “satisfactorily concluded,” the President must order the Secretary 
of the Treasury to prohibit importation into the United States of fish 
and fish products from that country.841 
                                                          
 835. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1999). 
 836. 236 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 837. Id. at 1333.  Plaintiffs-appellants were the Humane Society of the United 
States, Humane Society International, and Defenders of Wildlife.  See id. at 1321.  
The Driftnet Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826-1826g (1999). 
 838. Humane Soc’y, 236 F.3d at 1322-23. 
 839. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
 840. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b) (2000). 
 841. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000). 
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In response to an earlier challenge by the Humane Society,842 the 
Department of Commerce, in March 1996, identified Italy as a nation 
for which there was reason to believe its nationals or vessels were 
conducting large-scale driftnet fishing.843  Subsequently, acting 
through the Department of State, the President entered into 
consultations with Italy concerning its fishing practices on the high 
seas, and in July 1996 the two countries finalized an agreement that 
Italy would end driftnet fishing by its nationals and vessels.844  In 
January 1997, the Secretary of Commerce certified to the President 
and Congress that Italy had terminated the illegal driftnet fishing 
practices at issue.845  The Humane Society, however, obtained 
evidence of the continuation of proscribed driftnet fishing practices 
by Italian vessels in the Mediterranean, and filed suit with the Court 
of International Trade.846  Before that court, the Humane Society 
sought: a writ of mandamus directing the President to impose 
sanctions on Italy based on the 1996 identification; an order 
requiring the Secretary of Commerce to revoke his 1997 certification 
that Italy had discontinued prohibited driftnet fishing practices; and 
an order requiring the Secretary of Commerce to re-identify Italy 
under the Driftnet Act.847  The Court of International Trade held for 
the Government on the first two counts, but for the Humane Society 
on the third.848  The Humane Society appealed the first two aspects of 
the lower court’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. 
After stating that the dispute would be reviewed pursuant to the 
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard,849 the Federal Circuit turned 
to the threshold question whether the President and other executive 
                                                          
 842. See, e.g., Humane Soc’y of the United States v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 1995); Humane Society of the United States v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 178 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1996) (suing Secretaries of Commerce and State to compel 
enforcement of the Driftnet Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826-1826g). 
 843. See Humane Soc’y, 920 F. Supp. at 195 (stating that “[t]his court is now 
constrained to conclude that identification of Italy under 16 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(1)(B) 
has been unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed”); see also Humane Soc’y, 236 
F.3d at 1323 (describing the Secretary of Commerce’s recommendation of sanctions 
against Italy in response to the Court of International Trade’s earlier decisions). 
 844. Humane Soc’y, 236 F.3d at 1323. 
 845. Id. 
 846. Id. at 1323-24. 
 847. Id. at 1323. 
 848. Humane Soc’y of the United States v. Clinton, 44 F. Supp. 2d 260, 279 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 1999), aff’d, 236 F.3d 320 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 849. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1996) (instructing the reviewing court to hold unlawful 
any conclusions found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”).  The court explained that it “will apply the 
standard of review set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706 to an action instituted pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1581(i).” Humane Soc’y, 236 F.3d at 1325 (citing Miami Free Zone Corp. v. 
Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 136 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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officers were immune from suit due to sovereign immunity.850  The 
answer hinged on the interpretation of the pertinent provisions of 28 
U.S.C. § 1581(i), specifically subsection 1581(i)(3), covering 
“embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of 
merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public 
health and safety,”851 and subsection 1581(i)(4), covering 
“administration and enforcement.”852  The Federal Circuit agreed 
with the Humane Society that the legislative history to the Customs 
Courts Act of 1980 indicated that § 1581 itself waived sovereign 
immunity.853  The court also reasoned that statutory provisions and 
caselaw defining the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims—a 
court with jurisdiction “complementary” to that of the Court of 
International Trade—compelled the conclusion that Congress 
intended § 1581 to waive sovereign immunity.854  The court further 
noted the federal courts’ longstanding recognition of “the standing 
of organizations such as the Humane Society to bring suits against the 
Government to implement environmental legislation.”855  The Federal 
Circuit, however, did not agree with the Humane Society’s 
contentions that the President should have been ordered, by 
mandamus, to impose sanctions on Italy.856  While it held that there 
was no question that the Humane Society had exhausted all avenues 
for relief, it also held that the Society had failed to show that the 
President did not carry out a clear, non-discretionary duty under the 
Driftnet Act.857  The Federal Circuit reasoned that, evidence of 
continued driftnet fishing by Italian vessels notwithstanding, the 
“satisfactorily concluded” standard of 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3)(A) was 
so broad as essentially to render judicial review of such presidential 
                                                          
 850. See id. (explaining that the lower court did not address the sovereign 
immunity issue, finding it unnecessary to do so given its holding on the merits for 
the U.S. Government, such that the issue before the Federal Circuit was one of first 
impression). 
 851. Id. at 1326. 
 852. Id. 
 853. Id. at 1327. 
 854. See id. at 1327-28 (explaining unless Congress granted a coextensive waiver of 
sovereign immunity along with a grant of jurisdiction, that action would give no 
benefit to the “sovereign’s subjects” and have no consequences to the sovereign). 
 855. See id. at 1328 (citing  Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 
221 (1986)) (explaining that the adverse environmental impact alleged in these 
types of cases is sufficient to establish these groups suffered an injury). 
 856. See id. (citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)) (reviewing the 
analysis of the lower court as to whether the issuance of a writ of mandamus was 
appropriate, and finding that two requirements must be satisfied: “(1) the plaintiff 
must have exhausted all avenues for relief; and (2) the defendant must owe the 
plaintiff a clear non-discretionary duty.”). 
 857. See id. at 1328-30 (holding that the President had acted in good faith and 
therefore fulfilled his duty). 
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decision-making infeasible.858  In reaching this decision, the court 
cited a long line of cases emphasizing the deference owed the 
President in carrying out foreign relations functions:  “In these 
matters, it is generally assumed that Congress does not set out to tie 
the President’s hands; if it wishes to, it must say so.”859 
On the second issue—whether the Secretary of Commerce violated 
the Driftnet Act by certifying in 1997 that Italy had terminated large-
scale driftnet fishing—the Federal Circuit again noted the 
considerable lack of guidance provided by the Act and its legislative 
history.860  After first rejecting the government’s argument that the 
issue was not justiciable for lack of a live case or controversy,861 the 
Federal Circuit turned to a review of the 1997 certification.862  
Distinguishing between the Secretary’s underlying identification of a 
nation as engaged in illegal driftnet fishing and any subsequent 
certification that such a nation has terminated the illegal fishing 
practices, the Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court that the 
former determination was focused on the acts of individuals, while 
the latter was concerned with government action.863  Accordingly, 
with respect to the latter, individual violations by some Italian vessels 
would not be sufficient to support the claim that the Secretary’s 
decision was unreasonable.864  On this basis, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s judgment that the Secretary’s 1997 
certification, based on the earlier U.S.-Italy agreement, was not 
arbitrary or capricious.865 
                                                          
 858. Id. at 1329-30. 
 859. Id. at 1329-30 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
320 (1936)). 
 860. See id. at 1330 (emphasizing that the Act does not delineate which factors or 
evidence should guide the Secretary in his decision, making judicial review difficult). 
 861. Id. at 1331.  The Government argued that the issue was moot in light of the 
Court of International Trade’s order for the Secretary of Commerce to identify Italy, 
for the second time, as a nation violating the Driftnet Act.  Id.  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed.  Id. at 1332.  Noting that the propriety of a certification could potentially 
escape judicial review in the event of subsequent re-identification, the court held that 
the Act would be better effectuated by not rendering the question of whether the 
Secretary’s decision was in accord with the law moot because of a later re-
identification.  Id. 
 862. See id. at 1332-33 (reviewing the merits of the Humane Society’s claim that 
the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious). 
 863. See id. at 1332 (finding the trial court’s analysis to be a sensible approach to 
the statutory language). 
 864. See id. (holding that acts by individuals could not be determinative). 
 865. Id. at 1333. 
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Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans866 also involved a suit 
brought by a coalition of environmental organizations for judicial 
enforcement of animal protection laws.867  The Turtle Island cases 
represented the culmination of a decade’s worth of litigation 
concerning the interpretation of § 609(b) of Public Law 101-162868—
characterized by the Federal Circuit as “a long and tortured history, 
chiefly marked by the Government’s protean efforts to escape the 
statutory interpretations being imposed upon it.”869  At issue in Turtle 
Island I was the U.S. Government interpretation of the certification 
procedures set forth in guidelines promulgated by the State 
Department in 1999 to implement § 609(b) certification 
procedures.870  Under the 1999 guidelines, a country could obtain 
authorization to export shrimp to the U.S. market either by requiring 
its entire fleet to be equipped with TEDs, or by requiring TEDs only 
on those vessels harvesting shrimp for the U.S. market.871  In Turtle 
Island’s view, § 609 required the U.S. Government to ban 
importation of all shrimp from an uncertified country, rather than 
only those shipments not in accordance with the certification 
procedures.872  In the Court of International Trade opinion at issue 
here, that court found the 1999 State Department guidelines to be 
inconsistent with § 609(b) because, as maintained by Turtle Island, 
those guidelines impermissibly allowed the importation of TED-
caught shrimp from uncertified countries.873  However, the Court of 
                                                          
 866. 284 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Turtle Island I”).  See also Turtle Island 
Restoration Network v. Evans 299 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Turtle Island II”) 
(denying a combined petition for a panel rehearing and a rehearing en banc). 
 867. See Turtle Island I, 284 F.3d at 1284 (reviewing restrictions on shrimp 
harvesting techniques designed to protect sea turtles by requiring foreign shrimp 
harvesters to use turtle excluder devices (“TEDs”) as a condition of access to the U.S. 
market).  TEDs are designed to prevent sea turtles from being swept into trawl nets—
typically by means of a metal grid at the closed end of the net with bars spaced so as 
to allow shrimp to pass through but to “exclude” turtles by pushing them through 
escape hatches above or below the grid.  Id. 
 868. Section 609(b) is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537(b) (2000).  In general, 
subsection (b)(1) prohibits the importation of shrimp or products from shrimp in 
which harvesting equipment was used that adversely affects certain species of sea 
turtles except as provided in paragraph (2).  Id.  Subsection (b)(2) sets forth 
certification procedures to be adopted by a harvesting nation seeking an exception 
from a subsection (b)(1) prohibition.  Id. 
 869. Turtle Island I, 284 F.3d at 1287. 
 870. See id. at 1286 (citing Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of § 609 of 
Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing 
Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946 (July 8, 1999)). 
 871. Id. 
 872. See id. (arguing that certification is the only means by which shrimp may be 
imported into the United States). 
 873. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Mallett, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2000) (holding that the 1999 Guidelines resulted in weakened 
protections for the sea turtles targeted by § 609). 
FINALINTERNATIONALTRADESUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:31 PM 
1128 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1027 
International Trade did not grant Turtle Island’s requested 
injunctive relief or attorney fees.874 
Turtle Island I came before the Federal Circuit on cross-appeals—
Turtle Island seeking reversal of the Court of International Trade’s 
denial of an injunction and attorney fees, and the Government 
challenging that court’s judgment that the importation of TED-
caught shrimp from uncertified countries, permitted by the 1999 
guidelines, violates § 609.875  The Federal Circuit turned first to the 
foundational issue in the case—construction of § 609—clarifying that 
its analysis was a matter of law to be reviewed without deference to 
the lower court.876  Parsing the language of § 609, the court found, 
based on its plain meaning, that it authorized imports of TED-caught 
shrimp from uncertified countries, and that its embargo provisions 
applied on a shipment-specific basis.877  The court rejected Turtle 
Island’s contentions that the statutory framework and legislative 
history compelled the conclusion that § 609 applied only on a nation-
by-nation basis.878  The court found it telling that Congress had 
declined to include an express nation-by-nation embargo provision in 
§ 609, when it had done so in a series of comparable statutes.879  The 
court noted in concluding its analysis that, while it respected the 
plaintiff’s cause, Turtle Island’s view of the legislative intent of § 609 
was simply unfounded.880  The court reversed the Court of 
International Trade’s holding that the Government’s interpretation 
of § 609 was in error, and affirmed that court’s denial of injunctive 
relief and attorney fees.881 
                                                          
 874. See id. at 1018 (noting that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff would 
be truly extraordinary in this type of case).  Additionally, the court held that while 
plaintiffs clearly prevailed, there was insufficient evidence in the record to support 
the relief sought by plaintiffs.  Id. 
 875. Turtle Island I, 284 F.3d at 1284. 
 876. Id. at 1291 (citing SKF USA Inc. v. Unietd States, 263 F.3d 1369, at 1378 
(2001)). 
 877. See id. at 1292-93 (noting that if the statute intended to make certification the 
only way these imports could enter the U.S. market, much of the statutory language 
would be “largely superfluous”). 
 878. See id. at 1292-94 (emphasizing that according to the legislative history, the 
passage of § 609 was not motivated by the need to protect the sea turtle but rather 
the need to protect the domestic shrimping industry). 
 879. See id. at 1295-96 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) (2000)) (authorizing nation-
by-nation embargoes triggered by foreign restrictions on U.S. fishing vessels); see also 
16 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(3)(A) (2000) (authorizing nation-by-nation prohibition on 
imports of fish and fish products from countries employing large-scale driftnet 
fishing). 
 880. See Turtle Island I, 284 F.3d at 1297 (holding that the State Department’s 
interpretation of the congressional intent behind § 609 was in fact the proper 
interpretation). 
 881. Id. at 1297. 
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Judge Newman dissented from the majority decision, arguing that 
the decision was an improper departure from the established method 
of protecting this endangered species.882  Judge Newman reviewed 
extensively the legislative history, concluding that Congress intended 
to preclude the shipment-by-shipment methodology adopted by the 
State Department.883  This approach was fully consistent with the 
desire of Congress to protect the U.S. shrimp industry by requiring 
shrimpers of any other nation desiring access to the U.S. market to 
employ TEDs.884  Newman emphasized that there is no support in the 
legislative record for the claim that Congress intended to permit the 
shipment-by-shipment method.885  Judge Newman also stated that the 
State Department guidelines did not, in his view, survive Chevron 
scrutiny in light of Congress’ clearly articulated intent.886  
Furthermore, looking at earlier WTO decisions cited by the 
government as supporting the 1999 guidelines, Judge Newman 
concluded that that WTO panel decisions should not and could not 
authorize the courts or the Executive Branch “to rewrite the 
statute.”887 
In Turtle Island II, the Federal Circuit rejected Turtle Island’s 
petition for rehearing en banc.888  However, Judges Gajarsa and 
Newman dissented from the denial, drawing heavily from Judge 
Newman’s dissenting opinion in Turtle Island I and arguing that the 
majority had mistakenly approved the State Department’s 1999 
Guidelines, which contravened clear congressional intent.889  Arguing 
                                                          
 882. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that neither political nor diplomatic 
concerns make it proper for the court to depart from the statute as enacted). 
 883. See id. at 1299-1302 (arguing that Congress recognized only a fleet-wide 
approach, and not a shipment-by-shipment approach, would effectuate the goals of 
the legislation). 
 884. See id. at 1300-02 (dissenting from the majority’s view that the existence of a 
commercial purpose for the legislation renders the humanitarian purposes 
irrelevant).  Additionally, Judge Newman argued that the commercial goal of the 
legislation—protecting the domestic shrimping industry—was in fact disserved by 
condoning a shipment-by-shipment approach.  Id. at 1302. 
 885. See id. at 1300 (noting that both the House and Senate reports call for foreign 
nations to adopt regulations comparable to the United States fleet-wide adoption of 
TEDs). 
 886. See id. at 1303 (stating that the State Department had attempted to defend 
the guidelines on policy grounds, but that the court should not evaluate or effectuate 
political accommodations). 
 887. See id. at 1303-04 (citing, inter alia, Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas C. A. 
v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (arguing that well established 
principles dictate when WTO rulings can be relied upon, and here the government’s 
reliance was improper). 
 888. Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans, 299 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“Turtle Island II”). 
 889. Id. at 1374-75 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, I.N.S. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987)) (alleging that the panel majority adopted an 
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that § 609 was intended to protect sea turtles, as well as serve other 
commercial needs, the dissenters stated the majority had erred when 
it held that a shipment-by-shipment approach was supported by the 
statute.890  According to Judges Gajarsa and Newman, § 609(b)(1) 
plainly banned the importation of shrimp harvested without TEDs 
unless excepted under the guidelines laid out in § 609(b)(2) or 
harvested from waters uninhabited by these species of sea turtles.891  
The two judges concluded that the majority decision had 
“unreasonably construed a statute that was written to protect turtles 
so as not to protect them.”892 
CONCLUSION 
When it created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
Congress observed that the cases before it would be “unusually 
complex and technical.”893  The international trade jurisprudence of 
the Federal Circuit over the last three years validates this prediction.  
The ever-growing volume of international trade, combined with the 
expanding web of laws, regulations, and practices guiding the flow of 
commerce across the U.S. border, seem to guarantee that the 
international trade cases before the court will only grow in number 
and complexity.  Notwithstanding this burden, the Federal Circuit 
has in recent years performed its job admirably—rigorously and 
quickly disposing of the complex international trade matters before 
it, thereby contributing to certainty and predictability in the trading 
system. 
                                                          
improper and unreasonable statutory interpretation in Turtle Island I). 
 890. Id. at 1375 (calling the panel majority’s holding that § 609 did not ban 
importation from uncertified countries a “fatal error”). 
 891. Id. at 1376 (claiming the statutory language and structure demands this 
interpretation). 
 892. Id. at 1378.   
 893. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 7 (1981).   
